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Abstract 
This thesis provides a critical examination of the concepts of experience and 
life in the work of Theodor W. Adorno and Giorgio Agamben. The shared 
context of their thought consists in an examination of damaged life which 
reaches its apotheosis in "Auschwitz", an account of the destruction of 
experience in modernity, and an emphasis that the path to a form of life 
beyond damaged life can only be constructed immanently, through damaged 
life itself. 
The philosophical problem that this thesis addresses is the question of the 
possibility of a life beyond damaged life. Given the destruction of experience 
encapsulated in an idea of a life that does not live, how can a critical 
subjectivity found the possibility of a path beyond such a reified context ? Both 
Agamben and Adorno delineate such a path through a dissolution of 
subjectivity which can open itself to the possibility of a different experience of 
life. 
It is argued that Adorno's concept of negative dialectics gives the grounding 
for the possibility of a critical subjectivity that can found itself within its own 
dissolution through an experience of possibility produced by a deepening of the 
contradictions of damaged life. 
The first two chapters critically examine the accounts of bare life and 
damaged life through Adorno and Agamben's writings on Auschwitz and life 
as survival. Chapters three and four clarify the philosophical antecedents to the 
concept of life in Adorno's work and argue that a path beyond damaged life 
cannot be configured in terms of a re-enchantment of nature. 
Chapter five provides a bridge in the thesis between the analysis of 
concepts of life and experience, through a critical examination of the account 
of the decay of experience given in Agamben and Adorno's work. It is argued 
that both their accounts are too undifferentiated, as they miss the possibilities 
that arise in the decay of experience. However, Adorno's emphasis on dialectical 
experience rather than an authoritative concept of experience, gives his 
philosophy a resource with which to think the possibility of another form of 
life, even amidst the destruction of experience. 
In the final three chapters, I reconstruct three central and related concepts of 
experience beyond damaged life that Adorno outlines throughout his work; a 
concept of interpretation, a concept of a negative redemptive breakthrough, and 
finally the metaphysical experience of reconciliation. These experiences relate to 
a concept of life in terms of an embodied thought, but not as an experience of 
a naturalistic, unchangeable ground. The possibility of an experience of life 
remains in the experience of a dissolution of subjectivity that does not turn 
into total destruction. 
I 
Contents 
pages 
Abbreviations used in the text 1 
Introduction 3 
Chapter One: Auschwitz 18 
Auschwitz as Model of Experience 18 
Speculative Paralysis 22 
Auschwitz as Philosophical Representation 37 
Silence and Auschwitz 43 
Chapter Two: Survival and Bare Life 49 
The Muselmann: Human and Inhuman 49 
Bare Life 62 
Chapter Three: The Idea of Natural History 77 
Philosophical Antecedents 77 
Life and Self-Preservation 83 
Narcissism, Sublimation and the Ego 88 
Damaged Life 94 
The Idea of Natural History 102 
Chapter Four: Re-Enchanting Nature 110 
Anthropomorphic Nature 110 
Intellectual Experience 123 
Having An Experience ? 129 
Shudder 135 
11 
Chapter Five: The Decay of Experience 140 
Knowledge, Authority, Experience 141 
Kantian Experience and the Philosophy to Come 148 
Kantian Stammering: The Experience of the Transcendental 152 
The Experience of Hegel's Philosophy 156 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung 165 
The Destruction of Experience 176 
Chapter Six: Negative Dialectic as Self-Reflection 182 
The Experience of Philosophical Reflection 184 
Mediation 189 
Total Social Process: The Prince and the Frog 196 
Concept and Image 203 
Construction, Interpretation, Expression 215 
Expressive Philosophy: The Life of Things 218 
Chapter Seven: The Possibility of Living Today 232 
Readings of Aristotle 235 
Potentiality 240 
Adorno and the Negative Actualisation of Possibility 248 
Philosophy and Music 256 
Transcendence and Immanence 263 
Chapter Eight: Redemption and Reconciliation 269 
Redemption and Reconciliation 272 
Figures of Exhaustion 281 
Dissolution of Subjectivity 297 
Conclusion 306 
I 
Abbreviations Used in the Text. 
Works by Adorno 
References are given to the original German text in page numbers, followed by the page numbers 
from the English translation. Most of the translations cited in the thesis are taken directly from the 
English translations. Where translations have been amended this is indicated in the endnotes. 
AP "Die Aktualitat der Philosophie", in Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 1, (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996). "The Actuality of Philosophy", translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, Telos, 
no. 31, Spring 1977, pp. 120-133. 
AT Ästhetische Theorie, Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 7, ( Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1996). Aesthetic Theory, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor. ( The Athlone Press, London, 
1999). 
BW Theodor W. Adorno / Walter Benjamin, Briefwechsel 1928-1940, edited by Henri Lonitz, 
Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main). Adorno- Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, 
translated by Nicholas Walker, ( Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999). 
DA (written with Max Horkheimer), Dialektik der Aufklarung: Philosophische Fragmente, 
Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 3, (Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 1996). Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments, translated by Edmund Jephcott, edited by Gunzelin Schmid 
Noerr, ( Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2002). 
DSH Drei Studien zu Hegel. Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 5, ( Frankfurt am main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1996). Hegel: Three Studies, translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen. ( MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England, 1993). 
INH "Die Idee der Naturgeschichte", in Gesammelte Schriften. Volume 1, ( Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996). "The Idea of Natural History", translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, Telos, 
no. 60., Summer 1984, pp 111-125 
KK Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Nachgelassene Schriften 4, (Frankfurt am Main). Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, edited by Rolf Tiedemann, translated by Rodney Livingstone. (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, UK, 2001). 
MM Minima Moralia, Gesammelte Schriften, volume 4, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1996). Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life, translated by E. F. N. Jephcott. ( Verso, 
London and New York, 1997). 
ME Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie, Gesammelte Schriften Volume 5, ( Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996). Against Epistemology: A Metacritigue. Studies in Husserl and the 
Phenomenological Antinomies, translated by Willis Domingo. ( Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982). 
ND Negative Dialektik, Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 6, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1996). Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton. ( Routledge, London and New York, 1966). 
2 
NL Noten zur Literatur, Gesammelte Schriften. volume 11, ( Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am 
Main, 1996). Notes to Literature, Volumes I and 2, translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1992). 
MBP Metaphysik: Begriff und Probleme, Nachgelassene Schriften. 14, ( Suhrkamp Verlag; 
Frankfurt am Main). Metaphysics, Concept and Problems, translated by Edmund Jephcott, and edited 
by Rolf Tiedemann ( Polity Press, Cambridge, Oxford, UK, 2000). 
PMP Probleme der Moralphilosophie. Nachgelassene Schriften, 10, ( Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt 
am Main). Problems of Moral Philosophy, edited by Thomas Schröder, and translated by Rodney 
Livingstone. (Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000). 
SO "Zu Subjekt und Objekt", in Gesammelte Schriften, volume 10.2, ( Frankfurt am main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996). "On Subject and Object", in Critical Models. Interventions and Catchwords, 
translated by Henry W. Pickford , (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998). 
3 
Introduction 
The epigraph that Adorno uses on the front page of Minima Moralia from 
Ferdinand Kürnberger is "Life does not live". ' What is this "life" that "does not 
live" ? There are two problems contained within this paradoxical sentence. First, 
there is the problem of how to give an account of this deadened form of life. 
How can we characterise such a life that does not live, what are its features, and 
what has brought life to this situation? Is this a permanent form of life or a 
crisis in experience that relates to particular historical events? 
The second problem is whether we need an ontological concept of life to 
delineate the features of a damaged form of life. Implicit in the phrase "life does 
not live" is the assumption that the verb "to live" implies a fuller sense of life 
which either lies repressed beneath the existence of a life that does not live, or as 
a suppressed possibility within this deadened form of existence. The philosophical 
concept of life that underpins a statement such as "life does not live" needs to 
be clarified. Is this an ontological concept of life as a fundamental prepredicative 
mode of human relating to the world which has been eroded and suppressed 
through forms of society and cognition that only prioritise subsumptive predicative 
forms of judgement and knowledge ? This argument would postulate a mode of 
living more fundamental than the dominant modes of relating and experiencing in 
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modern societies. The problem with such a concept of life is that it presumes a 
"natural" mode of living, unchanged and unaffected historically. 
The relation between concepts of life and experience is crucial to an 
interrogation of what it means for there to be a "life that does not live". Central 
to such an interrogation of experience and life will be an analysis of the concepts 
of Erlebnis and Erfahrung, the two words for experience in German. The concept 
of experience as Erfahrung presupposes an idea of experience as a journey, a 
learning process, that is individual, but dependent upon a tradition and a 
community. An experience, in this sense, is an achievement, an accomplishment that 
only arrives through an immersion in a culture and tradition, which allows for a 
departure through the accumulated and assimilated experience of such a tradition. 
Such a concept of experience presumes an individual who is able over time to 
order and unify an experience through an accumulated memory and sedimentation 
of tradition and community. However, this is not a simple capitulation to tradition, 
but the building of a new tradition in the process of forming new modes of 
living through a harmonious unfolding that absorbs yet surpasses the past. 
Erfahrung also has a more limited sense as the description of the cognitive 
experience involved in judgement and knowledge. The process in the Kantian 
concept of experience, whereby a unified subject orders and classifies the raw data 
of experience, is a process that can be termed experience as a whole. This 
experience, then, is the process whereby an inert objectivity is synthesised by a 
subject and raw sensations are formed into the object of experience. In some 
sense, experience is configured here as a junior partner to the understanding, in 
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that, in the Kantian sense there is no knowledge without experience, but experience 
without the synthesising operations of subjective judgement, could not be termed 
experience at all. The concept of Erfahrung contains a full concept of communal 
experience, and a limited or narrowed concept of cognitive or subsumptive 
experience. Adorno's use of the Hegelian and Kantian concepts of Erfahrung 
produces a dialectical and historical mediation of these two forms of Erfahruna. 
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It was in response to this narrowed concept of experience as a form of 
cognitive subsumption, that the concept of Erlebnis arose in German philosophy in 
the late 19th century. 3 Willhelm Dilthey attempted to articulate a form of 
experience that would literally revivify philosophy, a philosophy, that he argued, in 
terms of Kant's concept of experience had "no real blood flowing in the veins". 4 
Erlebnis referred to a form of experience that moved beyond subject and object 
differentiations, either in the direction of a more primordial concept of experience 
as "lived experience" prior to subject and object distinction, or as a form of 
experience which moves beyond the everyday through an awakened experience 
that reveals new forms of temporality and spatiality for human experience. Lived 
experience also has its cognitive mode, in terms of the transcendental epoche, 
practiced in Husserlian phenomenology, a bracketing of experience in terms of its 
historical, social and cultural components that could give intuitive access to the 
unity of an intending consciousness with its intentional object, in a mode explicitly 
ruled out by Kant's concept of experience. The relation of Erlebnis to the subject 
of experience is paradoxical, in that in its Husserlian form there is an attempt to 
think the reality of a transcendental ego, whereas in other forms of lived 
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experience, the subject is dissolved in an overarching unity of subject and object. 
As Erlebnis originated in response to epistemological concepts of Erfahrung, it 
bypasses the fuller historical concept of Erfahrung. The conflict between Erlebnis 
and Erfahrung becomes a conflict between ontology and epistemology, which 
doesn't take account of the historical content of experience. Both Adorno and 
Benjamin refer disparagingly to a concept of experience as Erlebnis, but the use 
of a concept of life or nature certainly gestures towards a shared history with 
Lebensphilosophie, a shared history that is immediately suppressed, but as we will 
see is important in trying to disentangle concepts of experience and life in 
Adorno's work. 
Many commentators have pointed out the indeterminate nature of Adorno's use 
of a concept of experience. 5 The content and relation of Adorno's concept of 
experience as both historical concept and speculative or foundational concept, and 
the relation of such a concept to the idea of a "life that does not live" will form 
the central core of this research. However, the purpose of this thesis is more than 
a critical exegesis of confused or puzzling concepts within Adorno's work. I want 
to take seriously Adorno's provocative comment that certain historical events, 
particularly the event that he names as "Auschwitz", reveal an experience of life 
in modernity which closes down all possibilities for living. If the extreme nature 
of the events at Auschwitz transform the possibility of living, what can this mean 
for the continuation of life in the sixty years after Auschwitz ? If we take 
seriously the account of a near completed destruction of experience which results 
in a "life that does not live", then how can there be any experience of this state 
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itself ? How can a subject bear witness to its own ruin ? It is only through a 
negative ontology, a delineation of the false state of damaged life, that Adorno 
attempts to negatively reflect, through a deepening of contradictions, the possibility 
of a different way of living. However, this rigorous negativity has frustrated many 
interpreters, and led recent commentaries on Adorno's work to attempt to give a 
fuller account of a positive ontology or epistemology that could be developed 
from his work. Such approaches have concentrated on an attempt to outline either 
a more delineated account of what a life that could live would mean, or to re- 
describe Adorno's philosophy in terms of a transcendental rationality which could 
make experience possible if only life were organised differently. 6 What these 
interpretations tend towards, in different ways, is a dissolution of the importance of 
dialectics within Adorno's thought, in an invocation of an element of life, 
experience or rationality that is free of contradiction. Furthermore, in an insistence 
on Adorno's thought as epistemological, there is a downplaying of the speculative 
moment of his negative dialectics. Adorno's speculative philosophy and its 
relationship to an experience as a bodily experience that lies at the limits of 
thought is a crucial question for his philosophical work, the question of the 
meaning and possibility of a metaphysical experience. Such a metaphysical 
experience will be tied to the possibility of an experience of possibility itself 
which registers in a bodily form but rests in a zone between actual and logical 
possibility. The result of negative dialectics lies in a speculative experience that is 
difficult to delineate, but importantly, registers as an experience of life beyond the 
reified context. 
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Giorgio Agamben is the contemporary philosopher who has rigorously 
interrogated this theme of a dissolution of experience, a dissolution that results 
from a destruction of experience in late modernity encapsulated by Auschwitz. He 
has argued that it is through such an experience of a bare life that there can be 
a founding of a new form of life or politics which can resist the reified context. 
The comparison of Agamben's work with Adorno's concept of damaged life is 
interesting because of a refusal of Agamben to engage in any serious way with 
Adorno's work, alongside a comprehensive similarity of many of the themes that 
they address 7 The common point of contact with Adorno for Agamben is the 
work of Walter Benjamin, who Agamben has drawn on extensively and translated 
into Italian. Agamben's sparse references to Adorno are usually critical, and in 
relation to defending an interpretation of Benjamin in non-dialectical terms. Despite 
these differences, but, also, as we will see, because of them, Agamben's work is a 
fruitful source of interrogation if we want to determine the philosophical heritage 
of some of the central insights of Adorno's writing on life and experience. 
Agamben's work on bare life, Auschwitz, and the decay of experience shares a 
number of affinities with Adorno's critical project, although these affinities 
breakdown at the point of the affirmation of an ontological experience in 
Agamben's work, and his hostility to any form of dialectical thinking. The shared 
context is an account of damaged or bare life in modernity as an empty space in 
which power can produce and effect responses, and in an attempt to delineate 
forms of critical subjectivity which do not rely on vital notions of desire. Both 
Agamben and Adorno want to recuperate a concept of "life that does not live", 
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which as a form of life in which something like a bare life cannot be isolated 
can provide a position for a critical subjectivity. 
The important difference is staked upon the territory of how such a critical 
position can be delineated, and the nature of speculation or metaphysical 
experience as it relates to such a critical position. Such speculative experience will 
be material, in that it is a speculative experience of a life that only exists at the 
margins of experience. This experience changes the possibilities of experience 
itself, in the sense that such an experience opens the subject to a different way of 
living. However, this opening of the subject can only be conceived through a 
dissolution of subjectivity itself. The problem that both Agamben and Adorno 
attempt to deal with is how such a dissolution of experience can be both a 
dissolution and an opening. How does the negativity and destruction of experience 
intrinsic to a concept of a "life that does not live" open itself up to the 
possibility of redemption ? 
Agamben's response to this question results in a turn away from materialism 
and towards a fundamental ontology of Being, which can locate itself through a 
redemptive moment of appropriating a form of life which differentiates itself from 
bare life only through its own conscious appropriation of such a damaged state. 
Agamben reads redemption through the theological mode that the life which is 
most abandoned can be saved. In this thesis, I locate Adorno's account of the 
relation between redemption and reconciliation through an account of damaged 
life, as an account which immanently presents a dissolution of subjectivity that can 
open up the subject to a possibility of life itself, which involves a turn to 
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materialism, rather than a fundamental ontology of Being. Rather than an 
appropriation of bare life, the dissolution of subjectivity opens the subject to a 
horror at its own reification, which demands political change. 
The originality of the thesis lies in the elucidation of the concepts of 
experience and life within Adorno's work. I argue that a concept of life as 
embodied subjectivity functions within Adorno's work, but is not clearly delineated, 
because of his argument that there can be no account given of a fulfilled 
experience from the position of damaged life itself. However, I trace this account 
of life through Adorno's appropriation and critique of Freud and Nietzsche, and 
argue that Adorno's account of embodied experience functions as a model of 
fulfilled experience. Such a model of fulfilled experience, though, is fundamentally 
unfulfilled, in that it changes the very concept of fulfillment. Thus, the central 
importance of the changed concept of reconciliation within Adorno's work, a 
concept of reconciliation which emphasises error, exaggeration, and exhaustion as 
marks of experience which open the subject to a life lived in fundamentally 
different ways than are possible within the context of identity thinking. 
This thinking cannot be conceived as a re-enchantment of nature, or a return to 
embodied experience as a ground of experience, as this experience is subject to 
change throughout history. There is no possibility of a return or opening up to 
material relations as inferences which can be re-awakened in a straightforward 
manner. However, the problem I delineate is that Adorno's emphasis on 
metaphysical experience requires a concept of everyday experience that survives its 
own decay or destruction, to be able to access the dissolution of subjectivity 
which functions as openness rather than annihilation. 
It is this tension between openness and annihilation of experience that is so 
thoroughly outlined in Agamben's work. My use of Agamben is as a comparison 
which serves as delineating a trajectory for many of Adorno's concepts which 
nevertheless turns these concepts fundamentally away from both dialectical 
thinking and from materialism. The central question of how, within the context of 
a "life that does not live", a subject can experience the possibility of life beyond 
this context, is conceived by Agamben in redemptive and ontological terms, rather 
than in dialectical and materialist terms. 
This conception, though, opens up problems for Adorno's own methodology. How 
can an immanently negative dialectics conjure a transcendent moment without an 
affirmative redemption ? How can the possibility of an experience of life at the 
limits of experience be both a material experience, and an experience beyond the 
bounds of possible experience? Because Agamben takes seriously the question of 
the destruction of experience and of the form of life as survival within this 
destruction, his opposition to any conception of a materialist concept of possibility 
or a dialectical methodology poses the question of whether such methodologies 
can have a philosophical worth given the shared analysis of the challenge to 
metaphysics posed by Auschwitz. 
This thesis attempts to defend Adorno's changed concept of metaphysics as an 
experience which can open the subject to a critical relation with a context of 
reified life. Such a critical relation can only occur through the dissolution of 
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subjectivity as reified life, which opens the subject to an experience of its own 
reification and the possibility of reconciliation. Such an experience demands that 
subjective experience is not so reified itself that it can only be saved through an 
affirmative redemption. The comparison of Adorno with Agamben, therefore, opens 
his work to their common philosophical forebears in terms of Walter Benjamin 
and Martin Heidegger. Both Agamben and Adorno emphasise an account of the 
decay of experience in Benjamin's work, which stresses modernity as the 
destruction of experience. What they both downplay is Benjamin's more dialectical 
appreciation of both the possibilities and the losses contained within a process of 
the destruction of experience. This emphasis on one pole of an account of the 
destruction of experience leads Agamben to an emphasis on a Benjaminian 
concept of redemption, which has all its political connotations removed. It becomes 
purely theological. For Adorno, such an emphasis on the destruction of experience 
leads to contradictions within his concepts of experience, metaphysical experience, 
redemption and reconciliation which cannot lead beyond a dissolution of 
experience as dissolution itself. My argument is that any interpretation of Adorno's 
work needs to return to Benjamin's more nuanced account of the destruction of 
experience, and to differentiate Adorno's concept of redemption from his concept 
of reconciliation. 
Second, the relation to ontology opened up by the comparison of Agamben's 
concept of bare life and Adorno's account of damaged life returns us to 
Heidegger's work in a different light. Agamben's use of Heidegger relies on a 
reading of his work, which emphasises the continuity of his philosophical project, 
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rather than any turning in his philosophical work away from human existence as 
the route for the meaning of Being. Agamben uses Heideggerean ontology as a 
means of interrogating the bare life of human existence as a life without any 
definition, which can be appropriated as a form of redemption. Such an 
interpretation refuses the elements of a phenomenological hermeneutics within 
Heidegger's early work. The ontology contained within the descriptions of the 
lifeworld is of no interest to Agamben's fundamental ontology of Being, which is 
read through a human existence, but only a human existence as emptiness itself, 
bare life. This is the ultimate lack of any materialism within Agamben's concepts 
of potentiality and life. Such a critique, though, returns us to elements within a 
phenomenological ontology as embodiment which Adorno's work lacks. Such an 
account of embodied experience will not be a naturalistic ground per se, but a 
ground that is itself historicised through a dialectic of nature and history, as 
outlined in Adorno's central methodological idea of natural history, that the 
historical must be read as natural, and the natural as historical. 
The first chapter, on Auschwitz, situates the problem of life and experience in 
terms of the life that is produced by the event named "Auschwitz". Adorno's 
philosophical method in terms of both constructing and denying a universal history 
is the central theme for this initial chapter. I want to take seriously the thought 
that Auschwitz reveals a certain form of death-in-life which then compromises all 
life and experience afterwards, but I also want to deny this as a universal history 
that culminates in catastrophe. Thinking Auschwitz means thinking this event as 
the revelation of a certain new depth that life can plunge into, but not reifying it 
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as culmination of history. My critique of Adorno and various other thinkers is the 
critique that this philosophical representation of Auschwitz as catastrophic 
culmination, or negative completion of history, inaugurates a crisis for experience 
that has no end, and thus becomes meaningless as crisis. The attempt to think 
Auschwitz as the triumph of an immanence of history, as a world in which 
nothing new can arise, is a powerful attempt to remain faithful to the event, but 
must be denied at the same time if it is not to become reified as an ahistorical 
or absolute event. 
In the second chapter, I use Agamben's book Remnants of Auschwitz, and its 
account of the experience of survival to give meaning to the indetermination of 
life and death in the subject, to what a "life that does not live" may mean in 
terms of its concrete historical incarnation, an incarnation that Agamben discusses 
throughout the book with reference to the life in the camps. Agamben's concept 
of bare life is outlined as not a naturalistic ground but a description of the 
production of a form of life as an empty space, an indetermination between life 
and death. Nevertheless, the slippage between a concept of bare life as effect of 
power and as form of life which can resist power in terms of an ontology of 
potentiality is also noted here. 
The third chapter sets out from the discussion of death-in-life contained in 
Agamben's work and in Adorno's Negative Dialectics and attempts to understand 
the concept of a "life that does not live" in terms of what this life is that has 
been extirpated. There is an examination of the philosophical antecedents of 
Adorno's thought in terms of Lebensphilosophie, particularly the influence of 
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Nietzsche and Freud in Adorno's thought. Adorno's concept of damaged life is 
articulated in relation to his idea of natural history. A concept of life can only be 
formulated in terms of both its historical and its natural moments, as a mediation 
between history and nature. Damaged life can point towards a fulfilled life only 
through its absence. 
The fourth chapter considers the project of responding to the disenchantment of 
nature through a re-enchantment, configured as a re-awakening of modes of 
relating to life that have been either extirpated in modernity or completely 
concealed by processes of reification. The most powerful recent interpretation of 
Adorno's work in such a manner is J. M. Bernstein's book, Adorno: Disenchantment 
and Ethics. I propose a critique of this interpretation of Adorno's use of concepts 
of life and experience, as it reduces the speculative element of Adorno's thinking. 
Nevertheless, Adorno does gesture towards a fulfilled concept of experience, both 
as intellectual and aesthetic experience, but this fulfillment is fundamentally open 
and speculative rather than natural, although it can occur somatically. I try and 
articulate what such a notion of a somatic yet speculative experience might be, 
that is still dissociated from the mechanisms of desire, by an analysis of the 
concept of shudder in Aesthetic Theory. 
Chapter five analyses the accounts given of the decay of experience in 
modernity by Adorno, Benjamin and Agamben. There is an oscillation in these 
differing accounts between a traditional and an ontological concept of experience 
as Erfahrung. Adorno's distinctiveness here is a defence of a Hegelian concept of 
experience. It is this concept of experience that provides an outline for a mode of 
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relating between experience and life that can produce new forms of experience 
beyond Erlebnis and Erfahrung, but only if dependent upon a strong concept of 
Erfahrung in the first place. The problem for Adorno, is that his account of the 
destruction of Erfahrung as a form of traditional experience, leaves little 
opportunity for the "letting go" of subjectivity, which can produce a more fulfilled 
experience. 
Chapter six articulates how this dialectical concept of experience can provide a 
form of critical subjectivity, that is nevertheless historical and still bound to 
conceptual models of thinking. The relation between experience and life is a 
relation of a speculative experience. Such speculative experience, though, relates 
immanently to a negative dialectical experience of self-reflection. Such a form of 
self-reflection proceeds through the deepening of contradictions to an awareness of 
the dependence and conditionality of thought. Thought is dependent on objectivity, 
both as embodied thought and as a thought modelling itself on the object. I 
articulate some of the problems of Adorno's account of embodiment in this 
chapter, and outline how a fuller account of certain terms within Adorno's work 
such as the auratic, within the context of embodiment, gives an interpretation of 
the decay of experience, which nevertheless allows for a possibility of life which 
is not purely transcendent. 
Chapter seven analyses how such an experience of life can be possible given 
the increasing grip that forms of power have on forms of life, particularly in terms 
of the growth and diffuseness of power as biopower. I relate this fundamental 
limit experience of a point beyond the current reified context, to concepts of 
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possibility in Adorno's work and potentiality in Agamben's work. Through their 
different readings of Aristotle, these concepts of pure possibility orient the two 
thinkers in different ways towards materialism. I defend Adorno's concept of 
possibility as a means of providing a standpoint for a critical subjectivity, which 
relies on an individual experience, but doesn't reduce that experience to a form of 
inaction itself, but creates a space for the possibility of a different actualisation of 
subjectivity. 
Chapter eight analyses the concept of metaphysical experience, and outlines 
Adorno's concept of a negative redemptive moment of breakthrough as an opening 
towards a changed concept of reconciliation, through the description of figures of 
exhaustion. This is contrasted with Agamben's affirmative concept of redemption. 
Through this account, I outline a means of moving beyond a "life that does not 
live" that proceeds immanently but without the affirmation of such a bare life as 
the remnant that is saved in the time of redemption. 
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Chapter 1: Auschwitz. 
Auschwitz as model of experience 
Auschwitz marks a turning point in history for Adorno, a moment that changes 
fundamentally our relation to both the world and previous ways of theorising the 
world. Fundamentally, Auschwitz changes the very nature of any affirmative 
attempt at thinking the absolute, the core of the metaphysical tradition. Adorno's 
thinking on Auschwitz identifies a particular historical conjuncture as revealing 
both a trajectory for a certain tradition, particularly, but not exclusively, the German 
philosophical tradition, and also the starting point for a different mode of 
conceiving the relation between philosophy, life and history. Auschwitz is a 
problematic starting point because of the apocalyptic sense of the catastrophe 
contained in the event of Auschwitz. Auschwitz as catastrophe threatens to 
consume any critical relation to the event, and to life after this historical 
convulsion. Adorno's thinking in relation to Auschwitz should be conceived in 
relation to his phrase in Negative Dialectics, that "universal history must be both 
constructed and denied". ' The universal history that is constructed in the form of 
Auschwitz is in danger of becoming a teleological history that culminates in a 
catastrophe. This kind of negative teleology would leave us with a dead end for 
thought. The question of the denial of such a history, is the question of the 
"damaged life" that survives Auschwitz, and this question is posed through the 
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changed concept of a speculative experience that Adorno tries to articulate in 
response to the events named as Auschwitz. The extreme dialectical tension posed 
by the question of Auschwitz is that between the thought of a negative 
realisation of history in an event which consumes and destroys a tradition leaving 
it with no grounds for recuperation, alongside the denial of such a negative 
realisation through a materialist metaphysics, that will emphasise modes of living 
which can point beyond the current immanent historical context. In this opening 
chapter I want to consider this dialectical tension that Adorno poses. The problem 
with Adorno's thinking of Auschwitz is that it tends towards the absolutisation of 
an indeterminate event which then becomes overdetermining as an end to history, 
an end to philosophical discourse or artistic representation. Readings such as this 
will ultimately end up in a metaphysics of Auschwitz, rather than a metaphysics 
beyond Auschwitz. One of the virtues of Giorgio Agamben's book Remnants of 
Auschwitz is its thinking through the context of life after Auschwitz as both a 
continuation and a historical break, a form of thought which would remain true to 
the dialectical tension in the thought of Auschwitz, without either hypostasising 
Auschwitz as event which stands outside history, or as event which can be easily 
assimilated and assuaged within a historical narrative of enlightenment, however 
tortured and tortuous that narrative may have become. 
The problems inherent in the apocalyptic reading of Auschwitz are already 
contained within Adorno's analysis. It is not at all clear why Adorno identifies this 
particular moment in history, or even what Auschwitz the name denotes for 
Adorno. In Negative Dialectics, Auschwitz serves as the name representing the 
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systematic, planned and technologically executed genocide of the Jews during the 
Second World War by the Nazis, with the covert or overt co-operation of the 
German people. More importantly, it represents the logical outcome of a certain 
tendency within Western philosophical and social thought that Adorno terms 
"identity thinking". Auschwitz confirms the general trend of Western thinking, 
which is comprised of a totalising urge to integrate all difference under the self- 
preserving and subsuming identity of the concept. The Nazi genocide occurs as a 
practical culmination of a German culture which has instantiated a form of 
identity thinking which led to the rationalisations of a totalising but discriminate 
slaughter, which classifies, rationalises, and makes each individual life replaceable 
and exchangeable with another. For Adorno, this process is at one with a drive 
within capitalism for abstraction, exchangeability and identification. In Negative 
Dialectics, he is not concerned with locating a specific German context of anti- 
Semitism, or even a history of anti-Semitism within German philosophy, but rather 
with the paralysis caused to a tradition of German philosophy by an act that in 
some senses can be read as a logical outcome of that tradition: 
"Our metaphysical faculty is paralysed because actual events have shattered the 
basis on which speculative thought could be reconciled with experience". 2 
The starting point for Adorno's reflections is how a changed experience may 
affect the process of a speculative thinking, and the effect is framed in the strong 
terms of a reconciliation. His depiction of the historical conjuncture is lacking, and 
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there could be many arguments postulated for the weakness of an argument that 
is never proffered, as to why Auschwitz, or why, only Auschwitz ? Adorno appears 
singularly uninterested in this argument. Auschwitz serves as a model of 
experience, which is pertinent personally to him and the tradition from which he 
is writing and serves as an extreme instantiation of a certain result of 
enlightenment progress. Adorno can be interpreted as arguing that a history of 
domination has culminated in a catastrophic genocide that was inevitable given the 
structures of thought and institutions inherent in modern capitalism. He appears to 
recognize the problem of interpreting history in such a way, when he writes in 
Minima Moralia that "the recent past always presents itself as destroyed by 
catastrophes". 3 Auschwitz serves as a revelation of a latent potential within 
capitalism, a revelation that catastrophises history, in the sense that what is 
revealed is worse than could have been imagined. This is not then a determinism 
of history in the sense of a culmination of a process which inevitably led to this 
juncture, but a caesura which reveals a latent meaning in all that has gone before. 
It is clear then that Adorno's emphasis on the model of Auschwitz is not an 
argument about the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust in terms of its status as 
an historical event, but relates to the metaphysical status of Auschwitz. Bob 
Brecher has outlined two types of uniqueness claims about the Holocaust. 4 First, 
there is the historical claim to uniqueness which rests on the claim that what 
occurred at Auschwitz is a unique historical event, which has never been seen 
before and could not be envisaged again, an event that is literally incomparable. 
The evidence for such a claim is supplied through the numbers killed, or the 
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technology of the extermination, or the particular state apparatus that directed the 
genocide. This is not the main claim that Adorno makes, although certain aspects 
of the new paradigms revealed by the Nazi genocide are important for his 
argument. The second claim to uniqueness, according to Brecher is the conceptual 
claim, or what could be termed more accurately, the metaphysical claim about 
Auschwitz, that it serves as a revelation of a latent possibility within Western 
culture and, at the same time, the death of any positive claims from that culture. 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has expressed the idea of a caesura that occurs due 
to the revelation that Auschwitz serves as the expression of a "metaphysical 
decision". 5 The caesura is " ... that which, within 
history, interrupts history and 
opens up another possibility of history, or else closes off all possibility of 
history". 6 Everything hangs on this "or else". The caesura of Auschwitz is the 
event that threatens to close off all possibilities for history, and in this sense 
serves as an interruption and a beginning, but a beginning of what? 
Speculative Paralysis 
Alexander Garcia Düttmann, in The Memory of Thought, reflects on the peculiar 
interruption of history that the name "Auschwitz" introduces in Adorno's work. 
This is an interruption that is both an inauguration and an instantiation at the 
same time. Auschwitz is an instantiation of a negative totality of history, a 
teleology that leads to a catastrophe, rather than an account of the progress of 
history towards a utopia of human freedom. It is also an inauguration in the sense 
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that Auschwitz is thought of as the catastrophe that prefigures the worse that is 
to come, an event that changes the relationship of humans to their own life and 
puts history on a course to disaster. 
On this reading, Auschwitz is an "absolute event", an event that puts everything 
at stake but also consumes itself at the same time as an event, an event that 
cannot be represented. Auschwitz lies at the end of a process of western thought 
and practice as the event that negatively puts an end to an idea of enlightenment 
progress, and inaugurates a survival of a form of life to come, a form of life 
which will put into question the very definition of life itself. The distinctiveness 
of this event is the inability to represent the event itself, to encapsulate what has 
happened, and thus the importance for Düttmann, of the "memory of thought": 
"To the extent that an event is a destruction and an opening, and that it cannot 
be (re) presented as an event, thought is memory, the memory of a destruction, 
of an opening, of a guilt which always exceeds the memory of thought". 7 
The problem with the thinking of Auschwitz as "absolute event", is that it 
dissolves completely into a metaphysical or ontological event, rather than an event 
in historical time. As absolute event, Auschwitz becomes that which completes 
history in its erasure and destruction, it becomes the event which as destruction 
destroys any sense of a tradition, or the remnant of a tradition to be handed over. 
Düttmann's reading is certainly faithful to one element in Adorno's dialectical 
thinking of Auschwitz, one pole of the dialectic. This pole is the negative and 
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catastrophic completion of Auschwitz as an event which cannot be represented or 
reconciled with experience, an event that hovers above history. Auschwitz becomes 
a Name, which represents emptily but completely the unrepresentable, a 
metaphysical name. 
The process of both a destruction and an opening is the process of tradition, 
but the peculiarity of the event of Auschwitz is the impossibility of a 
representation of such an event, which then involves thought as a form of 
remembering, of surviving, of bearing witness, rather than a new mode of life. The 
question of a life after Auschwitz cannot be posed in these terms, even as a 
survival, in the sense that the absolute event consumes any thinking of life in 
historical or natural terms. However, the starting point in this thought of Auschwitz 
is a reversal of Adorno's starting point in that it begins with the metaphysical as 
linguistic, Auschwitz as "Name", rather than the experiential. It is the experiential 
question that drives Adorno's initial problematic, that a speculative thought cannot 
be reconciled with experience. 
The paralysis that results from Auschwitz is very much an experiential 
paralysis that inflects any metaphysical thinking. It is experiential primarily because 
it results in two modes of experience, those of despair and guilt, and opens onto 
the possibility of a plane of experience which is at the same time non-experience, 
or a form of living death, which is that of totalised immanence. Despair comes 
about through a realisation that the forms of metaphysical thinking that previously 
gave a meaning to life cannot be thought any longer given the context of 
Auschwitz. Any form of thinking that attempted to extract positive significance 
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from the meaning of a world (ultimately positive significance from Auschwitz) 
would be a lie and would not do justice to the irrevocable nature of the event or 
events thereby named. 
Auschwitz serves as a particular historical conjuncture that interrupts and 
fundamentally changes notions of the universal. This interplay between notions of 
universality and particularity in relation to an event, "Auschwitz", which is not 
really an event, as it describes a series of events that are gathered under the name 
"Auschwitz", is highly problematic. Adorno is raising a universal claim based 
around a particular historical juncture, which is in accordance with a notion of the 
temporal nature of truth, but it is the extremity of the consequences of this 
particular historical conjuncture, and the universalizing of those consequences, that 
tends towards a reification of the name "Auschwitz", as something that stands 
beyond or outside history. It is this tension between Auschwitz as something 
unique and unrepresentable, and yet within history that threatens the philosophical 
sense of the use of Auschwitz, but, at the same time, renders the thinking of 
Auschwitz important. 
In his book, Heidegger and "the Jews", Lyotard immediately universalizes the 
situation of the Nazi extermination of the Jews, by using the lower case name 
"the jews", which refers to a particular non-place of the otherness of Western 
thought. In this sense, "the jews" represent not only Jewish people or the Jewish 
tradition, but also everything that is masked by identity thinking, the non-identical: 
" ... 'the jews', never at home wherever they are, cannot be integrated, converted 
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or expelled. They are also always away from home when they are at home, in 
their so-called own tradition, because it includes exodus as its beginning, 
excision, impropriety and respect for the forgotten". 8 
Lyotard is aware of the dangers of his position, of the possibility of the marking 
of a tradition for its own destiny of annihilation through its very otherness, but 
despite acknowledging this, the use of "the jews" in this sense universalises the 
situation of the Nazi genocide to an unacceptable degree, as the particularity of 
the extermination of the Jews becomes lost. For Lyotard, the major project of the 
Nazis was just this radical excision of otherness, of non-identity, through the 
extermination of its representatives. This explains the excess of Nazi politics, an 
excess that Primo Levi refers to as "useless violence", an excess that involves 
hunting down to the last person in an extermination, which continues even when 
defeat is acknowledged. 9 
Lyotard refers to Adorno's determination not to make Auschwitz into an 
"episode", not relegating Auschwitz to something that can be passed over and 
easily encompassed within moral or philosophical frameworks. Thinking about 
Auschwitz is a thinking about the unthinkable, because Auschwitz was an attempt 
to annihilate the very resource for thought itself, that radical otherness, non-identity, 
without which thought cannot exist. This is why, for Adorno, the question of 
living after Auschwitz, becomes the crucial formulation, as life refers to the 
moment of nature within his thinking of natural history. The project of a 
dialectical thought of the natural within the historical and the historical within the 
27 
natural is threatened by an event such as Auschwitz, which excises any resources 
for thinking the non-identical within the philosophical tradition. It does this 
because the thinking of an identity thinking is the philosophical representation of 
the excision of the non-identical that is carried out in practical terms by the Nazi 
genocide of the Jews. This is not to claim some crass causal effect, but a deep 
cultural analogy between forms of conceptual thought and the claims to truth and 
freedom within that tradition, that are completely eroded by the experience of 
surviving Auschwitz. Any form of thinking that relegates Auschwitz to an episode 
within thought contains it within an identifying procedure that does not 
acknowledge the radical excision of thought which lies at the root of the Nazi 
project. Thought must remain in the "abyss", in order to struggle "not to continue 
along its representational line but to approach what it has not been able to 
think". 10 
In The Differend, Lyotard argues that Auschwitz serves as a model for Adorno, 
and he describes a model in the following way: 
" ... the model is the name for a kind of para-experience, where dialectics 
would encounter a non-negatable negative ... and would abide in the 
impossibility of redoubling that negative into a 'result'. "1 
What does it mean for there to be a non-negatable negative, other than that there 
can be no thought at all, if thought operates through the determinate negation of 
its material ? This would fully articulate the nature of paralysis that it is not even 
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possible to think speculatively about Auschwitz, as the very concepts that we 
would use to think about such an event are called into question by the event or 
the model. As Lyotard argues: 
"The 'Auschwitz' model would designate an 'experience' of language that 
brings speculative discourse to a halt. The latter can no longer be pursued 
'after Auschwitz'. Here is a name 'within' which speculative discourse would 
not take place. " 12 
Lyotard questions whether the model of "Auschwitz" serves as an anonym for the 
process of negative dialectics, and if so he argues that the only result can be "the 
despair of nihilism". After Auschwitz, speculative thought will only be able to 
consume its material without result, in an endless process of the production of 
waste matter: 
"So must be spoken the end of the infinite, as the endless repetition of 
Nichtige, as the 'bad infinity'. We wanted the progress of the mind, we got its 
shit. " 13 
For Lyotard, Auschwitz becomes the name for a destruction of experience, as an 
experience can only come from a form of thinking which has a result, and this is 
precisely what does not occur with the model of Auschwitz. This model thus puts 
a stop to the operation of speculative thought, paralyses that thought, leaving it 
with no direction or mode of progress. However, Lyotard again emphasises one 
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element in the thinking of Auschwitz, its unthinkability as historical event. This is 
a tendency within Adorno's thought, but this tendency is elucidated in order to be 
denied. This is the extreme form of Adorno's dialectical parataxis. Auschwitz must 
be thought both as the destructive ending, but also related historically to what 
occurred before and after its occurrence, namely in relation to experience and life 
after Auschwitz. 
As Auschwitz serves as the beginning rather than the end of the "Meditations 
on Metaphysics" in Negative Dialectics there must be some mode of beginning to 
think in this destruction of experience. How can this erasure produce a new form 
of thinking ? For Adorno, this thinking must occur in an experiential mode and 
despair is not the only experiential result, but there is also guilt, the specific guilt 
of the survivor, who through a statistical procedure reckons his or her survival as 
against the overwhelming numbers of those dead, and this guilt too feeds into 
despair, the despair of not being able to go on living due to the paralysis of 
guilt. In a characteristic reversal, Adorno claims that this situation compels us to 
philosophise. How this philosophising can take place is the question of the relation 
of thinking a constellation of a number of different elements, primarily the relation 
between the "damaged life" of survival after Auschwitz, and a speculative 
experience that can move beyond the current immanent context. 
In Heidegger and "the Jews", Lyotard gives a definition of what he understands 
this form of philosophy to be, which builds on the argument outlined above: 
"If there is 'dialectics' then, this inevitable fashion of occidental thought, it is 
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negative dialectics, not only because its movement does not get resolved in a 
Resultat, in a work, but because it does not affect moments, 'formations', 
entities that will have been here and now and can, in this future perfect, be 
collected in the Erinnerung, the memory that interiorises. This movement affects 
what cannot be interiorised, represented and memorized". 14 
Lyotard refers to a primary experience of the unconscious that takes the form of 
a "shock without affect", a shock that does not become processed, but that is 
always present in its displaced effects, despite never being interiorised, and that is 
forgotten but always there, without being represented. He writes of a primary 
repression that is not assimilated by the organism, and cannot be represented by 
the subject. Any form of critical thinking about the origins of thought, about the 
resource for thought must be a form of thinking about what cannot be 
remembered but must not be forgotten, this radical otherness at the origin of 
thought. This account relates to Auschwitz as it is precisely that which cannot be 
thought but is remembered, in an interminable "search for lost time", which is an 
acknowledgement of the vulnerability and fallibility of thought in general. To 
remember Auschwitz is to engage in this task of thinking the unthinkable, of : 
" ... time lost yet always there, a revelation that never reveals itself but remains 
there, a misery: and that this misfortune, this soul, is the very motive of thought, 
of research, of anamnesis ... a motive 
lost in the very principle of progress, 
soul lost in the spirit. i15 
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There is an interesting reversal in Lyotard's thinking here, as in an earlier essay 
entitled "Adorno as Devil", he had criticized Adorno's thinking for its negative 
theological trappings, for its belief in an underlying reconciliation which could not 
yet be captured by thought, yet the above quotation appears to be the very 
essence of negative theology, as it puts it faith in a perennially absent motive as 
the driving force for thinking. 16 Just as a negative theology traces God's attributes 
through the absence of such attributes in the world, Lyotard's invocation of 
Auschwitz operates as a negative theology, in that, for Lyotard, the misery of 
Auschwitz cannot be represented or formalised, but only invoked as an absence 
which drives thought. The difference in this negative theology is that what cannot 
be discerned in the world is not the attributes of a divine being, but the motive 
for thought itself, a motive that is extirpated by Auschwitz. There is a confusion 
as to what is extirpated here. In one interpretation, what Auschwitz removes is that 
non-identity to identifying thought which is the very motor of thought itself. At 
the other pole, what is impossible to discern is that very process of destruction 
itself as Auschwitz, that is impossible to represent or come to terms with. The 
fissure between these two interpretations is the experiential one of a notion of 
suffering which registers a protest against both the extirpation of the non-identical 
and the destruction itself. It is this concept of a speculative yet bodily experience 
of suffering that characterises the experience for Adorno of a survival that is a 
perpetual demand on thought to respond to its own unrest that remains without 
being directly representable. For Adorno, the response then is not only an 
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anamnesis, or a Proustian recovery of lost time, but a material and experiential 
response to suffering, which is a response that cannot be lived directly. In this 
sense, Adorno's thought is less negatively theological than Lyotard's formulation, as 
for Lyotard, the absent motive for thought has no material trace. 
Lyotard argues that Auschwitz cannot be made into an episode, something that 
can be fitted into humanistic and political discourses without some remainder of 
incomprehensibility. This form of episodic thinking is captured well by Derrida in 
a conversation with Jean Luc-Nancy, as a form of thinking which serves only to 
give the speaker a "good conscience" 17. As we will see later, this form of thinking 
emphasises the opposite dialectical pole of Adorno's thoughts on universal history, 
a form of thinking that too easily relates Auschwitz to its historical milieu. This 
form of thinking relates Auschwitz to other crimes against humanity, discusses and 
represents it in terms of the dreadful nature of the deed, but does nothing to 
approach the quality and particularity of the event itself. This relates to the 
question of the representation, particularly but not exclusively the artistic 
representation of Auschwitz. Lyotard argues that this representation of Auschwitz 
in words and images serves to make us forget rather than remember, because that 
which is not to be forgotten is unrepresentable. Baudrillard has referred to the 
proliferation of discourses about and stemming from Auschwitz, which serve as a 
mechanism for an industry of forgetting or an easy knowledge, and that even the 
attempt at a form of silence is no longer possible: 
"Even the type of sociohistorical dimension that still remained forgotten in the 
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form of guilt, of shameful latency, of the not-said, no longer exists because now 
'everyone knows'; everyone has trembled and bawled in the face of 
extermination. "" 
However, there are other options for thinking through the injunction upon the 
impossibility of writing after Auschwitz. First, it is important to return to the text 
in which Adorno discusses writing after Auschwitz, an essay entitled "Cultural 
Criticism and Society". 19 The essay is a reflection on the history and current status 
of cultural criticism and its relationship to both culture and society. It proceeds 
through a highly complex series of dialectical inversions based around the trope 
of the separation between intellectual and physical labour. For Adorno, what is at 
stake with the practice of cultural criticism is the attempt to understand and 
construct the truth moment in culture, without reifying that truth as a product 
independent of society and history. Cultural truth becomes both dependent upon 
society for its resonance but independent in the sense that it represents something 
that escapes from the total commodification of late capitalist society. The need for 
cultural criticism is due to the fact that culture does not provide its meaning 
through conceptual terms alone and therefore its truth will always demand yet 
escape reconstruction. Cultural criticism is the necessary correlate to any culture, in 
that it reconstructs conceptually the truth content of the work of art. The theme of 
the essay is this complex dialectic of culture and barbarism, of the difficulty of 
the separation of a moment of cultural criticism of an art object, which will at the 
same time not reify that object, but relate to the society from which it is 
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produced, whilst not being completely compromised itself as an act of cultural 
criticism, into simply becoming a mode of pricing the cultural market. Adorno 
gives a description of the dialectical method involved: 
"It must relate the knowledge of society as a totality and of the mind's 
involvement in it to the claim inherent in the specific content of the object 
that it be apprehended as such. Dialectics cannot, therefore, permit any 
insistence on logical neatness to encroach on its right to go from one genus to 
another, to shed light on an object in itself hermetic by casting a glance at 
society, to present society with the bill which the object does not redeem. 1120 
The difficulty of an immanent critique of culture in the sense described above, is 
the total commodification and reification of modern consumer society, which does 
not allow a position in which to perform such a delicate dialectical task. Society 
is then confronted with a final stage of the dialectic between culture and 
barbarism, as the individual attempts to escape the reification of the mind through 
an act of intellectual separation which in itself reifies the act of cultural criticism. 
It is at this point that Adorno writes about poetry and Auschwitz in the following 
way: 
"Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of 
culture and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this 
corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry 
35 
today. i21 
Adorno's statement is therefore twofold, but only one of these statements is argued 
for in the foregoing essay. The impossibility of writing poetry today is presumably 
due to the very dialectic of culture and barbarism that Adorno has spent the 
essay diagnosing. Poetry is perhaps being used as the paradigmatic art, the purest 
form of intellectual labour, which has become impossible due to the gradual 
colonising of the mind by the values of exchange and abstraction. The barbarism 
of writing poetry after Auschwitz is not explained. It is not even an injunction, as 
many took it to be, just a bald statement of supposed fact. For writers to use this 
statement as a ban on all writing after Auschwitz is therefore an extreme step to 
take. The most useful way of thinking through this statement would be to think 
about what Adorno means when he writes that we have reached the final stage of 
the dialectic between culture and barbarism, and how this affects writing. Adorno's 
reflection on his own injunction after reading Paul Celan's poem "Todesfugue" is 
an example of how the injunction should not be read as a ban, but only a 
requirement that any artistic achievement that attempts to wrestle with the subject 
of Auschwitz, must do so through the realisation that the artistic form used will 
be irrevocably transformed by the attempt. Adorno modified his supposed 
injunction after reading Celan's poetry, but then poses an equally challenging, but 
less cultural formulation of the question of existence after Auschwitz in Negative 
Dialectics: 
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"Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to 
scream; hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could 
no longer write poems. But it is not wrong to raise the less cultural question 
whether after Auschwitz you can go on living... "22 
Adorno's thought moves here to the reflection on how a process of survival after 
Auschwitz, particularly the survival of a person who escaped the genocide, can be 
justified experientially and ethically. 
Günter Grass has argued in "Writing after Auschwitz" that Adorno's comments 
on poetry and Auschwitz were misunderstood as a prohibition, when they needed 
to be read as a standard by which any writing should be measured before writing 
could begin. 23 Grass writes from a different perspective to Adorno, still the 
perspective of a survivor, but a survivor of a different hue, not someone who 
escaped the camps by chance but a survivor of the "camp of criminals", someone 
who had been in the Nazi youth, whose parents and grandparents had participated 
in the Nazi experiment. The prerequisite to writing after Auschwitz had become 
shame, rather than the guilt of the survivor that Adorno describes. Grass describes 
the process of a writer trying to write within the condition of this final stage of 
the dialectic of culture and barbarism: 
"Where can literature still find an outlet if the future has already been dated, 
the terrible statistical bottom line calculated ? What is left to narrate if the 
human race's capacity for destroying itself and all other life in a multitude of 
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ways is proven daily and practiced in computer simulations ? "Z4 
For Grass, the answer is to write about exactly this situation, to attempt to 
continue what he terms, the "crippled project of the Enlightenment. " The irony for 
Grass was that an engagement with Adorno's thinking did not produce a lack of 
writing but a massive fictional trilogy. For Grass, writing after Auschwitz is 
endless "unless the human race gives up on itself completely. " Writing from the 
perspective of 1990, Grass terms Auschwitz a "permanent stigma", but also, a 
"positive gain", in that understanding Auschwitz enabled us to understand 
ourselves. 25 The problem with Grass's conclusion here is that it emphasises the 
pole of relating Auschwitz to its historical afterlife in too banal a way. To refer 
to Auschwitz as a "positive gain" dissolves the event into a history of 
enlightenment, which does not take into account the relation between such a 
history and Auschwitz itself. Auschwitz becomes elevated and recuperated through 
a larger narrative that as a systematic narrative contains within itself forms of 
identity thinking, which were compromised by the event of Auschwitz. Thus, Grass 
emphasises the pole of denying a negative universal history, only by re- 
instantiating a positive universal history. 
Auschwitz as philosophical representation 
What these writings don't take into account is the question of the philosophical 
representation of Auschwitz, of what is the philosophical discourse when the 
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writing is a writing of the unrepresentable, a thinking of the unthinkable, 
particularly, as this unthinkable is universalized as a condition, an origin or a form 
of ending. The philosophical representation aims to remain true to a certain 
particularity of the event, but always relates that event to either a transcendental 
condition of human existence, or a fundamental caesura in human existence. Does 
this thinking turn Auschwitz into an episode, or does it remain faithful to a 
particular extremity of the event itself ? What is the status of this philosophical 
representation that forbids all other representation ? 
Jacques Derrida, in an essay entitled "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently 
Adopted in Philosophy", discusses a certain tone in philosophical texts relating to 
an apocalyptic writing or a writing of the apocalypse: 
"Among the numerous traits characterising an apocalyptic type of writing, let us 
provisionally isolate prediction and eschatological preaching, the fact of telling, 
foretelling or preaching the ends, the extreme limit, the imminence of the 
last" 26 
This discourse on the end of philosophy or the imminence of the end, which 
Derrida admits he too has been involved with, is not a new phenomenon. He 
situates his essay in response to an essay by Kant, who himself denounces those 
who try to put an end to philosophy, but in so doing, Kant, himself marks a limit, 
an ending which then becomes a boundary to be crossed: 
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... he ( Kant) 
has himself in marking a limit, indeed the end of a certain type 11 
of metaphysics, freed another wave of eschatological discourses in philosophy. "27 
Seen in this light, Adorno's supposed ban on "writing after" Auschwitz has itself 
freed an avalanche of philosophical discourses alone on the subject. Derrida writes 
of philosophers wearing an apocalyptic tone, which then adds an aura of truth and 
significance to the reading of the apocalyptic runes: 
"The end is beginning, signifies the apocalyptic tone ... The end 
is soon, it is 
imminent, signifies the tone ... We're all going to die, we're going to disappear 
I'm the only one able to reveal to you the truth or the destination ... let us 
be for a moment the sole survivors, the only ones to stay awake. "28 
All the tropes that are present in the philosophical writing that has been 
examined, of survival, of the imminence of a total reification, of a necessity for a 
form of reflection, a form of "staying awake", are parodically reflected here by 
Derrida. The interesting claim is that a tone in philosophy can augur more than it 
really represents, or perhaps the recourse to tone is because of the alleged 
impossibility of representation. Derrida then makes the characteristic, but rather less 
interesting move, of making a transcendental claim for apocalyptic discourse, that 
all discourse is apocalyptic in some way, in that apocalyptic writing reveals a 
general structure of all discourse, that one does not know who speaks or who 
listens. The parodic intent of the essay is interesting, because there does appear to 
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be such a tone in all these writings, and when the truth that is to be unveiled 
appears it is very elusive, perhaps understandably so. 
Klaus R. Scherpe argues that the specific effect of this apocalyptic thinking that 
commenced with Auschwitz and continued through different imaginings of nuclear 
catastrophe, and ecological disaster (and one might add post-9/11 musings), is that 
within post-modernity there has been a particular "de-dramatisation" of the 
Apocalypse, or the end, caused by the very producibility of catastrophes. 29 The 
peculiar problem of post-modernity is an aesthetic assimilation of apocalyptic 
thinking, which does not assume that the end is imminent but that it has already 
been, and that results in a form of "playing with the apocalypse. 00 Scherpe 
recognises that this form of thinking was already prevalent within modernism, 
particularly in the thinking of Benjamin's conception of the angel of history, and 
of the catastrophe already happening. However, Benjamin's difference is the 
possibility of a revolutionary rupture within this history of catastrophe, a caesura 
that would inaugurate new possibilities for history. This difference between two 
types of apocalyptic thinking, one that dates between the two world wars, and is 
indebted to the thinking of Benjamin and Bloch, and emphasises both the 
destructive and the redemptive moment of catastrophe, and the post-war apocalyptic 
thinking that is more sober and concerned regarding the closing down of all 
possibility is the thematic of Rabinbach's book on apocalyptic thought . 
31 According 
to Scherpe, the philosophical thinking inaugurated by the reflections on Auschwitz 
results in a form of postmodern thinking about the catastrophe, or the numerous 
producible catastrophes, which can only come to be a matter of indifference. 32 
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Postmodern apocalyptic thinking contains two moments both of which are 
bequeathed to it from modernism. The first is that of Benjamin, and that retains 
the shock of the catastrophe that can inaugurate the possibility of something 
revolutionary. The second moment is that of Jünger, and is characterised as the 
"non-dramatic observation of a permanent catastrophe .,, 
33 The post-modern 
encapsulates a thinking of a "pure and self-sufficient catastrophe", without the 
necessity of "expecting an event that will alter or end history. 04 This form of 
thinking about the apocalypse eventually serves the death knell for any form of 
critical thinking. Although he doesn't mention Adorno by name (there is a 
discussion of Mann's Dr. Faustus in the essay which mentions Adorno by 
implication), the idea that Adorno's reflections on Auschwitz have eventually 
reversed themselves into a thinking of the apocalypse which anaesthetises thinking 
is a worrying irony. Scherpe describes the situation in the following way: 
"The notion of 'It will have happened', with which one imagines a 
retrospective look at a future that will never occur and that cannot be 
achieved, certainly not as a utopia, produces the aesthetic consciousness of 
'distance' and 'indifference' that sounds the death knell for critical thinking 
in terms of negation, anticipation and causal connections. "35 
What is at stake in this penetrating essay is the legacy of a certain thinking 
about Auschwitz, and the stake is metaphysical, in the sense that Auschwitz as the 
event that consumes itself as an event, the event that puts a stop to all speculative 
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thinking, can produce itself a form of catastrophic indifference which anaesthetises 
critical thinking. The relation between speculative and critical thought is tense and 
complex in Adorno's thinking of Auschwitz. An immanent critique of capitalist 
society and its structures loses its foothold with the event of Auschwitz, which 
questions even the methodology of critique, such as a process of negation and of 
attempting to link and understand Auschwitz to other events in terms of the 
causes and meaning of its occurrence. The excess of such an event inaugurates the 
possibility of a life in which critique would be impossible, as all the traditional 
avenues for meaning and critique have been closed down. One response to this is 
to persist with an element of an immanent critique that realises that its 
foundations are not secure. That is not to say that the conclusion to any thinking 
about Auschwitz is just some kind of Sisyphean continuation of the project of 
enlightenment, as if the project of enlightenment were not implicated in Auschwitz 
to its core, but can be continued with regardless. Rabinbach's conclusion to his 
book is that: 
" 
... contemporary thought can continue to exist only in the awareness of how 
the burdened traditions of modernity remain stranded between apocalypse and 
enlightenment. 
06 
This is obviously true, but does not point a way forward for thought that must 
survive Auschwitz, and attempt to move beyond this point of being stranded. 
However, the attempt to move beyond the immanent context can only occur 
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through a transcendent thinking, a speculative thinking, but this speculation must be 
tied to the material if it is not to become a form of thinking which bans all 
thought and representation in relation to Auschwitz. The relation between critical 
thinking and speculative thinking is negative, in that the critical apprehension of 
the historical event of Auschwitz, in terms of its political, historical and cultural 
antecedents and meaning, always calls forth an excess of meaning which cannot 
then be hypostasised as metaphysical in itself. To hypostasise this excess as 
completely other would be the form of speculative thinking about Auschwitz, 
which maintains it as an event without relation. Speculative thought is called for 
by the very inability of experience to reconcile itself to the events named by 
Auschwitz, by the possibility that Auschwitz prefigures an event and a form of 
life in which all possibilities for a life beyond the reified context of contemporary 
capitalism are closed down. Therefore, although the situation of contemporary 
capitalist society still calls forth an immanent response of critique in the sense 
that the capitalist mode and relations of production does not provide the equality 
and freedom it purports to through concepts such as the exchange of equivalents, 
the excess of an event such as Auschwitz which cannot even be comprehended 
within the dynamics of capitalism, means that the concepts underlying such an 
immanent critique are themselves at stake, concepts such as freedom, life and 
experience. 
Silence and Auschwitz 
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David Carroll has discussed an attitude of "piety" with regards to philosophical 
writing on Auschwitz. 37 This piety turns Auschwitz into a "moral-religious" 
absolute that dogmatically aims to silence those who wish to write or think about 
the subject. This pietistic attitude grants authority to the writer to speak of the 
event, but not for others, and even decrees the "proper silence" in relation to the 
subject. Carroll's main target in this is Adorno, and Adorno's infamous misquoted 
pronouncement on the writing of poetry after Auschwitz. However, as a statement 
it could just as easily be appended to the text that follows the foreword, Lyotard's 
Heidegger and "the jews". Lyotard specifically writes about different kinds of 
silence about Auschwitz, a silence which approaches the unthinkability of the event 
in an attempt to think it, but always fails and the "mute" silence of those, like 
Heidegger, who refused to write or speak about the event. Carroll accurately 
diagnoses a form of piety, but it is something intrinsic and common to all the 
philosophical discourses on Auschwitz that have been examined here. The attempt 
to come to terms with the unthinkability of Auschwitz acknowledges the 
"unreadability" of the event, the fact that the more it is examined the more it is 
impossible to attribute metaphysical or ethical significance to something that 
escapes such significance. Primo Levi, in The Drowned and the Saved, refers to 
"The Grey Zone", where all ethical judgements are suspended, particularly when 
examining the roles of various prisoners who took on roles as camp 
functionaries. 38 Levi is clear that this grey zone, which revolves around the issues 
of bearing witness, of the Muselmann, and of camp "collaborators", does not mean 
that all ethical judgements are suspended with regard to Auschwitz, but that the 
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camps brought into existence forms of life that precisely in their instantiation blur 
previous ethical and metaphysical boundaries and discourses. 39 Levi's work is 
exemplary in attempting to hold to a critical sensibility, and refusing any 
discourse, which bans discussion or representation of Auschwitz. He was acutely 
aware that in his discussion of the concept of the "Grey Zone", and the roles of 
the Sonderkommando in the camps there was a danger of an equivalence of guilt 
which could be interpreted from the Nazi use of concentration camp inhabitants 
to carry out the acts of genocide. Levi argues that ethical judgements about who 
organised and implemented such a situation are not compromised by an 
examination of the world produced by such organisation. It is the world of the 
concentration camp itself that suspends ethical judgement but we can still judge 
those who created such a world. 
For Lacoue-Labarthe and Lyotard, who have both written of the metaphysical 
significance of Auschwitz in similar ways to Adorno, the very possibility of 
speculative thought, or any form of dialectics is impossible after Auschwitz. 
Lacoue-Labarthe puts it in the following way: 
"When Adorno spoke of accompanying metaphysics in the moment of its fall, 
there was still - leaving out of account a justified solidarity with philosophy - 
something 'voluntaristic' in the very grandeur of the gesture ... We must no 
longer have the desire to philosophise. '"4° 
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This final statement of Lacoue-Labarthe is qualified in a note that states that this 
philosophy is not a quietism or a nihilism, but a form of resistance. For Adorno, 
this capitulation to a time without philosophy, would in a sense be a capitulation 
to barbarism, despite the culpability of philosophical thinking in the catastrophe of 
Auschwitz. The de-dramatisation that Scherpe diagnoses would leave us in a 
situation of a lack of resistance to the history that continues despite the end of 
history, the history of capitalist production and its cultural and economic forms, a 
history which, in itself, threatens to become ahistorical, or a historical immanence, 
in the sense that it conceives of itself as a permanent state. Can we conceive of 
a form of philosophical thinking that enables resistance, but dispenses with 
metaphysics, or is the form of negatively dialectical thinking that produces a 
metaphysical experience the only possibility of a form of utopian thinking within 
late modernity ? The constellation of concepts that are produced from these 
reflections on Auschwitz results in the relation of a changed form of life and a 
changed concept of speculation, alongside the need for critique to reconcile 
experience with itself. This reconciliation is not a consolatory reconciliation, but a 
reconciliation that calls for change in the sense that, without change, there is the 
possibility that Auschwitz might occur again. The imperative never to repeat 
Auschwitz means that critical thinking reflects upon the very resources for its 
critique, concepts such as freedom, truth and possibility, concepts that have become 
distorted through the forms of life created by the camps. 
The dialectic I have traced through this chapter in the philosophical reception 
of Auschwitz has been between a critique that relates Auschwitz historically to a 
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certain larger philosophy of history (a philosophy of history as enlightenment), and 
the account of Auschwitz that argues that it is without relation, and, thus, suspends 
it above history. Auschwitz becomes either an aberration, or an absolute exception. 
Adorno's thinking also has a philosophy of history to which Auschwitz relates (the 
dialectic of enlightenment), and although there is a tendency to flatten out the 
dialectic to read it as a negative form of enlightenment history, a transition that 
culminates in the catastrophe of Auschwitz, what I have done in this chapter is to 
take seriously the conception of Auschwitz as both an exception, which in some 
sense must be related to what comes before and after it. Admittedly, the very 
name Auschwitz, in its philosophical and also its historical usage tends towards a 
reification, an examination of the genocide through a name which encapsulates a 
multitude of different acts and intentions. In this sense, one is tempted to state that 
the name causes more difficulties than it solves, and refuse to use it in the same 
sense as the term 'Holocaust' is refused because of its negative connotations. 41 
However, the question posed by Adorno as to life after Auschwitz, the possibility 
of living, and what it means to be alive in the sense of an experience that can 
move beyond the context of a life totally governed in its forms and responses by 
power, is the question that these reflections on Auschwitz lead into. 
The philosopher who has developed Adorno's thinking on Auschwitz and on 
survival, life and death after Auschwitz most recently is Giorgio Agamben. 
Agamben specifically configures his thinking within the Adornian terms of the 
possibility of living after Auschwitz, but his philosophical trajectory is also openly 
hostile towards dialectics. A comparison of Adorno and Agamben's thinking after 
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Auschwitz on philosophical experience may clarify which offers a more fruitful 
approach to avoiding the flattened indifference that Scherpe diagnoses, and would 
offer a refuge for critical thinking. That refuge must begin, post-Auschwitz, in the 
concepts of survival and bare life. 
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Chapter 2: Survival and Bare Life 
The Muselmann: Human and Inhuman 
The concept of survival is a central theme in Agamben's book on Auschwitz. For 
Agamben, the paradigmatic figure in the camps is the Muselmann, the figure of 
the camp inmate who has given up on life, who has become reduced to a form of 
"bare life", which is merely existing. This figure represents the extreme limit point 
of the meeting of the human and the non-human within the surviving biological 
body. The Muselmänner were those camp inhabitants who had been reduced to the 
lowest level of existence, whose sole form of existence was based around their 
food and getting their next meal, and who had reached a stage of an inability to 
communicate on any level with other prisoners. They were universally shunned, and 
invariably were selected for extermination rapidly. They were labelled as Muslims, 
due to a stereotyped view of Muslim adherents having a fatalistic and passive 
view of life. 
The Muselmann has several important implications for Agamben. First, in an 
echo of Adorno, this figure confirms that in Auschwitz there is now something 
worse than death, a form of existence that is created that is beyond all previous 
imagining, and that creates a form of death in life: 
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"The atrocious news that the survivors carry from the camps to the land of the 
human beings is that it is possible to lose dignity and decency beyond 
imagination, that there is still life in the most extreme degradation. And this 
new knowledge now becomes the touchstone by which to judge and measure 
all morality and all dignity. "' 
Agamben is articulating Adorno's thought that Auschwitz instantiates a new and 
changed relation to all metaphysical thoughts of human significance. The relation 
to death has been a fundamental category of metaphysical thought, whether that 
was in relation to ideas of immortality or ideas of a death that is one's own, or 
whether it is through death as the opening up of a horizon of possibility. The 
experience of death in the camps gives the lie to all these thoughts, as the point 
between life and death is precisely blurred, it becomes impossible to know when 
death comes, as the ending of a life can occur within the biological span of a 
life. This is the sense of Adorno's reference to the dying of elderly people who, 
in their decline, may cease to have any remnant of their individuality long before 
their biological life ceases. Agamben too, refers to the modern experience of 
death, using examples such as the comatose person. This is a common problem 
for modern medical ethics: the point at which life ends. The ethical significance 
produced by this question does not lie in the delineation of a point between life 
and death, which has become more difficult the more advanced modern medical 
science becomes, it lies in the creation in an individual of a site of an 
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indifferentiation between life and death. Whereas the natural ending of a life can 
prefigure what happened in the camps, the significant difference is the production 
of such a state through mechanisms of power and technology. Agamben expresses 
this through the idea of survival. 
Referring to Foucault's concept of the growth of biopower through the 
transformation of notions of sovereignty, Agamben argues that Auschwitz 
instantiates a new form of biopower. He cites Foucault as arguing that the "old" 
sovereign power constituted itself on the basis of the dictum "to make die and to 
let live", premised upon notions of the right to terminate life through capital 
punishment. This dictum changes through the Enlightenment to the idea of "to 
make live and to let die", a form of biopower which is characterized by 
technologies focusing upon the production, discipline and reproduction of the 
human body, within paradigms of justice and science that focus on the 
maintenance of life rather than the use of death as an exercise of power and 
control. For Agamben, Auschwitz instantiates a third form of exercising power, a 
form that he characterizes as the "most specific trait of twentieth century 
biopolitics ... to make survive. 
"2 
Survival, in this sense, is a production, an effect of power rather than a 
resistance to power. Survival instantiates in the individual a form of life that is 
not living, and furthermore, a form of life that cannot testify to the extirpation of 
human life within it. The Muselmann is the figure that reveals the nature of the 
camps, but it is precisely the figure that cannot bear witness, because he or she is 
beyond the point of bearing witness, beyond the point of any construction of 
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meaning or even attempt to give meaning to experience. Agamben ironically 
confirms this thesis at the end of his book with a series of quotations from 
camp survivors based around the theme "I was a Muselmann. i3It appears as an 
odd end to a book that has been arguing that there is no possibility of bearing 
witness to this experience of death in life, however the testimonies cited support 
his argument, because there is always a route out for these people, a situation 
beyond the state of the Muselmann. By the very fact of their survival this had to 
be so, otherwise extermination would follow. The testimonies revolve around the 
moment when they ceased to be a Muselmann, rather than accounts of the 
experience itself, confirming the impossibility of rendering such an experience, of 
bearing witness. 
For Agamben, the production, based around the trope "to make survive", is the 
point at which: 
" 
... 
biopower sought to produce its final secret: a kind of absolute biopolitical 
substance that, in its isolation, allows for the attribution of demographic, ethnic, 
national and political identity. 1,4 
Adorno writes about life as being infiltrated in its very basic forms in similar 
ways in Minima Moralia: 
"What the philosophers once knew as life has become the sphere of private 
existence and now of mere consumption, dragged along as an appendage of the 
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process of material production, without autonomy or substance of its own. ,5 
Agamben's use of the Muselmann is indebted to Primo Levi's description of 
this figure in the camps. For Levi, though, the Musselmänner are precisely not 
figures of survival, but the people who lose their identity and their possibility for 
surviving very soon after entering the camp. Those who survive do so through 
collaboration, luck, or are marked out by a particular attribute or skill that is 
useful to the camp authorities. The Muselmänner are only in the camp "on a 
visit", and will soon be exterminated, as they are useless to the camp authorities. 6 
Agamben's selection of the Muselmann, and his reading of camp life through this 
figure, allows him to have at his theoretical disposal, just this isolated "biopolitical 
substance", but he ignores the gradations of camp experience and survival that 
occur in Levi's accounts. There is no "grey zone" in Agamben's account because 
there is only a unitary power which instantiates itself within a certain form of 
individuality reduced to "bare life", a biopolitical substance. This is a characteristic 
mode of argumentation that Agamben uses, and everything rests on this use of 
particular examples, and what is revealed through those examples. However, there 
has to be a question as to why to just pick those particular examples as 
revelatory. For Agamben, the real reason for his selection of the Muselmann is his 
philosophical emphasis on the exception. No other form of survival in the camps 
represents the exception, the limit figure as well as the Muselmann. Agamben 
describes the exception in the following way: 
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"The exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a 
member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already 
included. What emerges in this limit figure is the radical crisis of every 
possibility of clearly distinguishing between membership and inclusion, between 
what is outside and what is inside, between exception and rule. 0 
This philosophical commitment to the exemplary exception determines the 
emphasis on the Muselmann as it is this figure that reveals the biopolitical basis 
of modern politics and life, in fact, the indistinction between modern politics and 
life. The camp as the site of the production of this form of life is "the bio- 
political paradigm of the West. ,8 
Agamben's claim is that the camp is the first time the space of a new 
political production and interaction between power, life and politics becomes 
instantiated. This occurs initially in a space of a suspension of the law, but 
becomes encrypted within the bodies of humans in a way that cannot be resolved 
through a return to a form of law once the suspension of law has passed. What 
is revealed through the camps, through the figure of the Muselmann, is an 
indistinction between life and death, which will continually reappear as a new 
form of political power after this moment. Agamben's examples concern medical 
technology, what he has termed "bio-political tattooing", and one thinks of Camp 
X-ray, and other such zones of indistinction. 9 
For Agamben, what is at stake in the camp is the isolation and production of a 
form of pure being, a "bare life", which can then be dealt with at will by 
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"sovereign power". It is important to note that bare life is a produced form of life 
not a reduction to some core essence. The importance of the paradigm of the 
camps for Agamben is that, in the figure of the Muselmann, a form of life is 
produced as bare life, as just a subject for the play of power. Agamben can be 
criticised for his reliance on Schmittian notions of sovereign power and decisionist 
political thinking. This is exactly the critique that Andrew Norris makes of his 
work in stating that his decisions on the exemplarity of something as an 
exception have an element of arbitrary sovereign power to them: 
" ... the claim that something is exemplary is as much a product of a Schmitt- 
style decision as is the claim that something is an exception. i10 
Norris's critique consists in his argument that Agamben relies on Schmittian 
concepts of decision making to isolate exemplary examples of modern political 
life. Norris argues that Agamben's mistake is to: 
" ... say that the aptness or accuracy of a description is something that is 
appropriately determined only by a sovereign decision. "" 
Norris argues that the acceptance of Schmittian decisionism makes it logically 
impossible for Agamben to make the generalised claims of exemplarity that he 
does for figures such as the Muselmann, and that it involves Agamben in a form 
of deciding between the victims of the camps one more time. 
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The problem with this critique is the way it frames Agamben's relation to 
Schmitt. For Norris, Agamben falls into a trap that Schmitt identified as making a 
"decision against the decision". 12 This is the trap of the anarchist theorist (in this 
case Bakunin). However, Agamben, in his writing on the state of emergency 
describes a political development, within which the state of emergency can no 
longer be considered as it is theorised by Schmitt. For Schmitt, the state of 
emergency is elaborated as a thesis that could incorporate that moment of 
violence external to the law, within the space of legality, and it is so included, 
through the sovereign decision. Agamben identifies Schmitt's writing as a response 
to the Benjaminian notion of "pure" or "divine" violence. 13 The state of emergency 
was given the task by Schmitt of responding to the Benjaminian challenge of a 
pure form of violence, a violence that is not related to the law. Agamben argues 
that Schmitt fails in his attempt to use the state of emergency and the sovereign 
decision as a means of relating this pure violence to the law. Schmitt's strategy 
fails because there is no separation between exception and norm, or to be 
accurate, because the spatial and temporal separation of exception and norm has 
fallen away. The Western political system was distinguished through this dialectical 
antithesis between law and pure violence, which could be related through the 
differentiation of exception and norm, but the process of modern biopower which 
begins in the camps is the indifferentiation of exception and norm. The 
Muselmann is the site of this indifferentiation. According to Agamben, this is the 
political state that we are living in, a state of emergency which has no relation to 
law, and no relation to the norm, but that founds itself on the decision on life 
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made through sovereign power. Agamben is not making a decision on the 
exemplarity of the Muselmann, but describing the Muselmann as the site of this 
new form of sovereign power, the result of a transformation in the political 
system. The system transforms itself into an apparatus of death because the 
sovereign decision, the fundamental founding political decision, is the decision on 
life, on the power to make live or let die, or the creation of new forms of death 
in life. Agamben's political ontology is reliant on a Schmittian concept of 
sovereign power as the founding decision of a sovereign in the state of 
exception, but his response to this is not a decision against decision, but to try 
and find a new politics within this zone of indetermination: 
"I would not feel up to forgoing this indistinction of public and private, of 
biological body and body politic, of zoe and bios, for any reason whatsoever. It 
is here that I must find my space once again - here or nowhere else. Only a 
politics that starts from such an awareness can interest me. " 14 
Agamben attempts to resolve the aporia by a transcendental turn in his thinking, 
whereby the Muselmann's extreme situation becomes a representation of the 
impossibility and possibility of a distinction between the human and the non- 
human within any form of individuality. There is a possibility of survival for the 
human being when all aspects of humanity have been extirpated in life, because 
humans per se exist in the fracture between the human and the inhuman that is 
the grounding of the point of language acquisition. For Agamben, the 
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transcendental condition of the possibility of being human is grounded in a 
moment of indifferentiation between the human and the inhuman in the process of 
language acquisition; at the heart of humanity, there is the very basis of the 
situation encapsulated by the Muselmann, this indifferentiation of human and 
inhuman, this impossibility of the attribution of meaning, but, still, this possibility of 
humanity, of a remnant of survival. 
This is a characteristic move for Agamben. In the book Infancy and History - 
The Destruction of Experience, he points towards a limit of experience, which 
cannot be understood as the limit of death, but has to be thought through the 
origins of language, through the idea of an infancy of experience, a point of 
transcendental origin for all experience which occurs at the moment prior to 
concrete language acquisition: 
"It is infancy, it is the transcendental experience of the difference between 
language and speech, which first opens the space of history ... to experience 
necessarily means to re-accede to infancy as history's transcendental place of 
origin. lots 
The transcendental place of origin becomes the focal point and culmination of 
Agamben's thinking. In the essay on "Infancy and History", this transcendental 
point of origin has a Heideggerian significance of the placing of the individual 
within the space of history, and in the reflections on Auschwitz, this point of 
origin is more Derridean, in its marking of a transcendental space of both the 
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possibility and the impossibility of the point of difference between the human and 
the inhuman. In both these writings, Agamben makes the final move of arguing 
that a return to this space is the form of life that can access some form of 
experience in a damaged modernity. In the essay on experience, the culmination is 
the idea of an infancy of experience as the only point at which any authentic 
experience can take place. In the reflections on Auschwitz, the idea of the survival 
of a remnant becomes a form of return to this point of indifferentiation between 
the human and the inhuman: 
"Muselmann and witness, the inhuman and the human are coextensive, and, at 
the same time, non-coincident ... the non-human is the one who can survive the 
human being and the human being is the one who can survive the non-human. 
Only because a Muselmann could be isolated in a human being, only because 
human life is essentially destructible and divisible can the witness survive the 
Muselmann ... What can be infinitely destroyed is what can infinitely survive. " 
16 
Survival in the sense of a survival of humanity, rather than the "make survive of 
biopower", rests upon a transcendental condition of the possibility and impossibility 
of humanity as such. Agamben appears to be arguing that we cannot bear witness 
to the human itself, rather than the Muselmann in particular, because the 
transcendental condition of the human resolves itself into just that fracture, that 
space of indifferentiation between the human and the inhuman, between life and 
speech. 
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J. M. Bernstein has identified this transcendental turn of Agamben's thinking as 
the point at which Adorno and Agamben differ: 
... Agamben wants the 
inhuman itself to be the fund or fount of ethical 11 
response. But if the experience of the inhuman is not the experience of the 
loss of the human, its eclipse, how might the experience of the inhuman cause 
abhorrence ? For Adorno, there is something anamnestic in our response, a 
response at the loss and absence of aura, hence a response to the claim of aura 
in its precise lapsing and consequent absence ... 
There is no intrinsic 
designation of the inhuman (it is not a self-sufficient dimension or 
stratum); and it is just such an intrinsic designation that I hear in Agamben's 
treatment. " 17 
This is an interesting argument as it points to a difference between Adorno and 
Agamben in terms of a humanism. Adorno's thinking would somehow involve an 
intrinsic designation of the human, whereas Agamben's would revolve around the 
inhuman. However, for Agamben, it is not the inhuman that is the fount of ethical 
response, or of a placing in history of the individual, but the point of 
indifferentiation between human and inhuman, the point of both the impossibility 
and possibility of being human. The problem for Agamben's argument is a shift 
between a concept of bare life as a production and effect of power and a concept 
of bare life as a form of life which can resist power. The closeness of these two 
elements rests on the concepts of indifferentiation and relation. Bare life as an 
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effect of sovereign power is an indifferentiation, because it is a relation of the 
same, what bare life relates to is only itself as a product of the exercise of 
sovereign power, in an empty way, that becomes almost analogous to the sovereign 
decision itself in the state of exception. What occurs with this indifferentiation is a 
number of spaces in modern political life that are effectively empty in terms of 
the grounds and the relation, for either decisions or for life itself. Bare life is in 
this sense not grounded on the human or the inhuman but on an indifferentiation 
configured as the relation of the same. The form of life that Agamben wants to 
relate to an infancy or elsewhere, as we will see to a potentiality, is a bare life 
which as potentiality does not relate, or holds itself in a suspended relation. The 
question is what is the significant difference here between an indifferentiation and 
a non-relation ? Is it a conscious appropriation of a space of indetermination, rather 
than just the occupation of such a space through the effects of power ? In Homo 
Sacer, Agamben describes the sovereign decision as a form of power, which holds 
itself as a "being in force without significance". '8 This is a pure relation which 
includes bare life through its exclusion, a form of relating to a bare life that in 
its relating excludes bare life from such a relation. The question for Agamben in 
the move from a delineation of bare life as produced in such a relation, and a 
form of life in which a bare life cannot be isolated, is how the structure of 
relationality changes significantly. Both descriptions of life seem indeterminate and 
empty. One of the problems for Agamben is this account of power in terms of a 
decisional matrix, as sovereign power, which gives this false symmetry to the 
relation between a sovereign power and bare life. 19 We will consider these 
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questions later in relation to Agamben's underlying ontology of potentiality, but it 
is important to note at this stage that the confusion as to what bare life means is 
present in his reflections on Auschwitz. 
Bare Life 
The concept of bare life plays a central role in Agamben's book Homo Sacer - 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life. The book begins by drawing attention to the 
Ancient Greek distinction between bins and zoe, both words designating life. Bios 
refers to the form or mode of life particular to an individual or a group, which is 
specifically concerned with modes of living rather than the biological fact of life 
itself, and is therefore subject to ethical and political ascriptions. Zoe refers to the 
simple fact of living, the biological fact of existence. 20 
Agamben's text traces the mode in which life gets prepared for political 
ascriptions, particularly in the movement from Greek to Roman thought. The key 
concept is "bare life", which he equates with a form of existence legitimated by 
Roman law, the homo sacer- the human that can be killed but not sacrificed. There 
is a confusion in the text as to what "bare life" actually denotes. 21 Bare life is 
mainly seen as the equivalent of homo sacer which is the preparation of a 
particular form of life to enter into the realm of politics through a sovereign 
decision which designates a citizen as liable for death but not for sacrifice. The 
particular figure of the homo sacer within Roman law is a paradoxical figure, in 
that he is both within and beyond the law. He is within the law in that there is a 
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claim that he can be legally executed but beyond the law in the sense that there 
can be no sacrificial sanction given to such an execution. The decision of 
sovereignty is one that is an exclusive inclusion, it includes bare life within the 
political sphere whilst at the same time excluding it. This is what Agamben refers 
. The state of exception absorbs 
bare life through to as the "state of exception" 22 
pronouncing it as an excess, as something that escapes its juridical rule. This is 
the process of abandonment or of ban. Bare life can only be conceived in the 
political sphere through its excision from that sphere. The sovereign decision 
includes through a process of exclusion. This is a decision because there is no 
legal or formal grounding for the exercise of sovereignty. It is a formal, but empty 
decision, which founds an empty space. Thus, the symmetry within Agamben's 
writing between the sovereign power and bare life. Both relate to each other in 
the form of an inclusive exclusion. But what is being excluded and included here ? 
Agamben gives us a political ontology, which enables us to understand a 
certain zone of indistinction caused through the sovereign decision in the "state of 
exception", a political space that makes it difficult to distinguish between life and 
death. Through an analysis of a paradoxical figure within Roman law, he aims to 
uncover the central and predominant relation of sovereign power and bare life 
within the modern political space. This political space is increasingly determined 
by an extension and radicalisation of sovereign power within different realms of 
society, so Agamben gives concrete examples of this with such medical conditions 
as the "neomort" who hangs between definitions of brain-stem death and "natural" 
death, and goes on to map the space of the modern as one where this 
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indistinction and state of exception has become the rule, with the concentration 
camp as the paradigmatic space of modernity. There is no such thing as bare life 
in itself, but a form of life is produced as bare life, which is completely open to 
the exercise of power. 
In his recent book, The Open, Agamben outlines what he terms the 
anthropological machine, and he gives an account of its two symmetrical forms. 
The anthropological machine of modernity functions through Darwinian discourse 
by attempting to isolate and classify that which is non-human or animal within 
the human, for example the location of the ape within man. 23 This process is taken 
further, in Agamben's opinion, through the later assignation of certain humans as 
similar to animals, for example in anti-semitism, where the Jew is designated as the 
inhuman to be found within the human, and referred to in terms of an animal. The 
symmetrical relation of the anthropological machine is the earlier one historically 
of the production of an animal dressed in human form, such as the feral man, the 
wild child, or figures such as the slave and barbarian. Agamben explains the 
symmetry of the anthropological machine in the following way: 
"If, in the machine of the moderns, the outside is produced through the 
exclusion of an inside and the inhuman produced by animalising the human, 
here (in the earlier, symmetrical version), the inside is obtained through the 
inclusion of an outside, and the non-man is produced by the humanisation of an 
"24 animal. 
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If we follow this schema, there is not a process whereby something termed 
"nature" is suppressed through the acquisition of rational thinking, but rather 
different negotiations of what it means to be human and animal, in the context of 
a decision made on life, and what life means. Life is produced through these 
symmetrical processes of inclusion and exclusion of human and animal within 
each other, but the production of this life is an "empty space": 
... the truly 
human being who should occur there is only the place of a 11 
ceaselessly updated decision in which the caesurae and their rearticulation are 
always dislocated and displaced anew. What would thus be obtained, however is 
neither an animal life, nor a human life, but only a life that is excluded and 
separated from itself - only a bare life. 1125 
The genealogical investigation into the concept of life reveals its lack of 
determination and definition. The human can only be understood in relation to life 
in the terms of a disjunction, rather than the traditional definition of the human as 
conjunction of rational soul and animal body. This disjunction is the result of a 
series of divisions of the concept of life, as vegetal, organic, animal and human. 
The distinction drawn on the border between human and animal becomes a 
ceaseless "metaphysico-political operation", which decides both the meaning of the 
human and the values that are attached to it. 26 
Borrowing from Benjamin's concept of "dialectics at a standstill", Agamben's 
concept of bare life articulates the experience of a life which is captured and 
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divided within an anthropological machine at a standstill. This is a life that cannot 
be defined in the terms of a dialectical interplay between humanity and animality 
or as a synthesis of the two parts, but as a between, as an "interval". 27 The 
anthropological machine, which continually reproduces itself through history in a 
ceaseless division and decision on life, has broken down, reached a point where it 
can operate no longer, and what is articulated in this breakdown, is the empty 
space of a bare life that is neither human nor animal: 
"The machine is, so to speak, stopped: it is 'at a standstill', and, in the 
reciprocal suspension of the two terms, something for which we perhaps have 
no name and which is neither animal nor man settles in between nature and 
humanity and holds itself in the mastered relation ... 
"28 
For Agamben, the core sociopolitical concern of modernity has been the value 
or non-value of life. He identifies the beginnings of this biopower in the early 
Nazi texts around the euthanasia of those with learning difficulties and mental 
illness, of the judgement of a life not worthy of being lived. With the increasing 
biotechnical capacities to genetically transform and mutate human biology, power 
has become more and more focused upon the life of the human as a site for the 
play of its resources: 
"Today a law that seeks to transform itself wholly into life is more and more 
confronted with a life that has been deadened and mortified into juridical rule. 
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Every attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin with the 
clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the classical distinction 
between zoe and bios. i29 
What Adorno diagnosed in the mid to late 1940s has been even further 
entrenched, according to Agamben, through the biopolitical focus of modern 
political power on the production and reproduction of forms of life, within which 
there can no longer be any distinction between a biological organism and a life 
that has its experience in relation to a separateness from a need for self- 
preservation: 
"The 'body' is always already a biopolitical body and bare life, and nothing in 
it or the economy of its pleasure seems to allow us to find solid ground on 
which to oppose the demands of sovereign power. " 30 
Agamben's resistance to any fundamental ground of bare life appears to leave him 
in a position of conducting an investigation into the processes whereby life is 
prepared for political ascriptions and increasingly in modernity colonised by 
political ascriptions. This appears to be a similar project to the one that Michel 
Foucault undertook in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. Agamben 
acknowledges this debt throughout his book, but criticises Foucault's allusion to a 
"different economy of bodies and pleasures" at the end of the History of 
Sexuality. 31 He urges more caution, although I think he misreads Foucault as 
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alluding to some fundamental alternative to current forms of biopower, when all 
that is being claimed in the History of Sexuality is that a different biopolitical 
structure will arise in the future, a different "economy of bodies and pleasures", 
from which a survey could be made of the current obsession with sex and 
sexuality. This is not to say that this new economy is more in accordance with 
truth or the reality of human desires, just that it gives a new insight into current 
dilemnas. 32 
Although there is a lack of clarity about what bare life means for Agamben, I 
think it is a deliberate lack of clarity in the sense that bare life itself is 
indeterminate and indefinable. With his concept of bare life, Agamben is not 
attempting a naturalistic definition of a core of human existence that could serve 
as the basis for ethical thought. This is the reading that Judith Butler gives in her 
transcription of "bare life" into "precarious life". 33 Butler reads a concept of 
"precarious" life as a vulnerable and fragile core existence, which can be the 
grounds for an ethics and a politics. She grounds this concept of "precarious" life 
through the work of Levinas, and the idea that the initial ethical relation to the 
other is a relation in which the other can either be respected as other, or 
dominated and killed. The precariousness of life becomes either an ontological 
presupposition, or a naturalistic ethics. Agamben's concept of bare life is neither of 
these things, but the tracing of a political figure as a form of life produced 
through the relation of sovereign power and bare life. The political ontology is 
the argument that the fundamental paradigm of politics occurs through the 
encounter of a sovereign decision which separates a form of life as naked or bare 
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life which then can be manipulated at will. The problem for bare life then is its 
separation from any form of life, any social role. In its separation from form of 
life, bare life becomes an isolated, yet empty definition , which can 
be dominated 
by sovereign power. The biological concept of life is the form in late modernity 
in which bare life gets separated from any form of life as a means for the 
manipulations of sovereign power. Agamben refers to Rabinow's distinction 
between two attitudes towards life; that of the scientist who sees his life as a 
laboratory, the example given being the scientist who is fatally ill and experiments 
upon himself, and the person who opposes any link between experimentation and 
life. 34 For Agamben, these are not fundamentally opposing conceptions of life, as 
they both rely on a certain concept of biological life which has its roots in the 
sovereign decision on the body of the homo sacer. It is the distinctive paradigm 
of late modernity that the homo sacer is now to be found in concepts of 
biological life. The dominant form of life is a bare life defined as biological life. 
Thus, rather than bare life being an essentialist foundation for any resistance to 
sovereign power, it is precisely the elaboration of bare life as form of life that is 
the most problematic element of current politics. This is why the paradigm of the 
concentration camp is the paradigm for modern political life, in the sense that the 
forms of life produced there as bare life in the extreme, in the forms of the 
Muselmänner, are the paradigms of the modern elaboration of a concept of life. 
There can be no elevation of this bare life as the bearer of a fundamental 
sovereignty itself. This is the mistake of Bataille's philosophy for Agamben. 35 The 
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abjection of a bare life cannot serve as a form of resistance to sovereign power. 
Agamben's political ontology disavows any form of naturalism or essentialism: 
"There are not first life as a natural biological given and anomie as a state of 
nature, and then their implication in law through the state of exception. On the 
contrary, the very possibility of distinguishing life and law, anomie and nomos, 
coincides with their articulation in the biopolitical machine. Bare life is a 
product of the machine and not something that preexists it .., "36 
The political ontology concerns a genealogy of a form of power that occurs 
through the sovereign decision in the state of exception and a form of life as 
bare life which have increasingly come to the fore and coincided in late 
modernity. The problem with this political ontology is its undifferentiated notion of 
power purely as sovereign power. Agamben's political ontology, although read 
through a complex genealogy of Roman Imperial power, Auschwitz and modern 
political structures and forms outlines one aspect of political power as the only 
aspect of power and thus raises the stakes for any resistance to that power. The 
paradigm of power in terms of sovereignty, and particularly in terms of a 
sovereign decision as the founding act of power, leaves any sense of a diffused or 
networked account of power unacknowledged. Furthermore, Agamben does not 
articulate any sense of power as resistance, as we will see later. His political 
ontology is avowedly Benjaminian in the sense that everything is staked on the 
eighth thesis on the philosophy of history. There, Benjamin states that: 
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" ... the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 
'state of exception' in 
which we live is the rule. We must attain to a concept of history that accords 
with this fact. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about the 
real state of exception, and this will improve our position in the struggle 
against fascism. " 37 
Benjamin's statement is in the context of the struggle against fascism, but 
Agamben's account of political power doesn't allow for differentiations in political 
systems as the state of exception as the rule is read across a multiplicity of 
political forms. Therefore, he suffers from an analogous deficit in specificity in 
political analysis to Adorno, whose account of domination often flattens out into 
an undifferentiated concept of political history. Agamben's political ontology is 
even worse in the sense that its paradigm is the sovereign decision on the state 
of exception, which gives little account of who the sovereign is and the forms 
the decision takes. In his recent book on the State of Exception there is a 
discussion of the different juridical forms in which the state of emergency, or 
exception appears, but it is precisely this account of politics as a purely juridical 
form that encapsulates a lack of differentiation to this political theory. Judith 
Butler tries to incorporate an element of different forms of political authority in 
terms of her Foucaultien adaptation of sovereignty as the return of an 
anachronistic form of power within a decaying governmentality of late modernity: 
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It 
... sovereignty, under emergency conditions 
in which the rule of law is 
suspended, would re-emerge in the context of governmentality with the 
vengeance of an anachronism that refuses to die. "38 
Despite the flaws in Agamben's political ontology, in terms of the concept of 
the sovereign decision and the state of exception, the account of bare life does 
give a genealogy of a problematic concept within Western philosophy, through its 
incorporation in political forms, particularly in terms of its appearance as biological 
life in late modernity. Agamben does give multiple and particular accounts of this 
bare life, some of which we have outlined earlier. The importance of such a 
concept is that it gives content to the account of what it means for there to be a 
"life that does not live". If we sever the account in Agamben's text of the pure 
symmetry between sovereign power and bare life, and, instead try to understand 
this concept of bare life as a distinctive form of life produced in the modern 
biopolitical space, then Agamben's political ontology has a power as an interpretive 
tool. In an article entitled, "Thoughts on the concept of biopower today", Paul 
Rabinow and Nikolas Rose criticise Agamben's attempt to think the relation of 
bare life as the life of the Muselmann in the camps to all other forms in which 
life comes into an encounter with power as a trivialisation of Auschwitz. They 
argue that Auschwitz is not in any way exemplary of modern biopolitics. 
39 
However, in the series of relations between forms of power and life that they 
elucidate, a series that includes the decoupling of reproduction and sexuality, the 
genetic coding of racial characteristics, the pre-symptomatic diagnosis of long-term 
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illnesses, and the genetic coding of mental illnesses, it is precisely though a 
thinking of these forms of biopower as the production of bare lives that a linkage 
with the camp can be made, in terms of a "thanato-politics". If we take the pre- 
symptomatic diagnoses of genetic predispositions to develop certain illnesses such 
as Alzheimer's Disease as an example, what is precisely produced in the individual 
is a zone of emptiness and uncertainty, because the developmental progression of 
the predisposition is unknown. What is being produced is a form of illness within 
life that doesn't exist in the present and may not exist in the future, but which 
manifests itself as an empty space within the individual that has all sorts of 
political and social ramifications. The point of trying to think this space in terms 
of a continuity with Auschwitz is an attempt to think Adorno's categorical 
imperative surrounding life after Auschwitz, that we must act in a way that 
something like Auschwitz could never occur again. 40 The thinking of the continuity 
between the forms of death-in-life produced in the camps, and forms of life being 
produced as empty spaces in modern biopolitics, is not a simple continuity, but a 
structural similarity in terms of a particular operation of power on life. Agamben's 
concept of bare life gives us a key to thinking the relation between the 
interruptive catastrophic event of Auschwitz and its after effects within modem 
society. Rose and Rabinow's dismissal of the link is also the dismissal of the 
thinking of a relation between Auschwitz and life and forms of power after 
Auschwitz. The justice in their critique lies in the over extensive concept of a 
state of exception and the sovereign decision within Agamben's work, but the 
concept of bare life, severed from this undefined concept of power can give a key 
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to understanding certain spaces within modern social life as produced spaces of an 
empty form of bare life. This is not to say that these forms of bare life are 
immediately and necessarily dominated or killed. These forms of life may be 
improved, in terms of such notions as "quality of life", but there is no analysis by 
Rose and Rabinow of the ideological nature of such a concept of quality of life, 41 
Agamben's concept of bare life can be thought in relation to the idea of a "life 
that does not live". It is in the attempt to then revivify such a life or find some 
ground for its recuperation that the difference between Adorno and Agamben's 
work will be located. 
The relation of this experience of bare life to an experience of a fundamental 
ontology of potentiality, an experience that Agamben will relate to the Benjaminian 
concept of the "real state of exception" determines the terrain of a philosophical 
encounter between Agamben and Adorno as to the experience of bare life, as 
something that is both produced through a certain political apparatus, however 
conceived, and that can serve as a form of opposition or resistance to such a 
designation. The concepts of bare life in Agamben's work and of damaged life 
within Adorno's work have a similarity in their emphasis on an empty form of 
life which in its function as a pure receptacle of the manipulations of power 
leaves few options for resistance. In an analogous way to Adorno, Agamben refers 
to a certain intellectual experience that can in its receptivity, freedom and 
potentiality be given over to a form of life, that will not allow anything like a 
bare or naked life to be separated. This thought is characterised as an "experience, 
an experimentum that has as its object the potential character of life and of 
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human intelligence". 42 This fundamental experience of thinking, will serve as an 
experience that can move beyond the attempt to separate a bare life from every 
form of life, as Agamben argues: 
"Only if I am not always already and solely enacted, but rather delivered to a 
possibility and a power, only if living and intending and apprehending 
themselves are at stake each time in what I live and intend and apprehend - 
only, if, in other words, there is thought - only then can a form of life become, 
in its own factness and thingness, form-of-life, in which it is never possible to 
isolate something like naked life". 43 
It is this terrain of a fundamental experience of life that can escape the 
reifications of capitalism and identity thinking that Adorno and Agamben share, 
but it is also the terrain of a fundamental disagreement over the role of 
philosophy and thought, which Agamben will tie to a certain Heideggerean reading 
of potentiality, and Adorno will attempt to read in terms of a post-Hegelian 
dialectics. 
Agamben concludes Homo Sacer in the following way: 
"This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself be transformed into the site 
for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted 
in bare life and a bios that is only its own zoe. "44 
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He poses a puzzling question as to how can a bios, a way of life, be its own zoe, 
how can a mode of existence seize hold of the bare life that escapes it ? This, for 
Agamben, is the terrain of the meeting point of metaphysics and politics, as he 
terms it thus: 
" ... 
how can a form of life (i. e. bios) seize hold of the very haplös that 
constitutes both the task and the enigma of Western metaphysics. i45 
Agamben then terms "bare life" as a correspondence to the Greek haplös, which 
he defines as the philosophy of pure Being. It is this ontological turn that Adorno 
attempts to resist through his idea of natural history. Adorno will attempt to 
differentiate his concept of experience through a dialectical reading of nature and 
history, and the concept of damaged life to which we now turn. 
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Chapter 3: The Idea of Natural History 
What does Adorno mean by his use of the concept of life ? Simon Jarvis has 
pointed out the difficulties inherent in Adorno's thinking about a concept of life: 
" The difficulties incident to any attempt to articulate the bare idea of 'life 
without domination', let alone, 'life without self-preservation' are 
obvious ... Adorno's materialism 
is deeply aporetic. " 1 
Jarvis is clearly correct in his comment, but that does not mean that a reflection 
on Adorno's use of a concept of life, however deliberately diffuse and gestural it 
may be, cannot serve as an important figure through which we can interrogate his 
concept of experience. In this chapter I will analyse the question of a 
philosophical definition of life in Adorno's work. My aim is to elucidate the 
paradoxical statement that "life does not live", and to outline some of the routes 
beyond this paradox that might outline new forms of experience. 
Philosophical Antecedents 
Before engaging with the central problem of the concept of life in Adorno's work, 
it will be useful to outline the history of Lebensphilosophie in terms of its 
relevance for his writing. Life philosophy has been associated with a group of 
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philosophers from the end of the nineteenth century, particularly Nietzsche, Dilthey 
and Bergson. 2 However, the broad concerns of life philosophy were passed down 
from the Romanticism of the eighteenth century, from thinkers such as Herder, 
Novalis, Schiller and Schelling. The connections between Critical Theory and 
German Romanticism have already been exhaustively mapped by writers such as 
Andrew Bowie amongst others. 3 For our purposes, it is important to lay out the 
connections between a philosophy of life and concepts of experience in their 
movement from late nineteenth century thought into early twentieth century 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis, which provided the philosophical milieu for 
Adorno's early thought. 
Philosophies of life broadly shared a concern with a delineation of (often 
configured as a return to) the full experiential richness of life in opposition to 
technological, schematised modes of human thought. This occasionally accompanied 
forms of vitalism that verged on mystic irrational thought about the foundational 
psychic energy of life, but also emphasised a concrete thinking in terms of starting 
from human experience itself. There was a fundamental division in terms of 
whether the life that was being considered was human life or life in itself. For 
example, Bergson and in a different way Nietzsche, were particularly concerned 
with life, and the forces of life itself, in how they structured human existence and 
produced new forms of existence regardless of human agency. Dilthey was more 
concerned with the interpretation of human forms of experience through the 
construction of a philosophy of interpretation which did not suppress the living 
material at hand but philosophised from experience itself. What these writers 
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shared was a critique of experience in modernity and a concern with a thinking 
about life as something that has been suppressed by modern forms of thought and 
modes of understanding. However, this return to life was not conceived in 
essentialist terms, but for Nietzsche, Bergson and later Freud, in terms of a primary 
dynamism which was productive in itself and adapted and changed in accordance 
with history. For Dilthey, a philosophy of life meant a return to history and a 
dispensing with absolute knowledge for a temporal understanding of human 
experience. He conceived of this as a new beginning for philosophy: 
"The fundamental idea of my philosophy is that no one, so far, has based his 
philosophising on the full, unmutilated whole of experience, and so on the whole 
fullness of reality. Speculation is certainly abstract ... 
but empiricism is no less 
so. It bases itself on mutilated experience, distorted from the outset by an 
atomistic theoretical view of mental life ... no complete human being can be 
confined within this experience. 114 
The connection with some of Adorno's thinking is clear although his specific 
project in Minima Moralia is concerned with just such an interrogation of 
mutilated experience in itself as the only form of experience that is available for 
philosophical reflection. There is no possibility of a return to unmutilated 
experience, only the damaged life of modernity. 
Dilthey is important for his linking of a philosophy of life with a philosophy 
of experience. For Dilthey, this relation is explicit through his use of the word 
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Erlebnis, which as a singular noun was hardly known in German before his work, 
although Goethe used the term Erlebnisse. 5 The prefix Er-, added to lebnis, 
deepens the sense of life involved. For Dilthey an experience described in terms 
of Erlebnis is something primary and prior to any division of subject and object, 
and serves as both a synthesis of past and present and a reaching out to the 
future. It is something that is intrinsically a temporal experience and can only be 
understood through historical thought. It is interesting that Adorno and Benjamin 
use the term Erfahrung rather than Erlebnis, and Benjamin has a specific 
distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung in his account of modernity. This is an 
issue that I will return to in more detail in a later chapter. Diltheyan experience is 
not something that Adorno will want to appropriate, as it is more akin to the 
experience that Heidegger develops in Being and Time, in its reliance on a 
temporalising projection, and a unity prior to any subject-object differentiation. 
However, the linkage between a philosophy of life and a philosophy of experience 
does become important in Minima Moralia. In his early philosophical works, 
Adorno outlines a concept of philosophical interpretation that is opposed to that 
of Dilthey and the hermeneutics that grew from Dilthey's work, in that 
philosophical interpretation, for Adorno, is not concerned with the recuperation of 
an intentional meaning, but the revelation of the historical and political bases of 
philosophical problems, so that a dialectic of nature and history can reveal, 
through a constellation of different sources and contents, both a temporal truth 
and the dissolution of any fundamental or absolute basis for that truth. In "The 
Actuality of Philosophy", Adorno writes of interpretation in the following way: 
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" ... the 
idea of philosophical interpretation does not shy away from the 
liquidation of philosophy, which appears to me to be signalled by the collapse 
of the last philosophical claims to totality. For the strict exclusion of all 
ontological questions in the received sense, the avoidance of invariable universal 
concepts - including, for example, that of man - the exclusion of every idea of a 
self-sufficient totality of mind, including of a self-enclosed "Geistesgeschichte"; 
the concentration of philosophical questions on concrete historically immanent 
complexes from which they should not be separated: these postulates become 
very similar to a dissolution of what has up to now been called philosophy. i6 
Adorno here lines up with what Hannah Arendt has termed the "rebellion of the 
philosophers against philosophy" which she uses to ascribe to the triumvirate of 
life philosophers Nietzsche, Bergson and Marx, in The Human Condition. 7 What is 
interesting in the return of concepts of life and experience in Minima Moralia is 
that in a sense they act as figures for a return of metaphysics, albeit in an 
aporetic sense. Contrary to received opinion, Adorno's later work can be read as 
more "optimistic" than his earlier works, in that through a concept of experience, 
it attempts to recuperate an idea of philosophy which the earlier concept of 
interpretation dissolves. Obviously, this can only be read optimistically, if a 
recuperation of philosophy was thought to be a good thing. 
This introduction has served to show the associations of a philosophy of life 
which would have been uppermost in Adorno's mind when he writes that: 
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" What the philosophers once knew as life has become the sphere of private 
existence and now of mere consumption, dragged along as an appendage of the 
process of material production, without autonomy or substance of its own". 8 
The life philosophy delineated in this introduction deeply influenced both the 
development of Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis, which 
formed the subject of Adorno's original Habilitation thesis on "The Concept of 
the Unconscious in the Transcendental Doctrine of the Soul", and his earlier 
doctoral dissertation on Husserl. As Bowie has pointed out, these early works 
outline a fundamental problem for Adorno of attempting to chart a course 
between a fidelity to forms of thought which undermine foundationalist and 
absolute forms of philosophising, whilst eschewing what he would consider the 
irrationalist components of vitalism. 9 The imperative to distance himself from the 
irrational components of life philosophy would be more urgent in the writing of 
Minima Moralia in the late 1940's after the consequences of a bastardisation of a 
certain form of life philosophy ( Nietzsche), along with concepts of race and Social 
Darwinism had led to key elements of National Socialism. 
What becomes clear in Minima Moralia is that the project of a dissolution of 
philosophy has in some sense been carried out politically, but in the name of 
barbarism, and the ethical orientation of Adorno's later philosophy, and the 
references to Aristotelian notions of "the good life", serve as a forerunner of his 
project of the rescue of metaphysics which now runs alongside its critique. 
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Life and Self-preservation 
Adorno's philosophical anthropology conducted through his account of the dialectic 
of enlightenment serves as the underpinning for his use of the concept of "life". 
This philosophical anthropology relates to the formation of subjectivity, which is 
outlined in the Odysseus chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment . An account 
is 
given of the formation of the self through the "abrogation of sacrifice". Sacrificial 
rites contain within themselves the deceit of natural forces, which will lead to the 
outright domination of the self over nature. In sacrifice, the gods are ostensibly 
propitiated with the sacrificial offering, but the very act of attempting either to 
gain a favourable outcome or to defer an unfavourable outcome contains within 
itself a change in attitude toward the gods and the natural world, an attempt to 
alter the course of events through human agency. This agency is of course not 
fully developed in the sense that it acts against a background of weakness and 
fear of the supernatural. The self arises through an increase in the powers of 
human agency and a domination of rather than subjugation to nature. However, the 
self that arises, in denying and dominating nature, denies and dominates its own 
involvement in the natural world. The triumph over myth, instigates another myth 
in the form of the persistent, rigidified self: 
"The identically persistent self, which arises in the abrogation of sacrifice 
immediately becomes an unyielding, rigidified sacrificial ritual that man 
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celebrates upon himself by opposing his consciousness to the natural context. i1° 
The grounding of the self arises through the domination of nature in order to 
preserve the life of the human animal, but in the process of the domination of 
nature the human disavows its connections with the natural world and therefore 
sacrifices itself to save itself. 
The pre-history of subjectivity lies in a denial of nature in humanity and 
releases a dominating irrationality, which controls both outward and inward nature. 
This is a nucleus for Adorno of all civilizing rationality, and therefore, at the very 
heart of all history lies this domination. What exactly this domination is, is 
perplexing. What is the inner and the outer nature that is being dominated, and 
what is the relationship between the inner and outer prior to the formation of the 
self ? How does the self experience itself as dominating, and what is being 
dominated ? Are we discussing a form of instinctual repression, a denial of 
"polymorphous perversity" in favour of the rigid ego, as Marcuse outlines in Eros 
and Civilisation ?' 'All of these suggestions are inimical to Adorno, as he opposes 
arguments on the basis of a fundamental ontology of existence, or a 'state of 
nature' argument, and this is perhaps why the references to nature become 
increasingly sparse in the later work, as the language of objectivity and non- 
identity replaces the ideas of nature and life. The exception to this rule is 
Aesthetic Theory, in which concepts of nature and natural beauty are central, and 
where Adorno attempts his most complete description of the dimensions of a 
fulfilled experience. Such a description of a fulfilled experience can occur only 
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through aesthetic experience, because aesthetics deals with semblance rather than 
the reality of experience, and therefore can image a reconciliation that cannot be 
affirmed in reality. 
To investigate further the responses to the above questions, it is necessary to 
interrogate Adorno's usage of both Freudian and Nietzschean themes in his 
writings, and also his critiques of Freud and Nietzsche. Adorno is indebted to 
Nietzsche for this conception of human life where all classifications and processes 
are due to serving the needs and drives to dominate and master the external 
world, and it has been regularly noted that Adorno's philosophical anthropology is 
fundamentally reliant on Nietzschean notions of power and domination. Bauer 
further identifies the commonalities in the conceptions of truth that Adorno and 
Nietzsche undermine, in that both are opposed to correspondence theories of truth 
and privilege understandings of truth as "experiment and adventure". 12 However, 
despite these evident commonalities, when exploring concepts of life, Adorno and 
Nietzsche appear to diverge quite sharply, even where Adorno might superficially 
be appearing to be outlining a Nietzschean theme. This is particularly the case 
when we examine the issue of self-preservation. For Adorno, as we have seen the 
process of self-preservation, through its reliance on the dominance and mastery of 
external nature and in its objectifying classifications of externality, separates the 
human from the natural in such a way that the life that is to be preserved is no 
longer evident. For Adorno, life occurs through the interrelationship of humanity 
and the world, through the embodiment of humans in nature, but the process of 
self-preservation forces a scission between humans and the natural world, and 
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between humans and their embodiment. Adorno outlines this in the following 
manner: 
"Man's domination over himself, which grounds his seithood, is almost always 
the destruction of the subject in whose service it is undertaken: for the 
substance which is dominated, suppressed and dissolved by virtue of self- 
preservation is none other than that very life as functions of which the 
achievements of self-preservation find their sole definition and determination: it 
is, in fact, what is to be preserved. " 13 
Some of these themes are admittedly Nietzschean, but Nietzsche would want to 
differentiate a concept of life that is fundamentally other to any definition of the 
human and is even not dependent on human self-preservation. Whilst Nietzsche 
occasionally writes as though our processes of knowledge are subordinate to the 
demands of self-preservation, he fundamentally argues that in its basic organic 
components there is more to life than self-preservation: 
"One cannot ascribe the most basic and primeval activities of protoplasm to a 
will to self-preservation, for it takes unto itself absurdly more than would be 
required to preserve it: and above all, it does not thereby 'preserve itself, it 
falls apart - The drive that rules here has to explain precisely this absence of 
desire for self-preservation. X 14 
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For Nietzsche, human subjectivity is an epiphenomenon of the process of life, 
which is ruled fundamentally by a will to power that takes place in competing 
suprahuman drives and instincts: "life would be defined as an enduring form of 
processes of the establishment of force, in which the different contenders grow 
15 unequally" . 
This movement beyond self-preservation belongs to the possibility of organic 
development and a fundamental battle between the strong and the weak. It is in 
this sense that Adorno and Nietzsche depart. Whereas both have an account of the 
formation of subjectivity as a renunciation of instinct and the body, for Adorno 
the important moment of an investigation of the pre-history of human subjective 
formation is an understanding of the human as more entwined with the natural as 
a process of mutuality, whereas Nietzsche's radicalism lies in his attempt to 
dispense with the human and the subject in terms of an aristocracy of what will 
forge powerful entities in life. Where Nietzsche and Adorno converge is in the 
understanding of a form of primal rupture in the formation of the human subject, 
and an account of the formation of culture which contains the seeds of its own 
decline in its very creation. The difference comes in the affirmative and negative 
stances that are taken towards this, as for Nietzsche, life is always something more 
than human, and this is to be welcomed, whereas for Adorno, human life is the 
fundamental concern. This dictates the critique of Nietzsche that Adorno conducts 
in Minima Moralia. For Adorno, Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics argues that 
hope gets mistaken for truth in the human construction of metaphysics. For 
Adorno, this is a fundamentally misplaced critique, because without a specific form 
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of hope, which is not just a wishful thinking, but which is "wrested from reality 
by negating it"16, then no form of truth can be provided in the current climate of 
modernity. For Adorno, the recognition of the untruth of human existence does not 
mean that there is no hope for a way of living differently, and this form of blind 
acceptance, of Nietzschean amor fati, is more theological than the negative 
glimpses of truth as hope. For the Nietzschean, this hope is beside the point, 
because the impossibility of living in the sense given to that in human life is not 
the most important issue. Of more importance is the release of those energies 
within life that will further its development which, as we have seen, are not those 
of human self-preservation. Keith Ansell-Pearson argues as follows in his book 
Viroid Life "The task is to render the concepts of soul, life, value, and memory 
genealogical in Nietzsche's ... sense, not metaphysical ... 
". 17 
To understand what Adorno means by the life that is "annulled by self- 
preservation", it will be necessary to look elsewhere than his reception of 
Nietzsche, and, therefore we turn to the work of Freud. 
Narcissism, Sublimation and the Ego 
Psychoanalytic concepts informed Adorno's work and the project of the Frankfurt 
school throughout and particularly offered an understanding of how the processes 
of intensified reification embedded themselves within the human psyche. However, 
the critique of the usage of psychoanalysis by Frankfurt School thinkers, a critique 
which has been applied to Adorno, is that in their outline of a fundamental 
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repression of an "inner" nature, they disregard connections between inner and outer 
nature and reify an originary state of pre-subjectification and libidinal happiness. 
Bernstein characterises this separation between inner and outer as applied to 
mechanisms of repression in the following way: 
" The fundamental conceptual error of the simple instinctual renunciation story 
is that, despite itself, it assumes a fundamental separation between nature and 
culture, as if inner nature was a qualitatively and quantitatively given ... i18 
This is what Whitebrook, in his book Perversion and Utopia, has referred to as 
"this Rousseauean figure of thought" that is searching for some untainted element 
within human nature that can then serve as an Archimedean point from which to 
effect radical or revolutionary transformation. 19 Adorno and Horkheimer do fall into 
these traps in Dialectic of Enlightenment, but Adorno has a more nuanced view of 
Freudian concepts which it will be useful to outline to give further content to the 
understanding of a concept of life. 
Adorno appropriates from Freud the early distinction between ego-instincts and 
libidinal instincts, as Freud states "I have proposed that two groups of such primal 
instincts should be distinguished: the ego, or self-preservative instincts, and the 
sexual instincts". 20 This simple division would give content to Adorno's argument 
that self-preservation annuls all life in the dominating ego of subjectivity, with the 
placeholder for the concept of life in this schema being the idea of a free 
expression of the sexual instincts. This would give Adorno an account of the 
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formation of subjectivity as a renunciation, and a renunciation in favour of the 
self-preservation instincts at the price of any free expression of the sexual 
instincts. This would be the account that we have seen criticised above as the 
"simple instinctual renunciation story". This is certainly an account that Adorno 
appears to be offering in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Whitebrook argues that this 
reliance on the repression of an originary sexuality as the motor for civilisation 
and the refusal to construct any theory of sublimation which would allow for a 
more free attribution of the sexual instincts condemns Adorno and Horkheimer's 
understanding of human life to a form of bad utopianism: 
" 
... 
it would follow from their argument that nothing short of remaining in or 
recapturing the original state and fulfilling 'the instinct for complete, universal 
and undivided happiness' could prevent the dialectic of enlightenment from 
unfolding. This is the tacit omnipotent requirement that constitutes the 
psychoanalytically formulated bad utopianism on which the entire construction 
i21 rests. 
In response to this problem, Whitebrook outlines the need for a theory of 
sublimation which could produce alternative forms of object attachment for the 
ego, which would not necessarily result in the catastrophic reading that Adorno 
gives. Whitebrook is sensitive to the historical situation that Adorno is writing 
from at the end of World War II, but argues that Adorno and Horkheimer 
nevertheless privilege first nature, and refuse to theorise how this nature could be 
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"sublimated-sublated". 22 Whereas many of these arguments are telling when applied 
to the fragmentary text that is Dialectic of Enlightenment, it ignores Adorno's 
more detailed appropriation and critique of Freud. 
Adorno's Freud is a peculiar mixture of the early and the late work. Adorno 
does not show a great deal of interest in the Oedipal structure of humankind, 
arguing that Freud's timeless ahistorical understanding of the id, reifies and covers 
over the social components of unconscious processes which are unconscious 
precisely due to the process of modernity: 
"The time-lag between consciousness and the unconscious is itself the stigma 
of the contradictory development of society. Everything that got left behind is 
sedimented in the unconscious and has to foot the bill for progress and 
enlightenment. Its backwardness becomes Freud's timelessness". 23 
For Adorno, contrary to the critique of his work, it is the id that is rigid not the 
ego, and it is the failure of psychoanalysis to reflect on the social content of this 
abstractness which is its undoing due to its reversion to myth: 
" ... Freud's 'myths' ... recur wherever 
Freud too perpetrates ego-psychology, 
in his case an ego-psychology of the id, and treats the id as if it possessed the 
consummate rationality of the Viennese banker it at times really does 
resemble". 24 
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Therefore, Adorno certainly does not articulate a first nature approach to an 
understanding of libidinal repression. Furthermore, when referring to the ego, he 
reads the ego in more complicated terms than just as a rigid, dominating form of 
subjectivity. Whitebrook argues that Adorno sees the ego as "rigidified, compulsory 
and coercive i25, but it is far more unstable than that implies. Adorno's 
understanding of the ego relies on a reading of Freud's later essay on The Ego 
and the Id, alongside holding onto the earlier division between instincts for self- 
preservation and sexual instincts. Adorno does not refer to Freud's revision of his 
instinctual theory whereby the sexual instinct comes to include both self- 
preservative and libidinal impulses, whereas it is counterposed to the death instinct. 
Adorno seems singularly uninterested in the death instinct, which is peculiar given 
his later writings on death and survival. For him, the ego has to contend with 
both the sexual and the self-preservative instincts and is therefore far from stable. 
This is not a once and for all battle but an ongoing instability within the 
structure of the ego. Adorno's central critique of ego-psychology is its rigidifying 
gaze, which fixes the id and the ego as entities which are separated and which 
only interact through the mechanisms of drive and repression. 
The concept of narcissism, for Adorno, "counts among Freud's most magnificent 
discoveries". 26 Narcissism further undermines the strict division between ego and 
id, because it means that the ego can be charged with a certain form of libido, a 
narcissistic libido. The self-preserving instinct of the ego remains tied to the ego, 
but not in the form of rationality, not in the form of control, but in the form of 
a particular kind of "narcissistic injury". The concentration is then on the 
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powerlessness of the ego. Narcissism becomes a form of defence mechanism, which 
is not even registered as such by the ego, because it takes place through libidinal 
processes. Adorno even goes on to question whether repression can be seen to 
take place in the rational consciousness of the ego rather than being a formation 
of narcissistic libido. Narcissism becomes so important for Adorno, because it 
incarcerates an instinct for self-preservation within the libidinal structure of the 
human psyche. This is discussed in relation to feelings of helplessness. The 
problem is not so much the feeling of helplessness in the face of an all-powerful 
society, because the ego as ego can articulate and express this feeling, but the 
narcissistic ego falls in love with its own situation of helplessness, such that it 
doesn't recognise the situation for what it is, it cannot "experience or confront 
(this) helplessness". 27 As we will see later with the question of reification, it is 
this inability in current society to grasp immediacy as a mediated form or to 
experience helplessness as helplessness, which pushes any experience of the truth 
of society to the margins. In the essay Sociology and Psychology, the margins 
become that of childhood. Childhood sexuality becomes something that cannot be 
grasped or adequately conceptualised by the discipline that supposedly discovered 
it, Freudian psychoanalysis: 
" His magnificent discovery of infantile sexuality will cease to do violence only 
when we learn to understand the infinitely subtle and utterly sexual impulses of 
children. In their perceptive world, poles apart from that of the grownups, a 
fleeting smell or a gesture take on dimensions that the analyst, faithful to adult 
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criteria, would like to attribute solely to their observation of their parents' 
coitus. " 
28 
The Freudian account of narcissism gives Adorno a concrete understanding of how 
the very core of life can become reified, in the sense that narcissism becomes an 
identification with that reification. What Adorno could have developed in this 
essay is that narcissism becomes the form that mimesis takes in modernity. 
Narcissism as a pathic and helpless identification with that power which takes 
hold of life is the return in modernity of the form of mimesis as fearful 
identification of a dominating nature. The twist within the modern form of 
narcissism is that fear is not the predominant mode for such relation, but the 
narcissistic love of the very elements within the self that rigidify and open up the 
self to the constraints of power. Adorno's critique of a commodified culture 
explores the means in which humans come to desire that which controls and 
manipulates their desire. The 'life that does not live' is this life that identifies and 
desires the very forces, which preclude it from living freely, 
Damaged Life 
For Adorno, any form of experience that can move beyond the reality of identity 
thinking will have to be something that is itself mediated and dependent on just 
that reality, if it is not going to become an empty solace. Any interrogation of 
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modern life, must begin with the estranged and degraded form of life that is being 
lived: 
"He who wishes to know the truth about life in its immediacy must scrutinize 
its estranged form, the objective powers that determine individual existence even 
in its most hidden recesses. , 29 
As we have seen, any conception of a life in its immediacy is likely to be 
problematic in terms of its complicity with a history of domination whose 
diagnosis both Agamben and Adorno share, and could serve as a mode of 
smuggling in ideological metaphysical notions such as the sacredness of life. 
Adorno will specifically address this through his use of a Hegelian notion of 
"immediacy" and through his use of the concept of reification, so that the life 
that is referred to throughout Minima Moralia is not a fundamental ground, but a 
product of history. 
The question of reification is fundamental for Adorno in the recuperation of a 
concept of life that is historical. Exactly what his concept of reification is, and the 
changes that it undergoes have been a matter of considerable debate in the 
secondary literature, but it is undoubtedly an important concept for Adorno, and in 
many ways is the central concept in Minima Moralia, in that "damaged life" is 
reified life. The concept of reification enables Adorno to construct a Hegelian and 
historical argument about life and the loss of immediacy. 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes that: 
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" ... subjectification and reification 
do not merely diverge. They are 
correlates. The more knowledge is functionalised and made a product of 
cognition, the more perfectly will its moment of motion be credited to the 
subject as its activity, while the object becomes the result of the labour that 
has congealed in it -a dead thing. " 
30 
What does it mean for subjectification and reification to be correlates ? In 
Negative Dialectics, Adorno counterposes the Marxian notion of fetishism (der 
Fetischcharakter der Ware) with the earlier notion of alienation (Entfremdung) and 
with Lukdcs's concept of reification (Verdinglichung) .31 For Adorno, the fetishism 
of commodities relates to an examination of two different forms of objectivity: an 
object as something that is kept in the foreground as the guiding thread of the 
project of criticism, what Adorno terms the "object's preponderance", and the 
distortion of that object into a fetish by the principle of exchange value. The 
theory of the fetishism of commodities expresses the contradictory thought that, 
despite the materiality of the world, despite the "preponderance of the object", the 
material world is also phenomenal, an appearance based on a concealment of 
social practices and institutions. Reification, for Adorno, is a concept that, if it can 
still be used, can only be used to refer in this way to the fetishism of 
commodities, a concept which is fundamentally analyzing contradictions to do with 
the appearance of objectivity within capitalism. This description of reification 
serves as a critique of the idealist presuppositions of the concept found in 
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Lukäcs's History and Class Consciousness. For Lukäcs, reification consists in a 
process whereby the products of human activity come to be seen as natural 
existents, and essential human qualities which are objectified through free labour 
become reified in the process of industrial capitalism, where the object is alienated 
from the labour of the worker. The object, rather than becoming a projection of 
the human into the world, serves as an alienated entity , which stands in a position 
of power over human subjects. Furthermore, objects become a form of "second 
nature", an inert, dead nature that seems to have nothing to do with the human 
labour that has produced them. 
Adorno criticizes this notion as it relies upon the loss of essentially human 
qualities through the productive process, and thus, only entrenches enlightened 
thought further, because the whole concept of reification is grounded upon a 
subjective idealistic philosophical premise; a subject confronting inert matter and 
attempting to synthesise this matter into objects. Estrangement occurs because 
humans are not free to synthesise inert matter on the basis of a free, rational 
choice, rather than under the coercion of need or the profit motive. This whole 
configuration ignores the presentation of objects as objects for a synthesizing 
rationality. Reification theory tends towards an idealistic identification of the world 
as subject and falls into the trap of an already reified form of thought dependent 
upon a prior subject synthesizing an inert materiality. This is what Adorno means 
when he terms the "lament over reification" an "epiphenomenon". 32 
Despite this critique, Adorno continues to use the term reification to refer to 
the state of modern life. Furthermore, there is little engagement on Adorno's part 
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with the carefully argued account of reification given in Lukäcs's central chapter 
of History and Class Consciousness. Adorno tends to read Lukäcs through a 
critique of either his early or his later work, when explicitly offering a critique. 33 
Some have argued that Adorno's concept of reification changed throughout his 
writing and that in his later work, he was criticising an earlier position on 
reification. 34 Martin Jay has argued that the major difference between Adorno and 
Marx is due to Adorno's undifferentiated and diffuse notion of domination which 
pre-dates capitalism and therefore becomes extended to the whole process of 
Enlightenment stretching back to the Ancient Greeks. 35 
The most detailed attempt at reading Adorno's theory of reification comes in 
Gillian Rose's book The Melancholy Science. 36 Rose outlines the main critiques of 
the Lukäcsian notion of reification, which Adorno provides, all of which are related 
to an overvaluing of the subject over the object. Rose outlines the following 
critiques. According to Adorno, Lukäcs's concept of reification, as we have seen 
above, verges on a criticism of objectivity as such. This seems a harsh criticism of 
the Lukäcs of History and Class Consciousness, whose central philosophical 
concern in the chapter dealing with reification is with the philosophical problem 
of the thing-in-itself. Lukäcs seems completely pre-occupied with philosophical 
notions of objectivity, and with how the object cannot be made to be identical 
with the subject, although, admittedly he will posit a subject/object identity. 
According to Rose's construction of Adorno's critique, Lukäcs is arguing that the 
bourgeois categories of thought can be simply eliminated. I don't think this is an 
accurate critique of Lukäcs's position, which is specifically concerned with working 
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through the bourgeois categories of thought. Arguing that they can be overthrown 
is not the same as saying that they can be eliminated. Lukäcs claims that the 
proletariat can become the subject/object of its own history, and become conscious 
of its own exploitation and work towards a reconcilement of subject/object. This is 
clearly a central point of difference between Adorno and Lukäcs. 37 
What Rose's clear presentation does is delineate points of difference between 
Lukäcs and Adorno, and identifies the different ways that these thinkers 
appropriate the Marxist notion of fetishisation. However, what is often ignored are 
the affinities between the two thinkers, as well as Adorno's often crude criticisms 
of Lukäcs. The central points of agreement between Lukäcs and Adorno are that 
reification is a process that is exacerbated and intensified through capitalism. 
Therefore, although forms of rationality, and economic exploitation occurred prior 
to capitalism, they are only totalised through the capitalist economy. This 
totalisation has intensified given the control of the economic system. Therefore, the 
theory of total reification, which appears nonsensical, in terms that it does not 
leave any position from which you can criticise capital, should be read as a 
description of the intensification of control in a totalising way, rather than a 
completion of the process. 
Both thinkers share an understanding of modern life as a form of second 
nature, but specifically something that is a dead nature. Life is not living because 
it has been defined in its naturalness as the eternal, the capitalist modes of 
production which are given as eternal laws. This penetrates into the very 
consciousness of human beings. Both thinkers privilege aesthetic modes of 
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understanding as having been foreclosed in modernity, but Adorno is particularly 
caught in the dilemna that Lukäcs outlines as follows: 
" ... either the world must 
be aestheticised ... Or else, the aesthetic principle 
must be elevated into the principle by which objective reality is shaped: but 
that would be to mythologise the discovery of intuitive understanding. " 38 
Both thinkers attempt to understand modernity immanently, through the use of 
dialectical thought, which can put into contradiction existing concepts and realities 
to point beyond itself to something other than the current status quo. There is no 
escaping the current reified whole, as Lukäcs argues in very Adornian terms: 
"The reified world appears henceforth quite definitively ... as the only possible 
world, the only conceptually accessible, comprehensible world vouchsafed to us 
humans. Whether this gives rise to ecstasy, resignation or despair, whether we 
search for a path leading to 'life' ... this will do nothing to modify the 
situation as it is in fact. "39 
Both Adorno and Lukäcs share an understanding of the irrationality and instability 
of this reified whole, and of how this can lead to catastrophe. The totality is a 
peculiar combination of chance and necessity, so that every manifestation of life 
exhibits this interaction between details that are subject to laws and a totality 
ruled by chance. 
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These affinities point to the way of understanding the usage of "life" in 
Minima Moralia through a dual combination of all of the philosophical 
antecedents freighting the term. The twist added by Adorno, in opposition to 
Lukäcs, is that Adorno fundamentally disagrees that there is a political agent 
capable of grasping the immediacy of their role within modernity and therefore 
changing it. For Lukäcs, reification can be overcome through a process whereby: 
" ... man, who 
is the foundation and the core of all reified relations, can only be 
discovered by abolishing the immediacy of those relations. It is always necessary 
to begin from this immediacy, and from these reified laws. , 40 
For Adorno, it is this immediacy that is becoming impossible, and it is certainly 
not possible to be discovered through the work process of the proletariat. Many of 
the descriptions of Minima Moralia are concerned precisely with this 
commodification of humanity in its basic core. The second important difference is, 
as we have seen, that Adorno's concept of reification is concerned with the 
process whereby objectivity is constructed through forms of identity thinking. 
Reification does not only concern the process through which social relations are 
turned into objects, but also the very relation of subject and nature intrinsic to 
human labour itself, encapsulated in the idea that humans recognise themselves 
through the domination of nature. For Adorno, there is a fundamental concept of 
reification which is concerned with an articulation of this domination that has 
been central to human history, and intensified through capitalism. To understand 
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what Adorno means by life in the sense of a life that is reified at its core, it is 
important to read his early essay on the idea of natural history, as it is here that 
his grappling with a concept of reification and its relation to ontology first makes 
an appearance in a specific engagement with the early work of Lukäcs. 
The Idea of Natural History 
"The Idea of Natural History" is an early text and some of its claims would be 
revised by Adorno, although not explicitly, but rather in a shift of language. For 
example, Adorno talks unabashedly of his aim being to "dialectically overcome the 
usual antithesis of nature and history", a form of language redolent with a 
Hegelian notion of sublation that the later negative dialectician would specifically 
disavow. 1 However, this is a foundational text for two reasons. First, because 
Adorno is setting out in a programmatic way his thinking on the conceptual pair 
nature-history, which will continue to be formulated through his writings on 
politics, aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics. Second, it is one of the few 
places in his writing that he engages with the project of ontology in a spirit that 
is not overtly polemical. The first section of Negative Dialectics and The Jargon 
of Authenticity are both marked by a tone of anger and a political desire to 
distance himself from the work of Heidegger, which is not present in "The Idea 
of Natural History". In fact, the essay stakes out a position, which has a certain 
sympathy with ontology, but then withdraws from this dialectically. 
Adorno grounds his enquiry in the following way: 
103 
"I would like to develop what I call the idea of natural-history on the basis 
of an analysis, or more correctly, an overview of the question of ontology 
within the current debate. This requires beginning with 'the natural'. For the 
question of ontology, as it is formulated at present, is none other than what I 
mean by 'nature' .,, 
42 
Adorno provides a survey of ontological thought prior to Heidegger, and then 
specifically criticises the Heideggerian project in Being and Time. He sets out the 
ontological critique of radically historical thought, a critique that he says has 
dominated the "Frankfurt discussions". This critique argues that any radical 
historical thought which concerns itself with a content which exclusively relates 
itself to historical conditions alone will have to account for how history is pre- 
given as a structure of being. This is clearly a critique that Adorno takes 
seriously, and it is this critique that is at stake in the essay, and particularly at 
stake in the idea of nature. However, he is adamant that the Heideggerian concept 
of historicity will not serve the purpose of grounding history; whereas the 
ontological critique has power for Adorno, its solution is just another version of 
idealism. Historicity is idealist for two reasons. First, particularities are related to a 
structural whole. A structural whole may not be a systematic whole, but it is still 
idealistic in its basic core belief that the existing can be known and incorporated 
by the one who constructs the structural whole. Adorno considers the objection 
that phenomenology would argue that it is not rationalistic, but concerned with the 
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category of "life", but dismisses this as still idealism in terms of an idealistic 
irrationalism. The path to a concept of "life" still goes through transcendental 
subjectivity, even if that is reified into the grand themes of historicity or Being. 
The attempt to grasp the historical being of Dasein as structural whole in terms 
of its being-in-the-world, or its relation to the meaning of Being, privileges a 
structural whole which ignores the particularity of real, historical existence. The 
unity of subject and object in Heidegger's work as either a foundational ontology 
of being-in-the-world, or an ontology of the relation of beings to Being, is a 
posited identity rather than an achieved entity. There is no content that can be 
given in historical terms to either the prepredicative world of being-in-the-world or 
the question of the relation of beings to the meaning of Being. There is a tension 
in Heidegger's work between an interpretation of concrete human existence and its 
core structure or modes. Heidegger's attention to a phenomenological description is 
a hermeneutic based upon uncovering formal and core components of a human 
existence which are not historical in the sense of being constructed by history and 
culture. This is only an initial phase in an attempt to think history as historicity, 
as the way in which humans can transcend their historical being and grasp 
historical reality itself. Adorno attempts to respond to the dual problem of 
historicity, of how you can ground historical being in terms of the natural, and 
how a transcendence and grasping of historical being as historical being can take 
place, but he argues that Heidegger's philosophy fails to provide a framework for 
such a thought. 
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The second idealistic component of the ontological use of historicity lies in its 
concept of "possibility", and the relationship between possibility and actuality. For 
Adorno, what he terms the project of being takes precedence over facticity, and 
therefore ontology comes to replicate the antithesis between possibility and 
actuality inscribed in the Kantian contrast between categorial subjective structure 
and empirical multiplicity. Ontology cannot give an account of the relation 
between Being and beings, and is caught in an analogous trap to a Kantian 
philosophy, which can give no content to the relations of a priori categories and 
how they apply to the sensible content of thought. Adorno formulated some of 
these criticisms in his earlier critique of Marcuse's work, HeR l's Ontology and the 
Theory of Historicity. Marcuse's work attempts a mediation between concepts of 
ontological life and dialectics through a return to Hegel's concept of life as the 
space of Being. This work is his last overt attempt to mediate between a specific 
Heideggerian philosophy and a fidelity to Hegelian dialectics, and he conducts it 
through a reading of the Hegelian concept of life as an ontological concept. 
Furthermore, Dilthey becomes the link from Hegel to Heidegger in this work, and 
the concept of historicity is the point at which the ontological meets the ontic 
through an ontological concept of Life that is made explicit through human 
praxis. 43 For Adorno, this project still shows too much fidelity to the ontological, as 
he argues in his critique: 
"Why indeed should the 'ontological' question precede that of the interpretation 
of the real, historical facts, since Marcuse himself would like to bridge the gap 
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between ontology and facticity ? '"a4 
For Adorno, and ultimately for Marcuse, the attempted bridging of this gap still 
privileges the ontological moment. 
Adorno agrees with the ontological project in the sense that his aim is the 
"concrete unity of nature and history", but this unity cannot be developed through 
the postulation of an ahistorical ontology either as foundational ground or as the 
meaning of Being, but only "developed from the elements of real being itself'. 45 
This leads to the programmatic statement, which would serve him well throughout 
his work: 
"If the question of the relation of nature and history is to be seriously posed, 
then it only offers any chance of solution if it is possible to comprehend 
historical being in its most extreme historical determinacy, where it is most 
historical, as natural being, or if it were possible to comprehend nature as an 
historical being where it seems to rest most deeply in itself as nature . 1146 
This statement has certain ambiguities which are continually present in Adorno's 
work when referring to nature and history. If we read the first pole of the 
dialectic, that historical being must be read, "in its most extreme historical 
determinacy", as the natural, what does this mean ? Well, it appears to mean two 
things in Adorno's work. First, that the historical, in terms of the transient and the 
product of human construction, must be grounded upon a residue of nature. This is 
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the ontological moment in the dialectic, in that there is always an ontological 
question as to the grounding of historical being. The natural is considered here in 
naturalistic terms as a foundational ground. Second, this statement can be read as a 
reading of the historical in terms of the natural as "second nature". Reading the 
historical as natural in this sense reveals how the historical has become eternalised 
as a natural non-human product in the modes that we examined above in relation 
to reification. Reading the natural as historical has a more straightforward 
programme in terms that every ontological ground in naturalistic terms must itself 
be read as mediated historically by the forces and relations of production. 
The second half of the essay concerns two readings of history and nature 
which conform to Adorno's programmatic statement. The first is from Lukäcs and 
concerns the reading of history through nature as "second nature". This is nature 
that is no longer mute and foreign to the senses, but presents itself as a deadened, 
alienated, yet complex and meaningful set of "ciphers". 47 It consists of a complex 
of meaning, but is inert, dead, cannot be brought to life. Lukäcs's exemplarity for 
Adorno is the attempt at reading nature as a historical product, as the depositing 
of human alienation into a world of nature that becomes rotten in its form. 
Lukäcs reads history as being transformed into nature, that which is transient is 
transformed into permanence. Adorno reminds us that there is no first nature for 
Lukäcs that is not alienated, that first nature for Lukäcs is the nature of science, 
grasped only in terms of our categorical construction and not in itself. The result 
of the transformation of nature from something living into something that is 
rotting, or even dead, petrified, is that any act of interpretation, any act of criticism, 
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becomes a form of awakening. For Adorno, Benjamin serves the second exemplary 
move in the idea of natural history, precisely by bringing this notion of awakening 
into the project of philosophical interpretation. Benjamin shows that nature in itself 
cannot be perceived as underlying substance, but must always be thought of as 
transitory in itself, that there is no conception of nature without history. Everything 
that exists must be grasped as a complex interweaving of nature and history, and 
that which is historical grasped as natural, as that which is natural is grasped as 
historical. 
Adorno explicitly outlines his rapprochement with ontology, although as he 
states it is a different form of ontology from the work of Heidegger: 
"A double turn, therefore, is made: on one hand I have reduced the ontological 
problematic to a historical formula and tried to show in what way ontology is 
to be concretely and historically radicalized. On the other hand I have shown 
under the aspect of transience, how history itself in a sense presses towards an 
ontological turn. i4S 
This ontological turn, though, must in itself be historicized. However, there is still a 
difficulty in Adorno's thinking, in that he emphasises an ontological turn, but at 
the same time resists any fundamental ontology. In terms of a concept of damaged 
life which is to serve as a critique of contemporary social forms of life, is it not 
reliant upon a foundational or naturalistic concept of life itself, which can be 
recovered or uncovered beneath such a damage ? The aspect of the dialectic of 
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natural history that is not emphasised in his critical appropriation of Lukäcs and 
Benjamin in the "Idea of Natural History" is the reading of the historical as 
natural, in terms of a concept of the natural as residue within the historical, rather 
than the natural as reifying "second nature". Is there an emphatic concept of 
natural life in Adorno's work which can serve as a means of recuperating a 
different mode of subject-object relations than those that pertain within "damaged 
life"? Such an interpretation of Adorno's thought has been given recently by J. M. 
Bernstein, in his attempt to give a content to Adorno's concept of life through a 
critical reading of the work of John McDowell. I think that this reading is 
important, but causes too many problems for Adorno's critique of ontology for it 
to stand, but I think such a project of re-enchantment is a plausible reading of 
Adorno, which I will now move to in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Re-Enchanting Nature 
In Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, Bernstein attempts to give content to 
Adorno's thinking of nature as the non-identical, through a reading of McDowell's 
writings on epistemology in Mind and World. ' Bernstein outlines three distinct, but 
interrelated meanings of "life" that Adorno uses in Minima Moralia. First, there is 
the Aristotelian notion of the "good life", an ethical mode of living, which Adorno 
refers to as previously being a central concern of philosophy. Second, there is, what 
Bernstein refers to as the "evaluative sense of organic life, the sense of "life" that 
gives on to vitalism". Third, there is the Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit, the life of 
society, with its practices and customs, which is depicted throughout Minima 
Moralia. 2 It is the second concept of "life", which appears to be, intuitively, the 
most problematic for a reading of Adorno, in that the notion of an "evaluative 
sense of organic life" would seem to be a foundational ontology which would 
negate Adorno's ilegelian insistence that everything is mediated. 
Anthropomorphic Nature 
Bernstein argues that Adorno gives an account of an "anthropomorphic nature" 
that has been replaced by enlightenment practices of instrumental reason. However, 
although this concept of "anthropomorphic nature" is used throughout the book, its 
definition is difficult to pin down. Bernstein argues that enlightenment defines 
myth as anthropomorphism, the projection of the human onto nature". 
3 He makes 
the claim that the project of demythologization becomes the elimination of 
anthropomorphic nature, the elimination of: 
If ... anything that might 
look like it is a part of nature solely because we have 
collectively placed it there. "' 
There already appears to be a confusion here. In a standard definition, 
anthropomorphism defines a state of mind, which results in the attribution of 
human characteristics to non-human entities. Presumably this is why Bernstein 
refers to animism as a form of "gross anthropomorphism", as it attributes human 
life, or a human soul to all living things, although animism could be equally 
defined as the attribution of divine entities, i. e. gods to non-human entities rather 
than the human projecting onto the non-human. Anthropomorphism does not refer 
to the project of objectification in the world, which is different from projection, 
although Bernstein here appears to conflate the two. This discussion is important 
because Bernstein makes the following strong claim that: 
"Adorno's philosophical project is to resurrect a legitimate anthropomorphism, an 
anthropomorphic nature that is somewhere between the extremes of 
myth ... and enlightenment. 
"5 
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What Bernstein means by anthropomorphic nature is an understanding of the 
human as a part of nature, as involved with nature and dependent upon the 
material world, and this is something that is lost through the domination of nature 
presupposed by concept-intuition dualism. Why this is termed anthropomorphic is 
odd, given that anthropomorphism seems to depend upon a separation of the 
human from the non-human in order to project human attributes on to the non- 
human. It is precisely a first stage in the transformation from mythical thinking to 
enlightenment thought in its attempt to mould and adapt nature. Bernstein's notion 
seems to be more nature-morphic, in terms of a conception of humanity that 
moulds itself and adapts itself to nature, rather than vice versa. In his earlier 
essay, "Re-Enchanting Nature", Bernstein uses the term "circumambient" rather 
than "anthropomorphic" nature. This seems a better term for the "nature intrinsic 
in and the counterpart of our embodiment". 6 Bernstein's use of this concept of 
nature borrows heavily from McDowell's work. In Mind and World, McDowell 
attempts a solution to the Kantian problem of how thinking can be both free (i. e. 
spontaneous), yet nevertheless connected to a material world which structures and 
determines thought. Thoughts must have some content, but that content cannot 
constrict thoughts to the extent that spontaneity and freedom does not apply in 
thinking. McDowell attempts to think a form of receptivity in experience that 
would allow the taking up of matter in a spontaneous way into the "space of 
reasons", but he wants to do this without any concept of the given, as something 
that is unproblematically available for the senses to work upon. The problem is 
the connection between thoughts and intuitions, and how a purely passive 
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experience can be linked to a spontaneous and active reason. This Kantian 
problem leads to an oscillation between two unacceptable alternatives for 
McDowell: 
" ... we are prone to 
fall into an intolerable oscillation: in one phase we are 
drawn to a coherentism that cannot make sense of the bearing of thought on 
objective reality, and in the other phase we recoil into an appeal to the Given, 
which turns out to be useless. "7 
McDowell's solution to the oscillation is a distinctive concept of experience, and 
furthermore a distinctively human concept of experience. For McDowell, there is no 
separation between the operations of the understanding and the passive receptivity 
of sense experience: human experience is conceptual all the way down. What 
McDowell means by conceptuality in this sense, is that there can be no separable 
thinking of spontaneity and receptivity in any form of experience. The rational 
understanding does not stand apart from a flow of passive intuitions, which are 
then organised by the mind, but the very form of receptivity involves conceptual 
understanding. Conceptual understanding is implicated in the very mode of sense 
perception, of the receiving of sense impression, and it is implicated in the sense 
that this mode of perception is spontaneous and free. Nature cannot therefore be 
conceived as a realm of law: 
"Experiences are impressions made by the world on our senses, products of 
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receptivity: but these impressions themselves already have conceptual content. "8 
What does it mean for sense impressions to have conceptual content? This is the 
point that is left rather unclear by McDowell, but he is clear that the actualisation 
of our nature is at stake, and it is the actualisation of a nature that is distinctively 
free, in the sense that it is both spontaneous and passive. This involves a 
distinctive understanding of nature as a realm of spontaneity, rather than the 
traditional scientific representation of nature as a realm of law. The corollary of 
this understanding of nature necessarily involves a certain re-enchantment of 
nature, a re-enchantment that McDowell embraces in terms of a positive concept 
of "second nature". Second nature is the awareness of how we develop as rational 
beings through our natural, embodied actualisations of a spontaneous, yet receptive 
nature. Second nature is the awareness of our development as being grounded in a 
natural development, but it is a development distinct from non-human animals as it 
is spontaneous all the way down. Spontaneity is only a problem if conceptuality is 
configured as a response within the structure of a realm of law, but concept 
formation should be thought as a way of capturing or configuring our "ways of 
living". 9 However, our ways of living will be significantly different from other 
forms of living because what distinguishes humans from nonhuman animals is this 
level of rational receptivity in all forms of living. McDowell's naturalism is also a 
thoroughgoing and old-fashioned humanism, in the sense that it sharply 
differentiates human from nonhuman animals. 
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The originality of Bernstein's reading of Adorno lies in his usage of 
McDowell's thought, and it is his achievement that he sees the congruence of 
elements of Adorno's thinking of nature and McDowell's critique of Kantian 
epistemology. These congruences lie in an attempt to think the connection between 
thought and objectivity in a way that privileges the object, without a concept of 
the given as an unmediated direct access to objectivity. However, there are several 
problems with McDowell's work, and these problems will also affect any reading 
of Adorno through McDowell, even given Bernstein's critique of Mind and World. 
Bernstein's critique of McDowell is twofold. First, he argues that the concept 
of second nature, or the recovery of a second nature in Mind and World, ignores 
the social and historical processes embedded in our inability to realize that the 
exercise of our reason is dependent upon our embodiment in the world. It is not 
just a category mistake that we have forgotten that thinking relies upon an 
embodied relation to the world, but a result of processes of thinking (identity 
thinking) and world historical processes, primarily industrial and post-industrial 
capitalism, which have made it almost impossible to recover a second nature in 
McDowell's sense. Bernstein is arguing that McDowell needs to complement his 
concept of second nature with a Lukäcsian concept of second nature, as his re- 
enchantment of nature is too easy. It is Bernstein's second critique that leads to 
particular problems in his interpretation of Adorno. Bernstein is uncomfortable at 
the clear demarcation between human and nonhuman experience that McDowell 
draws, for good reasons. McDowell's argument separates all human experience from 
nonhuman experience, primarily because he wants a grounding of human 
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experience which is both passive and spontaneous, and thus he wants a base level 
of responsive experience which is fundamentally conceptual "all the way down". 
McDowell feels that nonhuman animals are basically responsive and therefore not 
spontaneous, that passive receptivity and spontaneity are separable in nonhuman 
animals, but cannot be separated in humans. This distinction seems too sharp, and 
Bernstein correctly identifies it in his critique, as it does not allow for any 
understanding of how our animal lives as humans are actualized in our thinking. 
Bernstein recommends that we replace this central idea, with a notion of our 
animal selves as grounding our core conceptual capacities: 
" ... passive synthesis should 
be, in the first instance, associated with 
accomplishments of animal embodiment rather than the passive exercise of 
conceptual capacities. i10 
In one sense, this is a straightforward argument, that we share a range of 
activities, affects and drives with nonhuman animals, and that these will impinge 
upon the ways that we respond to the world. These will both be positive and 
negative attributes, in traditional normative terms, so we will share nurturing 
instincts and violent, aggressive instincts. The problem for Bernstein is that he 
wants to use these shared attributes in a strong grounding sense as the basis both 
for our spontaneous thinking and normatively as a basis for ethical thinking. 
McDowell could do this as he argued that there was no separation between 
receptivity and spontaneity in any form of human experience. Bernstein correctly 
117 
recognizes that this is not argued for and seems unlikely given our common 
evolutionary heritage with other species, but he wants to retain the strong 
grounding principle of this animal embodiment. He does this in his book on 
Adorno through the concept of material inference. ' He argues that Adorno's 
references to the non-identical as making a claim through human suffering, can be 
thought as a strong form of naturalistic grounding of both an ethics and a new 
form of conceptual thinking. It is in this sense that a new, awakened or enchanted 
epistemology will configure a more ethical relation to the world. This can occur 
through the processes of material inference, in the sense that our natural embodied 
responses to our vulnerability as human bodies can enshrine a different way of 
living. Bernstein uses the example that the response to someone bleeding badly is 
to apply a tourniquet, but it is unclear what the grounding is for such a strong 
inferential response. In fact, Bernstein retains some of the problems of McDowell's 
arguments in the very project of a grounding of reason in nature; this problem is 
that there is no argument as to why such a grounding should be inferential. There 
are two problems here. First, although McDowell and Bernstein reject a certain 
argument about the given, they still construct arguments that are foundationalist, 
and second, their foundationalism requires a level of inferential connections that is 
never argued for. In McDowell's case it is the argument that spontaneity exists all 
the way down in human experience, and in Bernstein's case it is the argument 
that certain states of affairs immediately call upon certain responses, due to our 
animal embodiment, but the whole notion of inference here needs to be 
examined. 12 Why a certain animal reaction should be enshrined as strongly 
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inferential rather than another is never explained by Bernstein, but, one could 
equally outline cases where the injurability of life calls forth responses of violence 
or indifference. In Precarious Life, Judith Butler explores a similar argument as to 
the injurability of life as a basis for ethical thinking, through an analysis of 
Levinas's writings on the "face of the other". 13 What is emblematic, for Butler, in 
the Levinasian account of the face as the demand of the other, as the 
representative of the fragility of life, is that it calls forth a conflicting response; 
the desire both to kill and to respect. There is no straightforward inferential path 
that leads from the capacity to suffer to a response which respects that, rather 
than tries to erase it. Both responses are parts of our animal embodiment in the 
world, and therefore that embodiment cannot provide a straightforward inferential 
means of grounding either our thinking or our morality. 
Bernstein states that "particularity and naturalism" are primary orientations for 
Adorno, and turns Adorno into a theorist of human nature, and an ethical theorist 
of human nature at that, with the twist that he is a theorist of human nature when 
there is no nature, a theorist of the residue of human nature. As he argues: 
" ... anthropomorphic nature 
has at least been made all but invisible, and, at 
worst eliminated, become a residue, then all Adorno can do is point to the 
original setting of reason and subjectivity, itself a highly speculative 
gesture ... 
" 14 
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Bernstein is accurate in one sense here, in the importance of a speculative concept 
of life within Adorno's work, but he is wrong in inflecting this speculation in a 
negative sense as a "gesture". Nor can this speculation be conceived as a re- 
enchantment of nature, as nature itself is full of conflicting impulses and urges. 
Nature itself as foundational ground for a humanism in terms of material 
inference ignores those aspects of the "natural" which may not call forth 
inferential ethical responses, but instead call for pure responses of self-preservation. 
This would be the Nietzschean critique of such a naturalism, that the concept of 
life as nature is indebted to a humanism which subordinates the natural and reads 
it in purely human terms. Adorno's response would be that the natural needs to be 
read "where it rests most deeply as natural", as the historical. 15 Although Bernstein 
does attempt this, with his critique of McDowell's overly optimistic concept of 
"second nature", his reading of Adorno's naturalism as a foundational ground 
ultimately leaves us with an ontology which is not historicised. 
Bernstein does capture Adorno's concern with a concept of life in Minima 
Moralia, what he refers to as modernity and the disenchantment of reason leading 
to a point where it is "sapping the living from life", but I don't think that the 
explanatory framework that is given in relation to the eradication of an 
anthropomorphic nature makes any clearer an Adornian understanding of life. ' 6 The 
other main problem, in this reading of Adorno through McDowell, is the concept of 
philosophy involved in McDowell's epistemology. This reading of Adorno remains 
at the level of epistemology, even if it is a deepened epistemology; the implication 
being the Kantian one that there are certain things knowable through the 
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categories of reason and certain things that are unknowable. Even though 
McDowell consciously sees his project as Hegelian it remains within the bounds 
of a certain Kantianism in its acceptance of the categories of thinking as they 
are. The process of the re-enchantment of nature is a clearing of the dense forest 
of philosophical concepts to open up the relation of mind and nature in a certain 
form of embodied practice. This foundational ism, though, needs to be supplemented 
with the Hegelian project of a speculative use of reason, as Robert Stern argues: 
" 
... while 
McDowell wants to vindicate common sense ... Hegel wants much 
more to vindicate a kind of conception of philosophy that Kant had thought 
was impossible ... 
Hegel does not see Kantianism as incompatible because it 
fails to uphold common sense realism, but rather because it fails to uphold 
philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. "" 
Stern's critique is that McDowell's thinking remains at the level of Kantian reason, 
whereas the core of Hegel's attempt to move beyond Kant lies in an attempt to 
think philosophy in a speculative sense, rather than as a vindication of reason as 
it currently stands. This leads McDowell to a certain passive conception of the 
nature of philosophy, and this leaks into Bernstein's reading of Adorno. Bernstein 
understands Adorno's dialectics as a dialectics that refers to material inference 
rather than a dialectics that opens up the space of thinking otherwise through 
conceptuality. The negative dialectic, for Bernstein, is the form of conceptual 
thinking which reveals the material moment of the concept that has been 
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repressed by identity thinking. '8 Whilst this is certainly one way of reading 
Adorno's emphasis on the preponderance of the object, and on a dialectical 
experience which opens up thinking towards its material determinants, to describe 
it in terms of a material inference already determines the status of what is outside 
current conceptual categories in a way that is illegitimate given Adorno's 
understanding of a reified life in which there is no space for a posited 
reconciliation between mind and world. Adorno's thinking of nature is speculative, 
in the sense that it has to be because there can be no true thinking of nature 
given the structures of identity thinking. The process of negative dialectics does 
consist in the "undoing of concept-intuition dualism", but it does not extend to "an 
elaboration of the notion of material inference", as Bernstein wants it to do. 19 This 
response to the difficulties in Adorno's thinking of nature is problematic, because 
despite the disavowing of a notion of nature as foundational, it nevertheless relies 
on a certain primary naturalism, a certain notion of nature as the given, and, 
therefore poses three difficulties for any philosophy, like Adorno's, that is self- 
consciously post-Kantian in the sense of agreeing with some elements of a 
Hegelian critique of Kant. First, there is the Hegelian critique of the given as 
unmediated; Adorno, like Hegel, will argue that there is nothing that is not 
mediated, and the reading of Adorno through a concept of material inference, and 
the setting of McDowell's thought, relies upon a certain notion of the given, even 
if it sets itself up as a philosophy that solves this problem. Second, the thinking of 
a foundational nature is fundamentally ahistorical, as though there are certain 
elements of fundamental nature that do not change over time and can be 
122 
recovered. This thinking lies at the heart of any project of a re-enchantment of 
nature; the thought that there is something that lies within either our conceptual 
categories or our animal lives that can be reawakened and thus illuminate a 
relationship to nature that has been disenchanted. This has to be something 
fundamentally different to the operations of enlightened thought, as the rational re- 
enchantment of nature is a contradiction in terms. However, the argument that there 
are capacities or modes of living unaffected by history, unchanged by our 
interactions with the world, that can be recovered and, thus, re-enchant nature is 
highly unlikely. Bernstein recognises this in his critique of Adorno's concept of 
mimesis, as precisely a capacity that survives the ravages of identity thinking 
unscathed and ready for recuperation in the experience of the work of art: 
"It is here assumed that mimesis represents an independent, archaic form of 
cognition that survives only in art. Where this thesis goes wrong is in giving to 
mimesis a substantiality and independence it does not possess. i20 
Certain aspects of the mimetic faculty are thought to have survived unscathed and 
can be recuperated in aesthetic experience. This reifies mimesis as a faculty 
unaffected by social and historical determinants, just as the argument for material 
inference reifies a certain response to living that can make a direct demand for 
an inferential response. Third, the reliance on epistemology as the mode of a 
philosophical rescue of an experience of nature ignores Adorno's attempt at a 
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speculative philosophy, a philosophy that attempts to change the categories of 
thinking rather than naturalise them. 
Intellectual Experience 
The other central critique of McDowell's reading of Kant is that the problematic 
he sets up within Kant is solved by Kant himself, or there is an attempt at a 
solution, but in the third rather than the first critique. 21 In Mind and World , 
McDowell's reading of Kant remains at the level of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
and doesn't take into account Kant's arguments in the Critique of Judgement. 
Adorno uses many of the concepts of reflective judging that are outlined in 
Kant's Critique of Judgement in his definition of an intellectual experience, which 
is essentially an experience of thought, of the ability of thinking to exist through 
the determinate negation of what is. The only possibility for such a determinate 
negation, given the erosion of autonomy through capitalist modernity, exists within 
the experience of a tension between immersion and withdrawal in objectivity. 
Adorno uses the following example: 
"Nothing less is asked of the thinker today than that he should be at every 
moment both within things and outside them. Münchausen pulling himself out of 
the bog by his pig-tail becomes the pattern of knowledge which wishes to be 
more than either verification or speculation. i22 
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The retention of an idea of truth rests with the possibility of forms of thought, 
which do not inflict violence to objectivity, which linger with particularity, without 
resolving into an identifying result. The experience of thinking is therefore 
something that is always fallible, always subject to error and failure, as it is 
always a thinking against the limits of what can be thought. 
In "The Essay as Form", Adorno articulates a notion of intellectual experience 
which is encapsulated at its best in the essay form, an experience in which 
concepts do not form a continuum, but are "interwoven" around the object under 
scrutiny. This form of thought is a form of experience due to a certain passivity 
in its nature: 
"The thinker does not actually think but rather makes himself into an arena for 
intellectual experience, without unraveling it. i23 
Intellectual experience can only function through conceptuality, but can escape the 
identifying function of conceptuality through its capacity to linger with objects and 
form patterns and constellations of concepts around the objects. It is an experience 
that is necessarily fallible, and an exaggeration in the sense that it always 
overshoots the object. However, it is not clear what the relation is between this 
intellectual experience and the subjective experience of modernity. This intellectual 
experience is a withdrawal, but any withdrawal is always compromised by what it 
withdraws from. Adorno writes as follows: 
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"If truth has a temporal core, then the full historical content becomes an 
integral moment in it ... The relationship to experience-and the essay 
invests 
experience with as much substance as traditional theory does mere categories - 
is the relationship to all of history. Merely individual experience, which 
consciousness takes as its point of departure, since it is what is closest to it, is 
itself mediated by the overarching experience of historical humankind. , 24 
Within the essay form, the individual experience of the object under scrutiny is 
mediated further by the historical experience of that object, and its reception, and 
it is only in the relationship between this individual experience and the historical 
experience that an idea of truth can be attained. It is only through experience, and 
not as a traditional Kantian approach would stipulate through the categories of the 
understanding that an idea of truth can be achieved. However, this account of 
experience has several Kantian overtones if we think of it in relation to the 
Critique of Judgement. In fact, the third critique can be thought of as the attempt 
to interrogate the problem of a rule-governed spontaneity, the very problem that 
preoccupies McDowell. Kant's characterisation of the judgement of taste as a 
universal judgement free from the determining synthesis of a concept is a model 
for the experience that Adorno describes. As Kant writes: 
"As the subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a 
judgement of taste is to subsist apart from the presupposition of any definite 
concept, it can be nothing else than the free play of imagination and 
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understanding. i25 
This mode of experience is intrinsically passive and requires a level of free- 
floating attention to be given to the object in view, as Kant writes, in language 
very similar to Adornos: 
"We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation 
strengthens and reproduces itself. The case is analogous ( but analogous only) to 
the way we linger on a charm in the representation of an object which keeps 
arresting the attention, the mind all the while remaining passive. , 26 
David Bell has outlined several elements to the concept of reflective judgement 
that Kant outlines in the third critique. Aesthetic judging is criterialess, it has no 
presuppositions or model to start from. It is spontaneous, in the sense of not being 
rule governed. The judgement is expressive of the object that is presented to the 
subject, and it is expressive in the sense of being a sensible mode of judging 
rather than a faculty of rational understanding. Thus aesthetic judgements are non- 
cognitive, in the sense of not being subsumed under a governing and synthesising 
concept. Despite being expressive in the sense of being accompanied with a 
feeling, aesthetic judgements are not invested in the object in the sense of desire 
or affection, they are essentially disinterested, and because of this they are 
"presumptively universal", in the sense that they hold for any apprehension of the 
object in the same circumstances, and can therefore be universally valid. Aesthetic 
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judgements are purely formal, in the sense that they are solely responses to form 
rather than matter. Nevertheless, they are synthetic, and do perform a synthesis, but 
a synthesis without a governing concept. Finally, they are reflective rather than 
determinative judgements. 27 Adorno's concept of intellectual experience shares many 
of the facets of this account of aesthetic judgement. His account of intellectual 
experience relies on the possibility of a constellation of concepts expressing 
something of the truth of the object through a passive and non-subsumptive 
experience of the object of interpretation. The interpretation is criterialess in that it 
does not presuppose any meaning to be uncovered or hold any sure key for 
unlocking the object of study. The attempt to put something into play, to think not 
through a continuum of logical progressions, but through the thinker "making 
himself into an arena for intellectual experience", demands a level of spontaneity 
and imagination. Intellectual experience is spontaneous in that it demands a passive 
and free response from the subject. Adorno articulates the relationship of 
experience to cognition as a relation within cognition rather than counterposed to 
cognition; 
"Knowledge of the object is brought closer by the act of the subject rending 
the veil it weaves about the object. It can do this only when, passive, without 
anxiety, it entrusts itself to its own experience ... 
Subject is the agent, not the 
constituent, of object ... X28 
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Experience that gives priority to the object, "entrusts to itself' in the sense that it 
allows the apprehension of the object to unfold through a lingering with the 
particularity of the object. Subjective experience is an attempt to encapsulate the 
forms of human cognition and understanding that are not encapsulated in the idea 
of the constituting transcendental subject. The subject of experience is therefore 
always changing in the moment of experience, in the sense that it is the subject 
that is constituted by the experience rather than the object. 
The question of how Adorno's concept of intellectual experience departs from 
Kant's concept of aesthetic judgement opens up questions which we have seen 
that Bernstein attempts to resolve through a certain naturalistic reading of Adorno. 
I have outlined where I think that this elaboration of Adorno's concept of 
experience causes more problems than it solves. Nevertheless, the problems remain. 
First, what is the basis for this blind synthesis that occurs in a synthesis without a 
subsuming rule-governed concept, if it cannot be articulated through a notion of a 
material inference ? Second, and relatedly, how does this material moment come to 
matter in thought, how is this intellectual experience determinative as well as 
reflective, is this intellectual experience the experience of form or matter, or how 
does it dissolve this distinction ? Finally, there is the question of how this 
subjective, intellectual experience, can link to a wider conception of historical 
experience ? How do we construct a concept of a wider historical experience from 
this intellectual experience particularly given Adorno's critique of any totalised 
system ? 
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Having an Experience ? 
The question of the basis for a non-conceptual synthesis can be approached via 
the question of what it means to experience in a fulfilled manner, what does it 
mean to have an experience, in the strong sense of the word ? In Minima Moralia, 
Adorno writes of the "fulfilled relation of experience to its subject-matter". 29 This 
fulfilled relation is not something that Adorno will posit, due to the awareness that 
a completed experience, given the conditions of life and cognition, as "damaged 
life" in late capitalism, is usually a false reconciliation. Adorno's thought wants to 
delineate the outlines of fulfillment through the concept of damage. However, this 
tension between a concept of damaged life and a resistance to outlining a fulfilled 
life causes problems for Adorno's negative dialectics, in that such a negatively 
dialectical proceedure always calls forth what Adorno terms elsewhere an 
"ontological need". 30 This ontological need, though, is betrayed if it results in an 
ontology, an account of the life of humans which is an ahistorical and 
foundational ground. Adorno's proceedure in terms of responding to the ontological 
need is twofold. First, looking to the past in an attempt to recover elements of a 
relation between the subject and object which can then be re-awakened in certain 
forms of experience (primarily aesthetic experience), and second, looking to the 
future through a utopian concept of experience, which arises aporetically from the 
possibilities opened up by a negatively dialectical philosophical experience. The 
question of the basis for such a non-subsumptive synthesis lies in Adorno's 
recuperation of mimesis as a faculty of reason, a faculty which has been 
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subordinated historically to the cognitive subsumption of object by concept 
indicative of predicative thought. The concept of mimesis has a clear reference to 
a certain concept of life, and also a strong element of a backward looking rescue 
about its recuperation as a concept. In terms of what it means to have an 
experience that is mimetic, I want to explore this relation between mimesis and 
life in terms of experience. 
The model for an authentic experience in Adorno's philosophy is aesthetic 
experience. The mimetic faculty has migrated into a form of aesthetic comportment 
towards the object, which can model a relation between subject and object that 
offers a positive concept of fulfilled experience. Such a positive concept of 
fulfilled experience can be offered through the theory of aesthetics, due to the 
semblance character of the aesthetic object. As aesthetics deals with artifacts, the 
reconciled relation of subject and object as outlined through aesthetic 
comportment, does not betray the diremption at large in reality, because the 
particular relation of subject and object within aesthetics is not reliant on 
conceptual subsumption. Mimesis originally arose as a means of coping with the 
fear of a dominating external nature. When humankind was unable to dominate or 
control natural events, mimetic activities attempted to model the object or imitate 
the object as a means of controlling fear. In this sense, mimesis is completely an 
entrapped and spellbound mode of human comportment, but the particular 
importance of such a relation between subject and object, is that it is a relation 
whereby the subject becomes immersed in objectivity, a relation where the subject 
is immersed to the extent of being dominated. With the increasing ability of 
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human technology to tame and construct nature in accordance with the needs of 
human survival and self-preservation, this mimetic comportment migrated into other 
less interest driven modes of human action, primarily the experience and 
production of artworks: 
"Art is a refuge for mimetic comportment. In art the subject exposes itself at 
various levels of autonomy, to its other, separated from it, and yet not altogether 
separated . 
i3' 
I have outlined above, the problem with this rescue of mimesis as a faculty, that 
somehow survives unscathed the vicissitudes of history. The problem for Adorno 
here is a certain concept of experiential fullness, which has a relation to life. 
Adorno doesn't articulate this fully, but there is a philosopher, John Dewey, who 
specifically outlines the connection between aesthetic experience and life, in ways 
that may assist in trying to understand the concept of a fulfilled experience. 
Adorno had read Dewey's work, and refers approvingly to it, in several texts. 32 
Dewey's book Art and Experience, mirrors many of the concerns of Adorno, in its 
explicit aim to articulate a realm of aesthetic experience as a model of fulfilled 
experience that is autonomous, but nevertheless has links with a continuum of 
human experience. It is the links that Dewey articulates through a concept of life, 
that can put some flesh on the bones of Adorno's concept of experience, but also 
raise questions for the recuperation of a concept of experience. In referring to 
Dewey's work here, I don't want to use this work as a means of substituting 
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Dewey's account of the relation between experience and life for an account of 
Adorno's concept of life, when Adorno only has a concept of damaged life, but 
simply to try and articulate a certain meaning of a fulfilled experience. 
Dewey articulates an intense experience as an achievement of "vitality", an 
achievement of the "organism". 33 Experience only arises through a complex 
interplay between the human subject and the environment that is characterised by 
resistance of an object, struggle and achievement. The experience has a certain 
closure, and a certain rhythm, modelled upon this interaction between subject and 
life. Experience is therefore both an undergoing, a suffering, and an achievement. 
Experience thus completes itself, but in its completion as a satisfaction of an 
initial need, returns in a changed mode. The unity and closure of fulfilled 
experience does not bring the organism to a stasis, but results in a changed 
subject and object, and a changed relation between subject and object: 
"Every movement of experience in completing itself recurs to its beginning, 
since it is a satisfaction of the initial need. But the recurrence is with a 
difference; it is charged with all the differences the journey out and away from 
the beginning has made". 34 
Although Dewey doesn't refer to the distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung, 
this description is a good summary of experience as Erfahrung, in the sense of the 
journey of experience which changes both the subject of experience and the 
object of the experience in a fulfilled mode that yet opens experience out again 
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at the end of the experience, as Dewey writes, we "are never wholly free from the 
sense of something that lies beyond". 35 This experience is not pure in the sense 
that it is always compromised by needs, desires, and a manipulating relationship 
towards the object. Nevertheless, a certain natural attitude is the prerequisite to the 
pure experience that is aesthetic experience, a natural attitude characterised by 
Dewey, in the terms of "rhythm", as it is only through a rhythmic relation between 
the subject and her environment, that the precondition for a certain comportment 
towards the aesthetic object can take place. Aesthetic experience is therefore not a 
separate realm to everyday experience, but is founded on certain modes of living, 
due to the relation between rhythm, form and expression that occur in the natural 
attitude and are sublimated in an aesthetic experience. Dewey articulates the 
experience of a work of art in the following way: 
"When the structure of the object is such that its force interacts happily (but 
not easily) with the energies that issue from the experience itself: when their 
mutual affinities and antagonisms work together to bring about a substance that 
develops cumulatively and surely (but not too steadily) toward a fulfilling of 
impulsions and tensions, then indeed there is a work of art ,,, 
06 
The concept of a relation between subject and environment that results in a 
rhythmic experience of resistance, tension and completion verges on a fundamental 
ontology, unless there is a historical account of this experience. Dewey gives a 
broad historical account of a certain tendency towards a decay in experience 
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caused by the replacement of an overload of information in modernity, rather than 
the tense achievement of a unity of experience. He argues that: 
... we yield to conditions of 
living that force sense to remain an excitation on 11 
the surface ... Identification nods and passes on. Or 
it marks a dead spot in 
experience that is merely filled in. The extent to which the process of living in 
any day or hour is reduced to labelling situations, events and objects as 'so and 
so' in mere succession marks the cessation of a life that is conscious 
experience. Continuities realised in an individual, discrete form are the essence 
of the latter ". 37 
The tension in this account is between a traditional concept of experience and an 
ontological concept of experience. It is a tension that we will trace in the next 
chapter in relation to accounts of the decay of experience in modernity. The 
problem with a concept of mimesis for Adorno, as a mimetic comportment that 
has migrated into aesthetics, is that as a foundation for a synthesis that is not 
subsumptive, it becomes purely ontological itself. If it is historicised then it 
becomes more open as to how such a relation returns as either a pathic and 
fearful imitation, or a tender and non-subsumptive imitation. The account of 
mimesis as "nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively produced with its unposited 
other", may work as an account of a certain form of aesthetic experience, but the 
gap between aesthetic and everyday experience is more difficult to bridge, unless 
an ontological argument is posited in terms of a fundamental mode of human 
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relation in the world, a form of "being-in-the-world" that has magically remained 
unaffected through history. 38 At times, Adorno does not historicise this notion of 
mimesis but articulates it as a form of rationality that has been forgotten but can 
be magically re-awakened through aesthetic experience. In a sense, this is the 
backward looking and regressive account of a relation between experience and 
life. However, Adorno does give a more speculative account of mimesis in 
Aesthetic Theory, an account of mimesis as a shudder (an Erschütterung (shattering) 
or, at other times, Schauer), which results in an awakening to the natural not as an 
ontological prepredicative lifeworld, but the natural as that which speculatively 
escapes the immanence of the historical. 
Shudder 
Adorno writes about the shudder in aesthetic experience, as a form of individual 
experience which desubjectifies, an experience of immersion and loss in the object 
that is frightening in its destabilising of the ego, but also an awakening to other 
possibilities and relations between subject and object. This is a moment of 
immediacy, but it would be wrong to characterise it as a lived experience in terms 
of an Erlebnis. Although the shudder as the dissolution of the ego in the work of 
art is instantaneous, its instantaneity is dependent on a full, comprehending 
consciousness (experience as Erfahrung). There can be no experience of the 
shudder, unless there is a strong individual who understands and approaches the 
work of art in terms of its tradition, its unfolding, and its relation to its historical 
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context. However, the experience of the shudder dislocates the egocentric nature of 
subjective experience in the sense that there is no "particular satisfaction for the I" 
in this experience. 39 This is not an intuitive grasp of the intentions of the artist, or 
a direct revelation of the content of the artwork as being personally meaningful in 
terms of the recipient's life. These two responses would remain at a level of 
Erlebnis. The relation between the shudder and experience is a non-conceptual 
experience of a completely new form of experience, an individual experience that 
is without a dominating ego: 
"Shudder, radically opposed to the conventional idea of experience (Erlebnis ) 
provides no particular satisfaction for the I; it bears no similarity to desire. 
Rather, it is a memento of the liquidation of the I, which, shaken, perceives its 
own limitedness and finitude. This experience (Erfahrung) is contrary to the 
weakening of the I that the culture industry manipulates. "4° 
Adorno attempts to articulate an openness of experience that is primarily 
individual, but at the same time dislocates the individual from a strong and 
dominating ego as self-preservation. This is a desubjectifying moment, but not 
analogous to the weakening of the subject by the manipulations of the culture 
industry. The passivity and withering of experience fostered by the culture 
industry, is a withering which reduces the ability of the subject to adopt any kind 
of differentiating or critical stance towards the object. A critical moment, and 
therefore a strong ego, is paramount for any form of experience, in the sense that 
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without a critical distance, the subject becomes a passive sponge for stimuli. 
However, the shudder intimates a form of individual experience that might move 
beyond the ego, not in terms of an identity of subject and object, but in terms of 
a relation between subject and object that is not dependent on domination and 
need, a truly free relation. This shudder is a trace of "life" in an emphatic sense, 
life in the sense of a reconciled relation between subject and object that is non- 
subsumptive. The life that is expressed here is the possibility of a different form 
of subjectivation in which the human does not lose her relation to her own body 
and to the natural world, in the process of a subjective formation. However, it is 
also an achievement, in the sense of experience as Erfahrung, in that it is only 
through the production and creation of a strong ego, that the "irruption of 
objectivity into subjective consciousness", can be achieved. 
4' 
The question, who is having the experience in this sense becomes radicalised in 
the form of a paradox. This is a "subjective experience against the I". 42 As a 
subjective experience, it is dependent upon a certain tradition and community to 
form itself as experience, and this tradition and community also represses itself as 
experience, in that it has a repressive side. The speculative experience of a life 
that can overcome such a dialectic is experienced in the aesthetic object, through 
this emphatic yet individual experience that registers itself as both a protest 
against the loss of ego and a pleasure at a complete immersion in objectivity. 
This immersion, though is only momentary: 
"For a few moments the 'I' becomes aware, in real terms, of the possibility of 
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letting self-preservation fall away, though it does not actually succeed in 
realising this possibility ... that 
it itself is not ultimate, but semblance. , 43 
Rather than foundation for experience, the shudder is a revealing outcome of a 
process of experience. This is a moment of immediacy, achieved through an 
attempt by the subject to model the object, but this immediacy is completely 
speculative in the sense that it is a glimpse of a different mode of being rather 
than a fulfilled achievement. It is also a speculative moment that is realised 
somatically, through a bodily reaction, but one that is disconnected from the usual 
motors and drives of bodily action such as desire. It is a model of an embodied 
yet disinterested response, what Adorno terms as the joining of "eros and 
Therefore, if we can talk about life in the subject it is only in terms knowledge". 44 
of this achieved experience of the "shudder": 
... 
life in the subject is nothing but what shudders ... 
Consciousness without 11 
shudder is reified consciousness. That shudder in which subjectivity stirs 
without yet being subjectivity is the act of being touched by the other. "45 
This fulfilled experience is not a foundation or a prerequisite, but a speculative yet 
bodily experience. The problem for Adorno is that it depends upon a certain 
formation of subjective experience in traditional terms, as a continuity of 
consciousness over time, as a subject which is able to order, assimilate and 
develop its experience, and its relation to a tradition in terms of both appropriation 
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and critique. The speculative experience that is the "shudder" is dependent on the 
possibility of a subjective experience formed through a certain relation between 
the subject and the environment, a relation described by Dewey. This relation is 
historically produced in terms of a traditional concept of experience, in terms of a 
subject who, in a rhythmic, yet harmonious relation with the world, is able over 
time to unify and absorb a sedimented tradition, in order to move beyond that 
tradition. The problem for Adorno is that in his account of the decay of 
experience, it is just such a concept of experience that is being lost, and, thus, if 
the speculative experience of the shudder in the reception of the artwork, or the 
experience of possibility in a process of negative dialectics, is dependent upon 
such a concept of traditional experience, the speculation will disappear alongside 
its foundation in subjective experience. It is to this decay of experience that we 
now turn. 
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Chapter Five: The Decay Of Experience 
In this chapter I will reconstruct the different accounts that Adorno, Benjamin and 
Agamben give of the decay of experience in modernity. The purpose of outlining 
these accounts is to understand their respective concepts of experience, and their 
common usage as both a decay of experience and an account of an experience 
that can be used as a means of rescuing a form of life in modernity. 
In a recently published essay, Martin Jay outlines three central questions for 
what he terms the Frankfurt School's "lament" over the decay of experience. ' The 
first question concerns the historical point at which this crisis occurred and 
whether the crisis can have been caused by a "historical event or process, ... or is 
something more ontological at issue ? 512 This issue was the main focus of the first 
two chapters of the present work on Auschwitz and the concept of survival in 
Agamben's and Adorno's writings. All three thinkers do argue in different ways 
that it is a historical process that has produced the crisis for experience, but there 
are fundamental differences in the interplay of history and ontology. 
The second question that Jay poses is as follows: 
" Is there, moreover, a coherent and unified notion of experience assumed by 
the lament, or does the word function in different ways in different 
contexts? "3 
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This question will guide the first two sections of this chapter which will begin 
with an analysis of the philosophical concepts of experience that are at work in 
the different accounts of decay or ruin given by Adorno, Benjamin and Agamben. 
It will focus on the concepts of Erlebnis and Erfahrung as the two differing 
concepts of experience that serve as a mode of accounting for the decay of 
experience in modernity and of the differing ways of attempting to rescue a 
concept of experience. 
Knowledge, Authority, Experience 
In his essay entitled "Infancy and History", Giorgio Agamben gives a genealogy of 
the concept of experience, that charts its transformation from an authoritative 
concept to something that is essentially incomplete and insatiable. This genealogy 
begins with the statement that experience at its core is not a matter of 
knowledge, but rather of authority, and this authority is related to the power of 
narration. Experience is therefore something that is expropriated by science and 
transformed into the experiment. The form in which experience gained its authority 
was that of the maxim or the proverb, but in its translation into science, 
paradigmatically with the work of Francis Bacon, experience becomes a tool, a 
method for the acquisition of knowledge rather than the authoritative transmission 
of experience itself. 
Adorno's relation to Francis Bacon, and to his place in a transformation of 
experience is rather more dialectical. In his inaugural lecture to the philosophy 
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faculty of the University of Frankfurt, he refers in a positive light to what he 
terms "that old concept of philosophy which was formulated by Bacon", as the 
"ars inveniendi (art of invention)". For Adorno, the aspect of this concept of 
experience and of science as the art of invention that is positive is the 
imaginative reconstruction of the material of the natural sciences to produce 
something new through the configuration of that material, by the use of the 
imagination, what Adorno terms "exact imagination". 5 In his early project of 
interpretation without intentional meaning, Adorno sees Bacon's creative and 
inventive concept of experience as a concept of experience that has been lost in 
idealism: experience as the invention of the new through the imaginative, yet 
immanent configuration of matter. This process is immanent because it remains 
with the material at hand, and attempts a free reconstruction of that matter, rather 
than an attempt to impose a meaning from outside. However, it is precisely this 
form of experience that Agamben reads as an expropriation of experience. 
Two things happen with this "expropriation" of experience according to 
Agamben. First, experience loses its authority, and second, it becomes displaced 
from the subject onto the methodology of measuring the natural world. There is, 
for Agamben, a concept of traditional experience, which relates itself to the 
authority of a life which cannot be measured or instrumentalised, and therefore 
cannot be talked about in terms of its certainty, but rather lies in the span of a 
human life approaching the limit of its death: 
"Traditional experience ... remains faithful to this separation of experience 
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and science, human knowledge and divine knowledge. It is in fact the 
experience of the boundary between these two spheres. This boundary is 
death. Hence Montaigne can formulate the ultimate goal of experience as a 
nearing to death - that is, man's advance to maturity through an anticipation 
of death as the extreme limit of experience". 6 
Agamben's account is clearly influenced by Walter Benjamin's argument about the 
decline of experience in his essay on "The Storyteller". Benjamin describes the 
situation in the following way: 
"Just as a sequence of images is set in motion inside a man as his life 
comes to an end - unfolding the views of himself under which he has 
encountered himself without being aware of it - suddenly in his expressions 
and looks the unforgettable emerges and imparts to everything that concerned 
him that authority which even the poorest wretch in dying possesses for the 
living around him. This authority is at the very source of the story. 0 
The temporal modalities contained in this experience are complicated in that they 
unfold through a momentary upsurge of authoritative experience through the series 
of images of a life as a whole, which comes unbidden with the shock of an 
impending death. Thus we have the memory, which is not willed, but comes 
unbidden, but is a memory of a tradition in the form of a life. Alongside this, 
there is the emergence of something new, unspecified and momentary, the 
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"unforgettable", which is imparted through the expressions and looks of the dying 
man. What is transmitted in this experience is therefore not something easily 
conceptualisable or communicable, but can be characterised as the experience of 
the man's life. Experience, in this sense, appears as a mixture of a sudden, and 
unwilled revelation which contains an authority through its narration to a 
community of listeners. Traditional experience has its model in the goal of 
achieving maturity through the approach of impending death. The aim was an 
"achieved totality of experience", which Benjamin cites in the passage above. 
Experience was something that it was possible to possess, but with the referral of 
all experience to the modern subject, whose model of experience is scientific 
knowledge, a knowledge which is in principle endless and never acquired in full, 
experience becomes something that it is never possible to have but only possible 
to undergo, and loses all authority. Experience ceases to be the ne plus ultra of 
knowledge, and becomes the path towards knowledge. 
The story being told is of a historical trajectory in terms of the transformation 
of experience from a form of fulfilled experience, which rested on an 
understanding of shared tradition and an ability to form and narrate that tradition 
through the authority of a privileged insight. The transformation of the subject of 
experience is narrated differently in Agamben's work and in Benjamin's essay; 
Benjamin configures this transformation through the various changes in the 
subjective experience of modernity, particularly the technical means of reproducing 
and disseminating information, whereas for Agamben it is paradigmatically the 
project of science which expropriates experience as authority. What is left unclear 
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in both accounts is the status of this traditional experience, as to whether it is 
somehow more authentic than the experience of modernity. Although often 
configured as a fall from grace, this loss of experience should not be immediately 
associated with a decline from an authentic to an inauthentic experience, but, rather 
as the loss of a place in the world. 
In the opening section of Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer 
situate Bacon in a similar way to Agamben as the author of a concept of 
experience as the foundation of the project of modern science, which inaugurates 
the domination of subjectivity: 
"Bacon's view was appropriate to the scientific attitude that prevailed after 
him. The concordance between the mind of man and the nature of things 
that he had in mind is patriarchal: the human mind, which overcomes 
superstition, is to hold sway over a disenchanted nature. Knowledge, which is 
power, knows no obstacles ... i8 
However, even at this point of most criticism, there is something in Bacon's 
concept of concordance between humans and nature relating to the chance 
discoveries of material that means that his concept of experience does not totally 
rest on an identifying procedure. The "experimental philosophy" still retains that 
element of a concept of experience where everything is open, and the outcome 
and intentions of any scientific procedure can be held suspended. 9 It is precisely 
this openness of exper ience that Agamben reads as an expropriation of experience 
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in the sense of a loss of authority, and in an analogous but contrasting way he 
reads this expropriation of experience through what he terms a "reversal of the 
status of the imagination. " 10 
For Agamben, the expropriation of experience corresponds to an expropriation 
of imagination. In Antiquity, imagination was the supreme medium of knowledge, 
serving as the mediating element between the sense and the intellect. Although he 
refers to this as mediation, he doesn't mean it in terms of Hegelian mediation, or 
even in terms of the Kantian schematism, but rather the imagination as that which 
guarantees the real, that which provides the "coincidence of subjective and 
objective. "" The imagination in this sense becomes replaced in the new science 
by the concept of experience, as imagination is removed to the realm of the 
"hallucinatory". Agamben concludes his argument in the following way: 
"Between the new ego and the corporeal world, between res cogitans and 
res extenso there is no need for any mediation. The resulting expropriation 
of the imagination is made evident in the new way of characterising its 
nature: while in the past it was not a 'subjective' thing, but was rather the 
coincidence of the subjective and objective, of internal and external, of the 
sensible and the intelligible, now it is its combinatory and hallucinatory 
character, to which Antiquity gave secondary importance, that is given 
primacy. From having been the subject of experience the phantasm becomes 
the subject of mental alienation, visions and magical phenomena - in other 
words, everything that is excluded by real experience. " 12 
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Agamben conflates and condenses a whole series of meanings of the imagination 
here, particularly in the "combinatory and hallucinatory" character of the 
imagination. The "combinatory" character of the imagination refers to a Kantian 
concept of the imagination combining the manifold of intuitions through the 
forms of intuition (space and time) to provide the object of perception. The 
"hallucinatory" character of imagination seems to refer to the process of 
imagination as something that is unreal, and, perhaps related to the notion of 
fantasy in the unconscious. Now, it is clear that there is a hallucinatory moment in 
the Kantian imagination, in the sense that the imagination serves the purpose of 
making present for the faculty of the understanding the synthesis of empirical 
intuitions, a combination of intuitions to form the object of perception. This 
making present depends on the imagination reconstructing and joining together 
disconnected intuitions into a present moment in order for this manifold to be 
apprehended as an object for the understanding. However, it is far from clear that 
this equates with the exclusion of imagination from experience, rather imagination 
gains a dual character as precisely that which is most needed as the mediation 
between the categories of the understanding and the contents of sensible intuition, 
and that which is most unreal as it cannot be characterised in terms of the 
Kantian system. For Agamben, the "old subject of experience" returns in Kant, but, 
in a new way, and it is to the contrasting responses to the Kantian concept of 
experience that we must now turn in more detail.. 
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Kantian Experience and the Philosophy to Come 
Kant's concept of experience is exemplary for Agamben as it is the last place 
"where the question of experience within western metaphysics is accessible in its 
pure form - that is without its contradictions being hidden. "' 
3 The problem of 
experience, as Agamben understands it, is the split between a traditional concept 
of experience, which is exemplified by a subject who has experience rather than 
undergoes a process of experience. Experience has its correlation here in authority 
not certainty, not knowledge in the sense of scientific understanding of the world, 
but what Benjamin terms "wisdom". 14 This old subject of experience is someone 
who retains his authority to tell a story from his own life and his connections 
with the lives of others, and has experience to the extent that the telling of the 
story consumes his life in the process of narration. Agamben configures the split 
in the subject of experience inaugurated by a dissolution of this traditional 
authoritative experience in relation to Don Quixote, who "befuddled by a spell", 
can no longer have an experience but only undergo experience, whereas Sancho 
Panza, the old subject of experience, has experience without undergoing it. ' 5 This 
split in experience emerges in the Kantian philosophy in the split between 
transcendental and empirical, in the terms of the epistemological problem of 
securing the grounds of knowledge. The Kantian philosophy is exemplary for 
Agamben because in its thinking of the subject it incorporates this split between 
an old subject of experience (in terms of the empirical "I"), and the new subject 
of experience (in terms of the transcendental "I think"). The authoritative subject 
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of experience was not concerned with the transcendental problem, the necessity to 
ground the conditions for the possibility of their experience. It is this move to a 
transcendental realm that fundamentally creates an empty form of experience as 
the condition for the possibility of experience. The aporia that results from Kant's 
attempt to identify the possibility of experience with the certainty of natural 
science is that the subject of experience disappears completely in the split 
between transcendental and empirical: 
"For Kant, since the transcendental subject cannot know an object (for this it 
needs the intuition furnished by sensory experience, being in itself incapable 
of intuition), but can only think it, it therefore cannot even know itself as a 
substantial rationality ... 
i16 
Thus, the Kantian concept of experience reaches the strange conclusion of positing 
the problem of experience "in terms of the experienceable. "" The 
"inexperienceable" operates in terms of both the thing-in-itself, and the 
transcendental subject of knowledge, the "I think" that accompanies all 
representations. Agamben's genealogy of experience results at this point in the 
story of the decline of experience from authority into experience as the 
inexperienceable, albeit in a search for certainty within the framework of the 
project of natural science. 
There is still a question as to how to understand this authority of experience 
that Agamben takes from Benjamin's "Storyteller" essay. One way of 
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understanding this is in relation to another essay by Benjamin, an essay 
specifically figured as a critique of the Kantian concept of experience. In his 
essay "On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy", Benjamin provides a 
groundwork for his concept of experience and the possibility of a new form of 
experience, an experience yet to come that will pass through a Kantian typology. 
The crucial element within the Kantian typology for Benjamin is the relation 
between subjects and objects, which is never overcome by Kant, and related to that 
the problem of how knowledge and experience can be configured through an 
empirical consciousness. Benjamin's strategy in the essay is twofold. First, to 
articulate the possibility of a concept of experience that overcomes the distinction 
between subject and object, and, second, to relate this to history in the form of its 
appearance in time. The concept of experience that Benjamin uses in the essay 
looks backwards to a form of fundamental experience based on an understanding 
of language and forwards to a concept of experience that will arise through a 
deepening and an overcoming of the Kantian categories. Benjamin's concept of 
experience is one of a fulfillment and unity that somehow lies behind the 
categories of the understanding. He makes the relation to theology explicit: 
"Such a philosophy in its universal element would either itself be designated 
as theology or would be superordinated to theology to the extent that it 
contains historically philosophical elements. " 8 
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Benjamin's early project in terms of the concept of experience can be 
articulated in the following way. First, there is a foundational concept of 
experience, the traditional concept of experience that Agamben outlines, which 
relates to a certain neo- Platonism in Benjamin's early theory of language. This 
emphatic concept of experience relates to a theory of the Name, which somehow 
expresses what is named: the coincidence of subject and object through a process 
of language as purely expressive rather than identifying. Although Agamben 
doesn't discuss Benjamin's theory of language, he shares a certain foundationalism 
in terms of a traditional concept of experience which resides in a coincidence of 
subject and object, but a coincidence that doesn't rely on the identifying 
procedures of epistemology. 
The second concept of experience for Benjamin is a concept that can be 
configured only through the Kantian categories; there is no return to a theological 
concept of coincidence between thing and name, but the orientation of this project 
guides the idea of a way of thinking the subject and object together, which can 
move beyond the polarities of subject and object. As he writes: 
... besides the concept of synthesis, another concept, that of a certain 11 
nonsynthesis of two concepts in another, will become very important 
systematically, since another relation between thesis and antithesis is possible 
besides synthesis. " 19 
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This is the productive moment in Benjamin's concept of experience, the idea of an 
experience to come. The third moment in this concept of experience relates it to 
its appearance in history; that the metaphysical concept of experience must be 
related in some way to its appearance in time: 
"This experience, in its total structure, had simply not been made manifest to 
philosophers as something singularly temporal ... "20 
This project of the temporality of metaphysical experience would become more 
important to Benjamin throughout his later work, and would inflect his neo- 
Platonism, but not to the extent that it disappears. 
For both Benjamin and Agamben, the Kantian concept of experience serves as 
both the terminus for a certain emphatic concept of experience, in the terms that 
Kant banishes the possibility of any linking of an emphatic or metaphysical 
experience with its appearance in history, and conversely, the point at which a new 
seed of experience might germinate, as the Kantian thinking of the subject and 
object pushes the concept of experience to a point of extreme contradiction. 
Adorno shares some of these concerns in his characterisation of Kantian 
philosophy, but his consideration of Kant's concept of experience pushes him in a 
different direction. 
Kantian Stammering: The Experience of the Transcendental 
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In his lectures on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Adorno devotes four separate 
lectures to the concept of the transcendental as it progresses through Kant's 
opus. 21 For Adorno, the Kantian concept of the transcendental functions as a block 
in Kant's philosophical project, a block that operates in two directions. First, the 
block operates as a ban on metaphysical experience, in the sense that all 
experience for Kant must come from the empirical realm; there can be no purely 
intellectual intuitions. However, as we have seen, the transcendental "I think" is 
precisely that which it is impossible to account for in its relation to the empirical 
realm within Kant's philosophy. What occurs with the transcendental "I think", and 
appears in its most clear form here, is the failure of Kant's dual attempt to base 
all knowledge on intuitions, and at the same time to outline a priori categories 
which will apply to these intuitions. The central experience of Kant's philosophy is 
the contradiction between these two approaches: 
"The path chosen by Kant instead is in actual fact a path constructed of 
pure concepts: he seeks through pure thought what absolutely must be 
thought if experience is to be at all possible. But such a process of logical 
deduction from pure thought is something he himself prohibits. i22 
It is in the thinking of the transcendental "I think" that Kantian philosophy comes 
up against the first block, the block of thinking the transcendent as something 
beyond the contents of experience. The aim of Kant's concept of the 
transcendental was to wring this sense of transcendence from the transcendental. 
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The concept of the transcendental was supposed to secure a realm of something 
prior to experience, something which must be the case for any experience to be 
possible, but not transcendent in the sense of a speculative thinking of something 
beyond experience. However, it is with the "I think" that these two meanings 
coincide again, however much Kant wishes to keep them apart: 
... the 
'I think' is emancipated from everything connecting to a merely 11 
empirical 'I' that is supposed to be contained in it. The moment we take 
this step it is hardly possible to arrive at any other conclusion than of 
elevating this spirit to the status of absolute spirit. v23 
This leads on to the Fichtean postulate of the absolute subject. However, the block 
does not just result in this gesture towards the thinking of a metaphysical 
experience that is forbidden, but also works in the reverse direction towards the 
realm of objectivity, of materialism. The aporetic concepts of Kantian philosophy 
result from the attempt of every theory of knowledge to resolve the problems of 
the non-identity of subject and object in terms of a "shift" towards the subject, 
and to base all knowledge on the subject. Adorno thus characterises the 
transcendental sphere, and the history of epistemology generally, as a system of 
credit which can never be redeemed, because the history of philosophy does not 
recognise that the object cannot be forced to coincide with the subject, and thus 
each concept fails in its identifying procedure: 
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"Each concept may be said to be an IOU that can be redeemed only by a 
further concept. Expressed more vulgarly, epistemology resembles the man 
who can only block up one hole by digging another. i24 
Kant's attempt to say what cannot be said is therefore twofold. First, there is 
nothing beyond experience in terms of a concept of transcendence, but, equally, 
there is no way of accounting for the object as it is, as every epistemology 
eventually rests on an identifying subject. There is an ongoing critique in Adorno's 
lectures of any separation of a constituens from a constitutum, and this is related 
to the concept of the transcendental, which is dependent on an idea of empirical 
individuality. There can be no discussion of the transcendental 'I' without a 
concept of empirical individuality. Adorno characterises the experience of Kant's 
philosophy as a form of stammering: 
"If I am not mistaken, we are looking here at the deepest aspect of Kant, at 
his attempt to say what cannot be said - and his entire philosophy is 
nothing more than a form of stammering, infinitely expanded and elevated. 
Like the act of stammering, it is a form of Dada, the attempt to say what 
actually cannot be said. "25 
Like Agamben, Adorno identifies the transcendental "I think" as the place in 
which the Kantian system expresses the problem of experience as the 
inexperienceable, but in Adorno, it is not conceived in the sense of a split between 
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knowledge and authority, but rather an inevitable aporia within the concepts of 
philosophy themselves. The sense of authority appears in Adorno's reading in his 
interpretation of Kant's critique as an attempt to salvage ontology, in the form of 
the absolute and timeless knowledge of the objects of experience that are given to 
us in the form of intuition. It is the failure of the system that reveals the problem 
inherent in any rescue of ontology, that the concept of a truth as a timeless truth, 
whether conceived of speculatively as beyond experience in the form of a 
transcendence, or transcendentally in the forms of what is prior to experience, 
cannot provide a grounding for a philosophy which wants to secure the objective 
world. The failure of the salvaging of ontology in the Critique of Pure Reason 
does not mean a loss of experience for Adorno, but the seeds of an experience to 
come, which would result in a thinking that is historical, and alert to the non- 
identity of subject and object, a thinking that is at the core of the experience of 
Hegel's philosophy. 
The Experience of Hegel's Philosophy 
In their respective genealogies of the concept of experience, Agamben and Adorno 
both situate Kant's attempt at a transcendental grounding of empirical experience 
as a key stage in the history of the philosophical concept of experience, but their 
different attitudes to the Kantian problem of the transcendental result in different 
evaluations of Hegelian experience. For Agamben, Kantian experience is the last 
place where the question of experience is to be observed in its purest form, 
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"without its contradictions being hidden". 26 The direction that the concept of 
experience takes in post-Kantian philosophy in terms of the absolute subject hides 
the traditional concept of experience that was expressed in the split between the 
transcendental and the empirical T. For Agamben, Hegelian phenomenology, which 
elevates the concept of experience as the method of philosophy, ultimately equates 
experience with the very essence of the subject, but in a way in which the 
subject's essence is always escaping it, through the enshrining of the concept of 
experience as negativity: 
"Thus experience here is simply the name for a basic characteristic of 
consciousness: its essential negativity, its always being what it has not yet 
become. "27 
This is the final loss of experience in its traditional sense, because the negativity 
of experience, which previously resided outside the subject in death, becomes 
internalised into the constitution of consciousness itself. Therefore, it is impossible 
for anyone to have experience, but only to undergo a process of experience, thus 
the description of the phenomenology of spirit as the science of the experience 
of consciousness. Agamben reads Hegelian experience as the fundamental loss of 
the authority of experience with its transposition from the realm of wisdom and 
narration, to that of the path of experience. It is the "negative and unattainable 
character of experience" incorporated in the methodology of the dialectic that 
finally extirpates the traditional concept of experience and institutes a concept of 
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experience which is by its very definition impossible to ever have. 28 This 
unattainable character of experience has its somatic corollary in the split between 
need and desire that Agamben configures as a result of the extirpation of the 
imagination from the concept of experience. Need as related to the satisfaction of 
corporeal needs and desire as insatiable and related to the imagination; these two 
entities were previously united in the traditional concept of experience, and only 
become sundered with the extirpation of the role of the imagination as mediator 
between subject and object. Hegel's use of desire as the motor for the recognition 
of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, incorporates this insatiability 
as the very mode of epistemology; "desire, - which emerges, significantly, as the first 
moment of self-consciousness - can only try to negate its own object, but never 
finds satisfaction in it". 29 This is why, as we will see later, Agamben proposes a 
critique of all dialectical thinking as a necessity for the rescue of any concept of 
experience in modernity. 
Adorno's essay on "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy" situates the 
experience of Hegel's philosophy, and, particularly the experience of the dialectic as 
a process with no definitive absolute result as the point in the genealogy of the 
concept of experience that the concept gains its true worth as the critique of 
existing social reality. Adorno agrees with Agamben that a new concept of 
experience arises in Hegelian philosophy, a concept which is produced by the self- 
reflexive moment of consciousness within Hegel's concept of experience as 
outlined in the Phenomenology of Spirit: 
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"This dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on its self -on 
its knowledge as well as its object - is, in so far as the new, true object 
emerges to consciousness as the result of it, precisely that which is called 
experience. "30 
This doubling of consciousness produces a new concept of experience in the sense 
that it produces an object which was not considered by Kant, "the object of 
reflection". 3' Hegelian experience is produced in the tension between knowledge of 
the object and knowledge of the process of apprehending the object as it appears 
to consciousness. The radical novelty of this concept of experience is that it 
becomes historical, in the sense that both the consciousness attempting to know 
itself and the object appear and are changed throughout history. The experience is 
precisely insatiable, in the sense that there is always a moment of non-identity in 
the attempt of consciousness to know its object, and to know itself as 
apprehending the object. Of course, the process of experience as journey in Hegel's 
philosophy culminates in an authority of experience at the end of the process, in 
the result of an absolute knowledge, which is the failure of Hegel's philosophy for 
Adorno. 
The self-reflection of Hegelian philosophy also involves experience as a turn 
towards the object due to the failed nature of any attempt to fully identify the 
object as such. This self-reflection as experience has a materialist orientation: 
" ... the reflection of reflection, the doubling of philosophical consciousness, is 
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no mere play of thought unleashed ... In that consciousness recalls, through 
self-reflection, how it has failed to capture reality, how it has mutilated things 
with its ordering concepts ... "32 
The self-reflection of Hegelian experience therefore has a number of consequences 
that are important for Adorno's concept of experience. First, and in stark contrast 
to Heidegger's reading of Hegel, Adorno argues that experience cannot be 
understood as something ontological in the sense of something that names Being, 
or something that is the Name that lies before language. This is ultimately 
Heidegger's reading of Hegel's concept of experience, that the concept names 
Being as something that is always involved in moving beyond itself. For 
Heidegger, experience "expresses what 'being' in the term 'being conscious' 
means". 33 The corollary to this is that philosophical experience cannot be 
understood in the phenomenological sense as an ur-experience, a transcendental 
ground for all other forms of experience. The most important lesson of Hegel's 
concept of experience is that it dispenses with all forms of ontological or 
transcendental foundationalism in philosophy through the concept of mediation. 
There is no experience of immediacy, of the object as such or the subject as 
such, or any originary experience that can be appropriated as event in history. 
There is only the mediation between subject and object as it appears and is 
conditioned by history. The important moment in Hegel's concept of experience is 
the reflective moment that enables us to reveal the non-identity between subject 
and object, and renew an orientation towards objectivity as such. The contradictions 
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within thought and within social reality are expressed by this new concept of 
experience which introduces a mobility into the forms of conceptuality themselves: 
"The movement of the concept is not a sophistical manipulation that would 
insert changing meanings into it from the outside but rather the ever-present 
consciousness of both the identity of and the inevitable difference between 
the concept and what it is supposed to express, a consciousness that 
animates all genuine knowledge. "34 
The contradiction of thought is constructed through both a consciousness of an 
identity between concept and thing and the inevitable difference between the 
concept and what it wants to express, the truth of the object. This is the 
contradiction of thought itself, and a reflection of contradictions in social reality, a 
social reality which both expresses forms of reconciliation and falsifies them at 
the same time. Adorno's common example is the exchange principle in capitalism, 
which both expresses a concept of equality in the exchange of equivalents, but at 
the same time covers up the exploitation in the social process that lies behind 
such exchange. Contradiction, in Hegelian experience, is always a reference to the 
form of thinking in a given reality, but a form of thinking set free, in the sense 
that awareness of contradiction involves the mobility of the concept that Adorno 
refers to above. 
Dialectics, for Adorno, cannot be reified into a method, or a dogmatic response 
to the world. Adorno's dialectical experience takes its leave from Hegel in a 
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certain distance from the concept of Aufhebung; the joint preservation and 
overcoming of contradiction in a more reconciled reality which will eventually 
resolve itself in an absolute truth that will be the identity of subject and object. 
Nevertheless, even in the extreme idealist moments of Hegel's philosophy, Adorno 
reads the hope that thought and reality can enter into a different relationship, a 
relationship that can only be different in relation to real changes in social reality. 
Adorno does not think that there can be an appropriation of experience as either 
authoritative or as an experience of grasping the whole in terms of the historical 
nature of existence itself, but only, both an interpretation and a construction based 
upon a dialectical experience that is immanent to the reality of a thought 
conditioned by society. In this sense, dialectics as the awareness of the non-identity 
of subject and object is the experience of social reality; "dialectical contradiction is 
experienced in the experience of society". 35 
For Adorno, the "central nerve" of the dialectic is the process of determinate 
negation, thus the experience of dialectics is fundamentally one of negativity. 
Determinate negation as a methodology concerns a re-orientation of philosophical 
analysis towards particularity, a turning towards the object that doesn't rest with 
the object as it is constructed by the categories of the understanding in Kantian 
terms, but attempts to undo the damage done to the object by concepts. Adorno 
refers to the attempt to "unleash the force" of the object. 36 Determinate negation, 
for Adorno, is a form of phenomenology as surrender, an attempt to approach the 
object without preconceptions and without any reserve, but at the same time this 
"immersion" cannot occur as some form of ur-experience. As we will see in 
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Adorno's critique of Husserl, there is no return to the "things themselves" that 
doesn't presume some foundationalist stance. Therefore, the corollary of this 
immersion in the object is that something in theory, or in the concept, or the 
forming of concepts must await a new apprehension of the object. Determinate 
negation is thus still a positing for Adorno, as it must work through concepts to 
move beyond what the concept identifies, and it can do this through an awareness 
of how every particular is mediated and is more than it is in terms of its 
presentation as object. However, this transcendence of the object does not take the 
place of a higher form of unity or identity of subject and object, but a deepening 
of the contradiction between subject and object, a deepening of the moment of 
non-identity. The difference between Hegel and Adorno's positing of determinate 
negation is in the construction of a whole which is absolute rather than negative. 
Adorno reverses Hegel's dictum that the whole is the true to assert that the 
construction of the whole is the untrue: 
"By specifying, in opposition to Hegel, the negativity of the whole, 
philosophy satisfies, for the last time, the postulate of determinate 
negation ... 
i37 
This position has several consequences for an attempt to understand Adorno's 
concept of experience. Adorno characterises Hegel's position between rationalism 
and empiricism as one which aims to move beyond rigid definitions, and holds to 
the task of interpreting "spirit" in its experiences of the world, and constructing an 
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experience through that interpretation of spirit as a movement. This dual process 
of interpretation and construction as both processes of determinate negation that 
occur in relation to experience in the world raises a number of questions. First, is 
interpretation an understanding of some meaning in the world that has been lost, 
or the unmasking of more fundamental aspects of human relating to the world ?I 
have tried to argue in the previous chapter that there is not a fundamental 
concept of life that Adorno wants to articulate in terms of foundational faculties 
of the understanding, or an animal embodiment which can serve as some form of 
a re-enchantment of nature. This raises the question of the basis for the 
intellectual and aesthetic experience described in Adorno's process of open 
interpretation. His characterisation of interpretation as a surrendering or immersion 
in objectivity has a certain experiential grounding , which is not always clear, but 
needs to be elucidated. The elucidation of the ground for such an experience rests 
in an account of an experience (Erfahrung), which is fundamentally put into 
question by the particular destruction of tradition in modernity. Therefore, although 
Adorno's philosophical account of an experience of thinking, through an analysis 
of the division between Kantian and Hegelian philosophy differs from Agamben's 
reading of such a history as a loss of experience, he shares with Agamben an 
account of the destruction of everyday experience in terms of the gradual 
colonisation of social life by forms of experience characterised as Erlebnis. Both 
thinkers accounts of such a destruction of experience are dependent upon 
Benjamin's definition of concepts of Erlebnis and Erfahrung, but both Agamben 
and Adorno interpret these concepts in terms of a decay of experience in a rather 
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unified and undialectical manner. This is important for Adorno, because without a 
concept of everyday experience as Erfahrung, there is not the subjective basis for 
the individual experience which can open itself to the speculative experience of 
the shudder as described in the previous chapter. Without a strong concept of 
individual existence, the liquidation of the 'I' in either aesthetic experience or 
intellectual experience will not be able to be recuperated. In order to understand 
this account of the decay of experience in relation to the concepts of Erlebnis 
and Erfahrung it is important to analyse the account that Benjamin gives of the 
decay of experience in modernity. 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung 
In his work on Baudelaire, Benjamin thematises the transition in modern experience 
through a differentiation between Erlebnis and Erfahrung. 38 It is worth considering 
the meaning of these terms as they developed in philosophical usage, before 
examining in detail Benjamin's account of the decay of experience. 
Gadamer outlines the history of the term Erlebnis in his book, Truth and 
Method. He writes that as a noun the term first came to prominence in the 1870s, 
when it was used in biographical writing. Erlebnis, with its use of the prefix er-, 
added to the word for "living", lebnis, gives a deepening sense to the verb that 
follows it carrying the sense of a deepening of life, as Gadamer says the 
"immediacy with which something is grasped". 39 There is a clear link between the 
terminology of Erlebnis, which first enters concrete philosophical usage with 
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Dilthey, and the life philosophy that was examined in the previous chapters, which 
serves as a philosophical critique of scientific, positivist thought by privileging 
modes of experiencing which are in some sense deeper than the rational 
formulations of enlightenment thought. Dilthey attempted to articulate a form of 
experience that would literally revivify philosophy. He characterises previous 
philosophy of experience in the following manner: 
"There is no real blood flowing in the veins of the knowing subject 
fabricated by Locke, Hume and Kant, but rather the diluted lymph of reason 
as mere intellectual activity. '"40 
Erlebnis can be characterised by three different elements. It refers to a form of 
experience that moves beyond subject and object differentiations, in the direction 
of a more primordial concept of experience as "lived experience" prior to subject 
and object distinction. This primordial concept of experience can be configured in 
epistemological terms, as it was largely by Husserl, in terms of an originary unity 
of intending consciousness and intended object, or as a form of embodied "being- 
in-the-world" which is foundational for all forms of cognition. Therefore, whilst 
Heidegger was hostile to the linguistic usage of the concept of Erlebnis, the 
account given of tool use as readiness-to-hand, and of a general "being-in-the- 
world" as a prepredicative form of existence, is one element of this concept of 
lived experience as somehow beneath all subject-object differentiation. 1 
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The second form of Erlebnis is that experience, that either as revealed in terms 
of religious experience, or in terms of aesthetic or surrealist experience would 
move beyond everyday forms of temporality and continuities of chronological time 
and personal identity over time. There is a sense of this experience in Heidegger's 
account of an authentic appropriation of certain fundamental moods which open up 
the possibility of the experience of different forms of temporality as a projection 
into the future. One could also think of the Bergsonian concept of duree as an 
access to a different and deeper relation of lived experience. Benjamin was 
particularly hostile to this concept of Erlebnis in terms of its incarnation in the 
philosophies that encouraged a form of war experience as a heightening of the 
experience of life, as demonstrated in the early philosophies of Buber and Jünger. 
However, despite this attempt to distance himself from a concept of Erlebnis as 
a transcendent experience of heightened life beyond the everyday, Benjamin was 
not averse to attempting to delineate forms of experience which might dissolve 
and explode traditional concepts of the continuities of experience and this 
ambivalence gives a certain dialectical tension to his account of the movement 
from Erfahrung to Erlebnis that is lacking in Adorno's and Agamben's 
appropriations of this account. 
The final element of Erlebnis is its mode as a form of apprehending an 
originary unity or a transcendent experience. This mode has its extreme cognitive 
form in the transcendental epochd that is outlined in Husserlian phenomenology, a 
form of bracketing out of social, historical and personal constructs to achieve a 
presupposition less attitude towards the appearing of phenomena. This bracketing out 
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is conceived as a tension between a regulative ideal of a certain experiential 
methodology and an actual practice of bracketing as lived experience. Adorno's 
hostility to the concept of Erlebnis is largely, but not exclusively, waged through 
an attack on this concept of a lived experience as a presupposition less attitude 
towards the apprehension of subject-object relations. Adorno's critique of the 
concept of Erlebnis occurs in his metacritique of epistemology and is largely 
concerned with the problem of the given in philosophy, and, particularly how this 
is structured in phenomenology. 42 For him, Husserl's phenomenology rests on an 
immediacy and identity of intention and object, which thus reifies the given into a 
primordial experience which does not take into account the reality that every 
experience of consciousness is a mediated experience, mediated through the 
structure of subjectivity, and the structuring of that subject in history. The search 
for lived experience in the sense of an Erlebnis presupposes some reified notion 
of originary experience that can be put to one side and reflected upon: 
"The talk about reflection on lived experiences (erlebnisse), which signify 
thoughts directed to a univocal contour, presupposes nothing less than the 
reification of the concept of givenness. It presupposes that the subject has a 
lived experience in itself upon which it may reflect. 1143 
There can be no talk about a lived experience that lies in wait in consciousness 
for reflection, as the very process of experience involves a reflexive moment in 
the moment of perception. There is no Erlebnis, which is the ideal moment of the 
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identity of intending consciousness and given material. The whole process is 
mediated from the first. Thus, phenomenology creates its own problems through the 
inability to recognise the fundamentally dialectical nature of human experience. The 
concept of Erlebnis as either originary unity of intentional consciousness with its 
correlative object of intention, or as the transcendental epoche on the other hand, 
are both attempts to delineate a purity of perception that are doomed to failure. 
There can be no separation of subject and object, or a positing of an originary 
embodied subject-object that is somehow prior or transcendent to these structures 
of thought and existence. 
Agamben's account of Erlebnis initially appears to share Adorno's critique of an 
experience that is in search of a chimera; "pre-conceptual immediacy". 44 The 
concept of Erlebnis locates itself in that no-mans land between the Kantian 
transcendental 'I' and the empirical 'I', and finds itself without any recourse for 
expression, other than through a reversion to poetry or mysticism. However, 
Agamben turns away from a dialectical turn at this point, and rather than drawing 
the Hegelian conclusion that everything is mediated, and thus that the search for 
an immediacy without conceptual determination is a fruitless search, he argues that 
it is the attempt to express this "muteness" of experience that is the problem, 
rather than the experience itself. 45 His critique results in the posing of a 
transcendental question as to the possibility of an experience, which in a sense is 
Erlebnis to its utmost degree, as "mute experience": 
"A theory of experience truly intended to posit the problem of origin in a 
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radical way would then have to start beyond this "first expression" with 
experience as "still mute to speak" - that is, it would have to ask: does a 
mute experience exist, does an infancy (in-fancy) of experience exist ? And, if it 
"a6 does, what is its relationship to language. 
This infancy of experience is the return to a form of life, as that place that is 
before or between any form of determination and expression, but in some way, can 
serve as a starting point or seed for a new form of experience. The problem is 
that it is impossible to see how such an originary experience could be anything 
other than an extreme reduction of experience, and a reduction of experience that 
is analogous to the reduction of experience characterised as bare life. The 
confusion in Agamben's account is therefore between an account of bare life as 
this empty space for domination produced in the context of power, and a similar 
account of an empty space of indifferentiation either as the experience of the gap 
between muteness and language, or the originary space of potentiality as an 
ontological move which can give some meaning to the concept of experience. 
Erfahrung is primarily differentiated from Erlebnis by its relation to history and 
tradition. Erfahrung is the experience that is acquired through "memory and 
expectation". 47 Experience, in these terms, is thoroughly mediated by its context and 
the forms of its transmission. It is also an undergoing, a process of acquiring 
knowledge that is transmitted through passive reception rather than scientific 
experimentation. Experience is not about constant confirmation but about the 
assimilation of thwarted expectations. Experience in this sense, then, is not 
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something that stands outside of life, but is integrated into the life of communities 
through memory, tradition and shared culture. The key components of Erfahrung 
are an authority to the experience that is transmitted, a culture that is able to 
communicate that experience, and a culture within which that experience can be 
shared, remembered and transmitted. This is the sense of experience in Benjamin's 
essay "The Storyteller". 
Erfahrung also has a more limited sense as the description of the cognitive 
experience involved in judgement and knowledge. The process in empiricism, 
whereby a unified subject orders and classifies the raw data of experience is a 
process that can be termed experience as a whole. This experience, then, is the 
process whereby an inert objectivity is synthesised by a subject and raw 
sensations are formed into the object of experience. In some sense, experience is 
configured here as a junior partner to the understanding, in that, in the Kantian 
sense there is no knowledge without experience, but experience without the 
synthesising operations of subjective judgement, could not be termed experience at 
all. It was in response to this narrowed concept of experience as a form of 
cognitive subsumption, that the concept of Erlebnis arose in German philosophy in 
the late 19th century. Some of the problems in the opposition of Erfahrung to 
Erlebnis and some of the different modes in which these two words have been 
used stems from this opposition which bypasses the fuller social content of 
experience. Because Erlebnis was configured in response to the desiccated and 
ahistorical experience of empiricism, it tends in its simple positing of a fullness of 
life, or a prepredicative lived experience, to reinstate the problem of the separation 
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of form and content instituted by empiricism but at a deeper level. The problem 
of empiricism is the epistemological problem of how a form-giving subject can 
assimilate the wild and raw sense data into objects of knowledge, which can then 
be said to coincide in some sense with objects as they are. How does the empty 
form of the subject encompass the content of matter in universal subsumptive 
structures that do not dissolve the particularity of sense data in illegitimate 
universals ? This is the problematic relation of form and matter as debated within 
empiricism. The opposition of a concept of Erlebnis to such a positivist sense of 
forming matter into concepts or objects of knowledge is still consumed with an 
attempt to construct an ahistorical, core structure to experience, to which all 
content must relate. This core structure or unity is configured in phenomenology 
as beyond subject and object differentiation, but it still absorbs all particularity in 
an empty concept of "life" or of unity of intentionality and given object. There is 
a symmetry between the two concepts, because the relation of both concepts to 
Erfahrung as historical experience is not thought. 
The problem, for Benjamin, in this relationship between Erfahrung and Erlebnis 
is the place of tradition in modernity. It is the distinctive mode of experience 
within modernity that it has lost its relation to tradition. Benjamin argues that the 
increasing technological sophistication of society has produced forms of 
communication which have atrophied the possibility of experience, in the sense of 
Erfahrung. The replacement of narration by information has atrophied the 
possibility of authority in the tradition of communicable experience. Alongside this 
are the increasing shocks, both on an everyday basis and on a larger basis in 
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modern society which do not enable the individual to assimilate experiences in 
modern society. In "The Storyteller", Benjamin refers to soldiers returning from the 
First World War, without the possibility of communicating their experience. 48 In the 
essay on Baudelaire, he refers to the everyday shocks of modern city living which 
preclude the individual from assimilating experience. Using Freud's essay "Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle", Benjamin cites the necessity for the human organism to be 
constantly alert to the parrying of shocks to its perceptual system. The greater the 
shocks are in the perceptual system, the more human consciousness becomes an 
alert system which parries the shocks that are surrounding it, and the less do these 
impressions enter into the perceptual apparatus and become lasting experiences: 
"The greater the share of the shock factor in particular impressions the 
more constantly consciousness has to be alert as a screen against stimuli: 
the more efficiently it is so, the less do these impressions enter experience 
(Erfahrung) tending to remain in the sphere of a certain hour in one's life 
(Erlebnis). t149 
Agamben writing in the early 1990s repeats these formulations in the opening 
pages of his history of the destruction of experience. Thus, he begins his essay in 
a consciously Benjaminian manner by writing: 
"The question of experience can be approached nowadays only with an 
acknowledgement that it is no longer accessible to us ... his incapacity to 
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have and communicate experiences is perhaps one of the few self-certainties 
to which he can lay claim. "50 
What Benjamin argues in the essay on Baudelaire, and in the "Storyteller" 
essay is that with the onset of modernity and, particularly, with the First World 
War, there was what John McCole terms an "epochal upheaval in the human 
sensorium". 51 It is this change in experience that he equates with Erlebnis, in the 
sense that with the constant shocks of city life, the human perceptual organism is 
unable to assimilate sensations and form a stock of experience. There is a 
correspondence between the shock experience of everyday city life, the worker's 
experience at the machine and the bombardment of information that replaces the 
processes of narration. All of these shocks combine to atrophy modern experience. 
However, it would be a mistake to accept Benjamin's too straightforward 
distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung, and to configure his account purely as 
the transformation of Erfahrung into Erlebnis in modernity. Benjamin's account is 
far more an account of the destruction of Erfahrung, which leaves the question of 
the possibility of a new, third form of experience open. Erfahrung is destroyed 
because the process of the communicability of tradition is fundamentally altered in 
modernity. There does seem to be a certain reduction of the concept of Erlebnis 
at work here. Relating Erlebnis purely to the moment of perception, reduces that 
sense of an experience that escapes the bonds of tradition, and somehow escapes 
the bonds of conceptual determination. Of course, Erlebnis in the sense that 
Benjamin gives it, does escape the bounds of a conceptual determination, but 
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purely through its complete lack of assimilation as experience by a subject. As 
experience, Erlebnis is reduced from that form of experience which stands out as 
a more alive and lived experience from the everyday, to a form of experience that 
is not an experience, because it is analogous to just a series of jolts. Elsewhere, for 
example in the essay on "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical 
Reproduction", Benjamin will gesture towards a new concept of experience, an 
experience that takes as its model the reception of film. 52 In this experience, the 
subject does not appropriate and form experience, or have a lived experience 
which can stand outside the everyday, but passively assimilates an experience 
which decentres and desubjectifies as experience. The experience of certain 
techniques in film, such as montage, produces forms of passive experience that 
aesthetically mirror the shocks of everyday life, but enable the viewer to observe 
these effects and produces a communal, passive and surface experience that 
desubjectifies and provides the glimpse of a different form of experience. This 
desubjectification of experience is similar to the account that Adorno gives in his 
experience of the aesthetic shudder. The crucial difference, though, is that Adorno's 
account of aesthetic experience as a subjective experience against the 'I' depends 
on a strong ego for the immersion in objectivity to be an immersion that opens 
but does not liquidate the subject. Benjamin talks about the experience of film in 
the context of a collective lack of communal Erfahrung, which opens up the 
possibility that the new form of experience could just passively order the 
experience of a mass consumption, as a passive assimilation of reified experience. 
The liquidation of subjectivity in the reception of film cannot be recuperated in 
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terms of a subjective experience, because it has no experience as Erfahrung to rely 
on, and therefore can just be open to the manipulation of false needs and false 
desires of the culture industry. In a narcissistic form, this experience falls in love 
with its helplessness, whereas the experience of the shudder registers a protest 
against the rigidity of the ego and a glimpse of a life without self-preservation, 
which is a move beyond the state of passivity and helplessness. 
The Destruction of Experience 
The common argument shared by Adorno, Agamben and Benjamin regarding the 
destruction of experience in modernity is that experience as a communal form of 
authoritative experience begins to wither with the First World War. The experience 
that has decayed is an experience that is communal and rooted in a certain 
physical response to the world, that is not dissimilar to the account of the relation 
between life and experience that we saw John Dewey give earlier with regards to 
what it means to have a fulfilled experience. 
Adorno shares the assessment of the place of the subject in modernity as the 
loss of a place, configured in terms of the loss of experience, and is indebted in 
his account to Benjamin's account of the process of the destruction of experience 
through the technologies of modernity, and particularly through the relation of an 
identifying subject towards an object that is imposed through modes of capitalist 
production and consumption, as he argues in the following passage from Minima 
Moralia: 
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"Not least to blame for the withering of experience is the fact that things, 
under the law of pure functionality, assume a form that limits contact with 
them to mere operation, and tolerates no surplus either in freedom of 
conduct or in autonomy which would survive as the core of experience 
"s3 because it is not consumed by the moment of action. 
A certain relation between subjects and objects encapsulated by factory production 
and other mass forms of repetitive experience, alongside a culture industry that 
colonises the free time of the worker in relation to a standardised culture of 
consumption, has caused the marrow to be sucked from experience. 
54 This 
destruction of experience realises its apotheosis in the forms of bare life that are 
revealed as death-in-life in Auschwitz and that Agamben develops as different 
empty spaces within the context of modern biopower. This negative teleology of a 
history of experience should be both constructed and denied in terms of Adorno's 
statement in Negative Dialectics. However, it is only Benjamin who attempts to 
grapple with the potentially liberating possibilities of this destruction of tradition, 
although the problem for Benjamin is that he does this through a certain 
experience of a redemptive whole, that although it takes place through history, is 
fundamentally ahistorical as completion of history. I will consider this in further 
detail in the next chapter in relation to the concept of dialectical images. 
However, at this juncture, it is important to note that the destruction of experience 
178 
becomes an undifferentiated and unhistorical notion, particularly in Agamben's use 
of this account. 
Adorno attempts a more subtle account of the destruction of a certain 
experience of a tradition in his acknowledgement that tradition dominates and 
restricts as much as it enables the opening up towards the world. The process of 
tradition is just as much about entrenching certain possibilities and certain 
attitudes within humanity as it is about enabling the possibility of experiencing 
something new. Adorno's response to the question of tradition is therefore suitably 
dialectical. On the one hand, tradition has been handed down by the victors in 
history and communicated by attempting to ignore the traces of suffering that are 
almost expunged in the process of the transmission of tradition. Nevertheless, 
without some context, some place to locate an experience, there can be no 
experience. Therefore, Adorno concludes his essay on tradition with a characteristic 
paradox: 
"Whoever seeks to avoid betraying the bliss which tradition still promises in 
some of its images and the possibilities buried beneath its ruins must 
abandon the tradition which turns possibilities and meanings into lies. Only 
that which inexorably denies tradition may once again retrieve it. '"55 
The possibilities that open themselves up in the decay of experience are twofold; 
first, a new awareness of the beauty of the old forms of experience comes to 
light in the decay of experience itself, and, second, there is the possibility that new 
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forms of experience will arise that can separate themselves from the debilitating 
aspects of tradition. Nevertheless, Adorno's predominant mode when discussing 
experience in modernity is through an account of it as a withering or a decay, 
and this account is fairly undifferentiated culturally. There is no attempt to look at 
the differences between different cultures in the assimilation of modernity and 
accelerated change. This is important for Adorno, because his concepts of 
intellectual experience and aesthetic experience, depend upon the formation of a 
subjective experience which can allow the dissolution of subjectivity within certain 
experiences entailing a metaphysical experience of the possibility of something 
other, without liquidating the individual as a locus point for a critical subjectivity. 
In a certain sense, the dissolution of Erfahrung into Erlebnis is less of a problem 
for Benjamin as the movement beyond the reified whole of a destroyed 
experience is configured in both redemptive and revolutionary modes as a 
collective experience, either the collective experience of an unconscious which 
preserves traces of a destroyed tradition, or a revolutionary project that embraces 
the destructive character of such a process within modernity and intensifies it to a 
point of liberation. As we will see, Adorno is hostile to both of these approaches. 
Agamben's account of the decay of experience, although written some forty to 
sixty years on from Benjamin and Adorno's accounts does not move the account 
any further in relation to an understanding of this as historical process. He 
proceeds as though the inter-war diagnosis of a decay of experience can still hold 
for the last years of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first 
century. In The Idea of Prose, he makes the startling claim that there has been 
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nothing written since that period about the decay of experience that takes the 
problematic any further forwards. 
56 He writes from the assumed position of a 
completed destruction of experience, and moves between the assumption of such a 
place in terms of what it could mean in concrete living situations, such as his 
accounts of life in the camps and bare life in the modernity of biopolitics, and 
then crosses to a position that welcomes this destruction of experience as a 
restoration of our fundamental emptiness as a non-relating relation to Being, the 
"Being-expropriated is the human being". 57 This oscillation doesn't give any content 
to an account of what forms a critical project or a critical subjectivity could take 
in terms of this completed destruction of experience. 
There is little attention as to when this period of crisis will end, or whether 
it can even still be called a crisis if it has lasted for almost a century. Martin Jay 
concludes his earlier cited essay with the statement that we are still living the 
crisis of experience: 
"... it will only be when the crisis itself ends and a deadly calm settles 
over the world that the perilous journey that is experience will no longer 
be a human possibility 58 
This equation of experience, crisis and a journey seems to put into question what 
any of the individual terms can mean any more. How can there be a crisis of 
experience, if experience itself is defined as a crisis ? There needs to be a more 
delineated and detailed account of the different forms that experience takes in 
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everyday life, for this account of destruction not to be hypostasised as an 
interminable crisis, and a crisis that has lost its historical specificity. The specificity 
of the crisis of experience inaugurated by the First World War was the transition 
from a form of experience which was not marked by speed of travel, accelerated 
technological change, and mass technologised slaughter. The incommensurability of 
experience was due to the polarity of a before and after, an experience of 
communal, traditional experience being suddenly and irrevocably altered. To 
continue to invoke this account unhistorically, when this polarity of experience is 
no longer lived seems to ignore how the relation between Erfahrung and Erlebnis 
is constructed in the different geographical spaces of late modernity. There is a 
tendency to elevate a certain conception of communal or traditional experience in 
an undifferentiated manner and then to map its decay or destruction. This is not 
to deny the elements within Benjamin's account of a particular accelerated and 
rapid form of change within modem societies which destroys the process of 
tradition as it was previously understood. What is needed is a historical account of 
experience as Erfahrung that accepts that the particular transmission of a tradition 
as both a destruction and a preservation has been destroyed, but that this does not 
eradicate completely possibilities of communal and subjective experience. The 
problem for Adorno will be that in his acceptance of this undifferentiated account 
of the decay of experience, he loses the concept of a subject within a tradition 
that he relies on for his account of metaphysical experience. 
182 
Chapter 6: Negative Dialectic as Self-Reflection 
In this chapter, I will examine Adorno's account of dialectical experience as it is 
outlined primarily in his studies on Hegel and in Negative Dialectics, and argue 
that his new conception of dialectics is fundamentally a speculative dialectics. The 
convergence with the normative readings of Adorno that I examined earlier in 
chapter four, is that this speculation revolves around the question of life; social life 
and natural life, and their mediation. However, the relation between dialectics, 
experience and life cannot be given any concrete content in the terms of either an 
enhanced rationality or a sensuous materiality; it is fundamentally speculative. The 
concept of speculation is altered in Adorno's philosophy, but it retains an element 
of its use in Kantian philosophy as a thinking which is at the limits of possible 
experience, and in Hegelian philosophy as a speculative experience produced by 
the reflection on dialectical contradiction. The concept of speculation in the 
discourse of everyday language is also involved to a certain extent, as Adorno's 
attempt is to formulate an experience which is not fulfilled, that has an affinity 
with the idea of wishing or hoping. ' What I will emphasise in this chapter is that 
Adorno's concept of speculation is closely tied to a practice of self-reflection 
which reveals the possibility of a different relation between subject and object. 
The concept of speculation is tied to Adorno's concept of possibility, of which I 
will give a fuller account in the next chapter. However, here it will be necessary 
to outline how a practice or process of self-reflection, which is tied to a reflection 
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on objectivity, and what objectivity means for the subject, can reveal the necessary 
grounding for the possibility of such a speculative experience. If this sounds like 
a transcendental idea, then it is not meant to, as the reflection does not reveal an 
empty subjectivity, in terms of transcendental ego, thought in either Kantian or 
Husserlian terms, or the empty subject of desire in terms of Hegel's philosophy. 
The process of self-reflection reveals both the subject's reliance on a material 
basis, which is thought in terms of need and drive, and the separation from such a 
material basis in the very act of reflection. The result of a process of self- 
reflection will be a subject conceived as embodied thought reliant on a 
constitutive but aconceptual object, that cannot be hypostasised as either "volitively 
bridgeable or an ontological ultimate". 2 The speculative experience is tied to a 
different possibility of being human, of living life in a way which would not 
mean a radical split between a human ego and nature, although importantly, it is 
not configured as a fulfilled or completed reconciliation of subject and object in 
experience. The dialectic of self-consciousness, a dialectic that Hegel terms 
experience in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, is the means to gain 
an insight into both a separateness and an intrinsic relatedness to the natural 
moment within all human reason and will. Adorno refers to a form of immanent 
transcendence, as "... what transcends nature is nature itself'. 3 However, this process 
of self-reflection as dialectical experience that reveals a life that is still living 
beyond the grasp of the identifying subject cannot be invoked itself as enhanced 
rationality, or critical method. To do so, would be to place the negative experience 
of dialectics as a positive system of enhanced rationality, to postulate a 
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reconciliation that does not exist in reality. Therefore this self-reflection as 
experience calls for a further critique itself, a form of reflection on reflection. 
This introduction outlines the themes of this chapter. I will begin with a 
reconstruction of Hegel's account of self-consciousness, and an attempt to map on 
to that account Adorno's appropriation and reconstruction of this experience. 
Adorno's conception of dialectical experience will be further outlined through a 
reading of his essays on Hegel, and his account of a dialectic of construction, 
interpretation and expression. Adorno's concept of mediation will be considered and 
defended against a recent critique of it given by Brian O'Connor. 4 The second 
part of the chapter will explore Adorno's materialism, his attempt to outline a 
concept of the subject as embodied, as a thinking responding to bodily impulses 
and needs. It is at this point that Adorno comes closest to needing a fundamental 
ontology, and his description of the body and the place of the body in rationality 
is certainly figurative rather than thought through in detail. However, in relation to 
what the verb "to live" means in terms of a life that does not live, Adorno 
attempts at least to give a material understanding, a material understanding that is 
absent in Agamben's attempt to recuperate a concept of a form of life in which a 
bare life cannot be isolated. This discussion about the possibility of living, will 
then be considered more fully in the next chapter. 
The Experience of Philosophical Reflection 
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The initial stage of consciousness, as described in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
is a simultaneous distinguishing of a subject from an object, and at the same time 
a relating to that object. There is something for consciousness, an object, only 
through this initial dual process of separation and relations Adorno gives an 
account of this in terms of a philosophical anthropology in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, an account that we have considered in chapter three. To recapitulate 
here, the process of separation and relation is resolved in capitalist society 
through a relation that is a postulated subject- object identification. This is what 
Adorno terms domination. Why is this domination ? 
The reason is because when we reflect upon the object as it is for 
consciousness, what we come to realise is that this is not a relation to the object 
as it is in itself, but an object as it is for us. The process of separating and 
relating to the object is not a mirroring of finite objects as they are in 
themselves, but the product of the synthesising activity of the mind producing its 
own objects for itself. The object in itself disappears from view, and the 
postulation of the object for consciousness as that which is to be identified 
excludes the natural completely. 
This is the position within which Kant attempts to build a bridge between an 
empirical realm, where the objects as synthesised by the understanding can be 
within the bounds of reason and a transcendental realm where the thing in itself 
can only be thought not known. Speculative reason is an attempt to think the 
thing-in-itself, an attempt to think that which is beyond all possible experience. 
Kant's grounding of the possibility of experience lies in an acceptance that an 
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experience can only be the experience of the object that is synthesised by the 
unity of consciousness through the categories of the understanding. There is no 
possibility of moving beyond the gap between the thing in itself and the thing as 
it is for consciousness. 
For Hegel, experience starts with this contradiction: 
"... this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which 
affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called 
experience. i6 
Experience here is conceived as a process, rather than a realm, and this is the 
fundamental importance of this description of experience for Adorno, the possibility 
that an experience will develop historically and socially, and that the speculative 
will not be pushed beyond the bounds of a possible experience. The process of 
reflection results in the contradiction that knowledge does not correspond with its 
object. The process of experience as a journey is the attempt to resolve such a 
contradiction, which will have a historical form. Rather than a resolution of the 
contradiction through a delimitation of the legitimate use of reason, Hegel's 
concept of experience is conceived initially as a task, and, thus as the possibility 
of a reconciliation. Adorno's critique of Hegel is that his resolution of such a 
contradiction through a progress to an Absolute knowledge, in terms of a subject- 
object identity, does nothing to preserve the dignity of the particular. The thing-in- 
itself as object of knowledge is just subsumed into an all-embracing subjectivity. 
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What Kant and Hegel share, for Adorno, is a failure to account for the self of 
such a self-reflection. The self is conceived as an empty transcendental ego for 
Kant which is just the "I think" that accompanies all representations, but can have 
no other content or even an inner content. There can be no experience of the self, 
as it is beyond the spatial and temporal forms of intuition, and thus beyond all 
possible experience. This causes Kant all sorts of difficulties, in both his critical 
and his moral philosophy. However, what it is important to note here is the formal 
emptiness of the transcendental subject. It is the synthesising ground of experience, 
that cannot be experienced. In Hegel, thought is replete with determinations and 
content, but still exists as a fundamental emptiness in terms of its immersion in 
the external world. The subject of desire is full of a content but separate from 
that content in the sense that it projects itself outwards onto the natural world. 
Consciousness becomes replete with meaning through the process of finding itself 
and gaining recognition in the world and by other consciousnesses. The dialectical 
contradictions and failures of recognition determine the progress of experience as 
it moves through different stages in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The process of 
self-consciousness is the location of itself in the world, the "identity of itself with 
itself'. 7 What becomes lost in this characterisation of self-consciousness as desire 
is the ineliminable moment of nature within the subject itself, the body of the 
subject. For Adorno, self-reflection will ultimately be a reflection on the natural 
within the subject, and therefore, the subject cannot be configured as an empty 
law-giver for the natural ( Kant) or a projection of empty desire for recognition 
(the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Spirit ). 
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Adorno wants to retain the Hegelian account of an experience of consciousness 
that moves beyond itself through the experience of its own contradictions. The 
process of this movement will be his appropriation of a concept of mediation 
from Hegel and Marx. Despite the Kantian ban on experiencing the noumenon, this 
concept retains for Adorno a certain dignity as the horizon of something that is 
always both within and beyond the subject. Adornian self-reflection is a process in 
g 
which the "self observes: I myself am part of nature". This reflective process is 
still a separation, but what Adorno refuses to do is to make this radical cut 
between subjectivity and nature. The process of self-reflection is the process of a 
"nature that has become conscious of itself'. 9 Nevertheless, this process of self- 
reflection as nature becoming aware of itself, is still a process of separation. 
Adorno is not arguing for some form of intuition of the natural within the 
human, or an appropriation of the becoming natural within the human. What he is 
attempting to think is human nature as a relation between subject and object that 
doesn't suppress the bodily element of subjectivity. In the very process of self- 
reflection, we recognise ourselves as separate from nature through a capacity for 
reflection. 
This process of a nature becoming conscious of itself as nature is speculative 
because the natural within the human has been denied in favour of a drive for 
self-preservation. Adorno adopts the Freudian account of a renunciation of instincts 
in favour of a civilised society, but then poses the question as to whether such a 
renunciation was worth the effort: 
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"In social terms, the compensation promised by civilisation and by our 
education in return for our acts of renunciation is not forthcoming". 10 
But, this renunciation cannot be wished away. Any attempt to understand what it 
means to live in a different sense will have to occur through a reflection on the 
contradictions inherent in contemporary experience. The process of self-reflection is 
therefore a mediated process and it is important to understand what Adorno means 
by mediation. 
Mediation 
In his essay, "The concept of Mediation in Hegel and Adorno", Brian O'Connor 
criticises Adorno's concept of mediation on a number of grounds" It will be 
useful as an introduction to Adorno's concept of mediation to outline this critique, 
as what O'Connor misses in Adorno, namely the dialectic of contradiction, is an 
important element for his use of the Hegelian concept of mediation. 
O'Connor states that Adorno attempts to use the concept of mediation to solve 
two separate problems, first the subject-object problem, and second to outline a 
certain claim about conceptuality: 
"It seems to me that mediation (in the sense that Adorno uses the term) 
conflates, rather than synthesizes, two very different claims: first, a materialist 
claim about the priority of non-conceptuality and second, an idealist claim about 
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the conceptual nature of experience. The result is that we find two competing 
strands of thought which ultimately prevent Adorno from resolving what he 
sees as the various problems of representationalism. " 12 
This quotation demonstrates Adorno's concept of mediation in a negative way, as 
we can construct Adorno's concept through opposition to this critique. Adorno is 
not interested in a synthesis, in terms of a sublation of contradiction in Hegelian 
terms. Nevertheless, he is very interested in the concept of contradiction, and his 
use of mediations normally serves the purpose of expressing certain fundamental 
contradictions. Therefore, where O'Connor reads a lack of synthesis, there lies 
contradiction. My response to such a critique would be that Adorno is not 
interested in resolution or solution, but is interested in the deepening of certain 
fundamental contradictions, a deepening which takes place through a process of 
mediation. This process does lie in the first process that O'Connor outlines, the 
account of mediation through the priority of the object, and this is a twofold form 
of mediation, in that it reflects on the relation between subject and object in terms 
of its social and natural history. However, I don't think Adorno claims that 
experience is conceptual alone, rather dialectics affords the experience of a 
dichotomy between our forms of conceptuality and what is not expressed by these 
forms, the residue of conceptuality. 
Adorno's account of subject and object mediation rests on an understanding of 
the mutual dependence of subject and object. There can be no subject without an 
object as the something to be thought. Therefore, "What is known through 
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consciousness must be a something". 
13 But, there is a further element in this 
mediation of subjectivity by objectivity, in that the knowing subject itself must be 
conceived in terms of its embodiment: 
"If subject is not something, and 'something' designates an irreducibly objective 
element, then it is nothing at all; even as actus purus it needs to refer to 
something that acts. " 
14 
This is the ineliminable material moment that Adorno asserts in opposition to the 
empty subject of Kant or Hegel. The priority of the object lies in the fact that an 
object can be conceived of without subject, whereas a subject without an object 
cannot be conceived. O'Connor reads the mediation of the object as an internal 
mediation, a mediation "according to its own concept", as he quotes Adorno. 15 If 
the object is mediated according to its own concept, then mediation does not 
become a relation between subject and object, but can be a process of subject and 
object mediation which can exist without reference to one another. The problem is 
that Adorno does not have a concept of the object that is mediated according to 
its own concept, as if you read the full quotation, the sentence can be read in two 
ways: 
"Object is also mediated; but, according to its own concept, it is not so 
thoroughly dependent upon subject as subject is dependent upon objectivity". 16 
192 
This sentence could be read in the way that O'Connor reads it, but the comma, 
after the 'but', inclines a reading that means that the concept of objectivity can be 
conceived independently of subjectivity, rather than that there is a process of 
mediation internal to the object that doesn't involve subjectivity. Mediation is 
always a mediation of subject and object, but the object is not as dependent upon 
a subject as vice versa, as it is logically possible to conceive of an object without 
a subject, but the opposite is not true. This is, perhaps, a tendentious argument. One 
is inclined to respond that it is perfectly possible to imagine a bodiless subject, 
but Adorno will attempt to push this point, that there must some element of the 
objective within the subject. Any conception of a transcendental ego is reliant on 
an empirical ego, but what is purged through the move from empirical to 
transcendental is the reliance on the body, and it is this purging that Adorno reads 
again and again in the postulation of an empty subject of reason. This reading is 
supported on the next page when Adorno writes that: 
"The primacy of the object can be discussed legitimately only when that 
primacy - over the subject in the broadest sense of the term - is somehow 
determinable, that is, more than the Kantian thing-in-itself, as the unknown cause 
of phenomenal appearance. "" 
The object must matter materially for the subject in some way. The object enters 
into mediations with subjectivity and can only be understood as such, but there is 
always something beyond in terms of the object, something that is non-identical to 
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the concepts that wish to identify them. The same is true of the subject, but what 
is beyond the subject is its own objectivity, its bodily needs, instincts and desires 
which have been suppressed by the renunciation of instincts in favour of the drive 
for self-preservation. This is the priority of the object, in its mediation between 
subject and object, as a mediation both within subjectivity and external to 
subjectivity. This is still a relation, not a mediation internal to the concept of 
object itself. Adorno, contra Hegel, does not have a purely conceptual concept of 
mediation which does not refer to the nonconceptual. The difficulty and the 
speculative experience of Adorno's materialism is to account for such an 
ineliminable moment of nature within the subject. 
O'Connor's second claim as to Adorno's account of mediation is the claim that 
he is an idealist, that mediation refers to a linking of one concept to the next, in 
that all concepts are insufficient and call for further concepts. The idea of a 
constellation is that no single concept is sufficient to express the meaning of a 
particular and therefore further related concepts are called for. O'Connor reads this 
as a "conceptual coherentism", in the sense that truth resides in a constellation of 
concepts, and, thus this idea of mediation does not correlate with the materialist 
thesis of the priority of the object in subject-object mediation. What O'Connor 
misses is that Adorno's attempt through constellations is to deepen a certain 
contradiction between concepts and objects. Concepts cannot completely identify 
objects, and neither can constellations of concepts. The construction of a 
constellation is an attempt to orient a shift in the rigid relation of subject and 
object, as identifying relation, in a different direction or register. Constellations are 
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an attempt to construct a different relation which would reveal a new possibility 
of the meaning of objectivity, as Adorno states, "cognition of the object in its 
constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object". 
'8 The constellation 
of concepts results from the awareness of the contradiction between concept and 
object, and is a twofold process of attempting to destabilise the identifying rigidity 
of the single concept, and therefore to unlock its relations to other concepts and 
other mediations, often its social and historical conditions which are being 
suppressed, and the attempt to express the meaning of the object, in a process of 
interpretation without intention, without presupposition. 
Through this critique, I have outlined Adorno's central concept of mediation as 
related to subject-object mediation, but this is a mediation that involves a dialectic 
in the form of contradiction. What mediation reveals are different levels of 
contradiction between subject and object, but this contradiction cannot be resolved 
purely philosophically, as it results from real contradictions within society. One of 
the key forms that mediation will take in Adorno will be the reflection on the 
social and historical form and meaning of both subjects and objects. The process 
of a negative dialectics as self-reflection is the awareness of contradiction as 
contradiction, and the speculative moment within such an experience is the 
possibility of different forms of relating between subject and object which would 
allow the "communication of what is differentiated". 19 As what is differentiated 
cannot be communicated through conceptual categories which do not allow for 
the communication of the differentiated, a philosophy which attempts such a 
communication is caught within the trap of attempting to say the unsayable. 
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However, through an experience of possibility at the limits of the possible, an 
experience, which will always be responsive to a material residue within the 
subject, the concept of a speculative philosophy can survive as experience, as an 
experience of life. 
Adorno will depart from Hegel in the characterisation of such a process as a 
closed totality which has a necessary progress. For Adorno, this is the problem of 
idealism in its ultimate dominance of objectivity, that it postulates an identity of 
subject and object beneath, above and beyond all processes of mediation. Therefore, 
the hallmark of Adorno's dialectic, rather than that of necessity, will be "fragility": 
"Hegelian dialectic finds its ultimate truth, that of its own impossibility, in its 
unresolved and vulnerable quality, even if as the theodicy of self-consciousness, 
it has no awareness of this. "20 
Adorno's formulations about objectivity have the nature of speculation about them, 
in the ordinary sense of the term, of groping for something beyond formulation 
concretely. He recognises this himself: 
"Hegel is able to think from the thing itself out, to surrender passively, as it 
were, to its authentic substance, only because by virtue of the system the matter 
at hand is referred to its identity with the absolute subject. "Z' 
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Nevertheless, Adorno wants his dialectical philosophy to express the life of things 
through a turn to the object. Adorno's materialist metaphysics consists in the fact 
that the object of speculation is material; life itself. However, life is itself mediated 
in a twofold manner, being both social and natural, and it is to this speculation 
about social life and natural life that I will now turn. 
Total Social Process: The Prince and the Frog 
The role of a concept of labour in Adorno's work is perplexing. On the one hand, 
the concept has an orthodox Marxist centrality, in the sense that the beginning of 
the dialectic and the motor of the dialectic for Adorno is the origin of society and 
conceptual thought in the social production of labour. He agrees with Marx's 
critique of the spiritualising of material relations in Hegel's concept of Geist. 
Although the immanence of Geist, and its production through history is approved 
by Marx, the reliance on a concept of reason as identity above and beneath the 
movement of history that has no relation to the social labour embedded in objects 
is the fundamental flaw of the Hegelian dialectic. For Adorno, the essence of 
objects can, therefore, be understood in terms of the social relations of labour 
embedded in them: 
11 ... society is manifested in phenomena the way for Hegel, essence is 
manifested in them. Society is essentially concept, just as spirit is ... 
"22 
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However, this originary notion of social labour cannot be hypostasised in itself. 
Labour and the social relies upon a certain relation to nature, a relation to nature 
that Marx himself drew attention to. Adorno writes that: 
"When Marx, in his critique of the Gotha Platform, told the Lassalleans that in 
contrast to the customary litany of popular socialists labour was not the sole 
source of social wealth, he was philosophically ... saying no 
less than that 
labour could not be hypostasised ... Such hypostasis merely extends the illusion 
of the predominance of the productive principle. It comes to be true only in 
relation to that nonidentical moment which Marx in his disdain for 
epistemology called first by the crude, too narrow name of "nature", later on by 
that of "natural material", and by other less incriminated terms. i23 
Thus, there is a twofold understanding of the relations of social labour within 
Marx's writing. First, there is the argument as to the intrinsic, one might say 
ontological, mediation of humanity and nature through social labour that is outlined 
in the early writings, and in The German Ideology. 24 This is what Adorno terms 
the moment of nature in Marx's work, and it is not something that is posited as 
such, but developed as something that always escapes the bounds of a capitalist 
society. Adorno will refer to this in different terms as nature, as the somatic, as 
the non-identical. 25 This will be the focus of one aspect of Adorno's speculative 
dialectical philosophy in terms of the experience of the object. However, the other 
concept is a purely immanent concept of the social relations of labour embedded 
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in objects within capitalist society. This is as equally important an aspect of what 
Adorno means by the preponderance of the object, and it is in this sense that his 
dialectics can be seen as a form of hermeneutics, an interpretation of objects in 
terms of the social meanings embedded them, and a reading of that social 
meaning in terms of the conflict of the social relations of production within 
capitalism. 26 However, the second speculative process in Adorno is this attempt to 
experience the somatic, the natural, the non-identical, and this is the sense in which 
Adorno's relation to a concept of social labour becomes more ambiguous, because 
here the important thing for Adorno is the experience of something beyond any 
relation within labour, and therefore, it appears a move even beyond Marx's 
account of unalienated labour. 
However, what I want to consider first, is the dialectical move to the subject- 
object relation as being a relation that can be read in terms of the social relations 
of labour encoded within it, because this is itself a problem of speculative reason 
for Adorno, as he must rely on a certain underlying meaning and unfolding of a 
historical process to construct these hermeneutic readings. Given his critique of 
absolute idealism, and his critique of the proletariat as the agent of historical 
change, on what can Adorno rely for the movement of his dialectical mediations ? 
In the famous correspondence from November to December of 1938 between 
Benjamin and Adorno concerning the methodology of a dialectical materialism, 
Benjamin locates the substantive issue as one of construction within the dialectic: 
" ... the problem is one of construction. I believe that speculation can start its 
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necessarily bold flight with some prospect of success only if, instead of putting 
on the waxen wings of the esoteric, it seeks its source of strength in 
construction alone. 
27 
Benjamin's argument is in response to Adorno's well-known critique that the study 
of the Arcades project, and the study on Baudelaire in particular, stands at "a 
crossroads between magic and positivism", as Benjamin's immersion in the cultural 
and social artifacts of capitalist existence in 19th century France relates these 
superstructural elements too immediately to the base of capitalist economics. There 
is no process of mediation between the objects of study and the social elements 
that are embedded in them. 28 Adorno is not referring here to some orthodoxy of a 
dialectical mediation that Benjamin is departing from, as he states himself this 
problem of the construction of the dialectic is one that he is grappling with and 
has not resolved. 29 The shared methodology is that dialectical thought begins with 
everything discarded by Hegel; the particular, the transient, the fragmentary. It is 
through the immersion in objectivity that the subject is dissolved and can come to 
an experience of elements of the object which can escape the reification of a 
subsumptive, identity thinking. This experience of immersion is a form of surrender 
to the object by a subject that attempts to suspend its identifying proceedures 
through such a surrender. This initial attempt of an experience of immersion is 
presupposition less in the sense that it aims to uncover the meanings inherent in 
the object itself through a passive assimilation rather than an aggressive 
identification. The experience of immersion has a strong affinity with aesthetic 
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experience, in this initial suspension and approach to the object as inherently 
meaningful. It also has a certain affinity with phenomenology in the sense of an 
attempt to approach the meaning of "things themselves", but as we have seen 
Adorno's phenomenological proceedure is more Hegelian than Husserlian, in that it 
refuses a transcendental subjectivity which performs an epoche, and instead relies 
on an initial dissolution of subjectivity into the meaning of the object itself. 
The question of construction is how the subject emerges again, as a critical 
subject, beyond the experience of immersion. But, what is this experience of 
immersion? It is fundamentally reflective, for Adorno, an intellectual experience, but 
as we have described earlier an intellectual experience which opens itself to the 
object of interpretation. Another form of such an experience of immersion that has 
been described earlier, is the aesthetic 'shudder' which dissolves the ego in a 
subjective experience against the ego. Immersion is then a process of 
desubjectification that occurs through an intellectual experience that registers 
bodily. This is a point in Adorno's thought where the demand for coherence starts 
to seep in. How is this immersion coherent, when it contains such a range of 
confused categories ? The easy answer, and to an extent the correct answer, is that 
coherence is not the issue, as what is precisely produced through such an 
immersion in the object is the blurring and deepening of all of the contradictions 
that the demand for coherence wants to keep separate, distinctions such as subject 
and object, body and mind, and theory and practice. This still doesn't give us an 
account of the conditions for the practice of such an immersion in objectivity. One 
of the forms of such a practice rests on the constellation of concepts that attempt 
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to produce a different relation between subject and object, without a final 
identification of the object. Through a constellation, the subject is still ineliminably 
differentiated from object, in the use of conceptuality, but concepts are destabilised 
as pure identifications in their relation to other concepts, often in a relation of 
parataxis, contradictions being expressed as different clauses within one sentence. 
However, for this to matter materially, there must an elaboration of how this 
conceptual constellation affects the object, and Adorno attempts this through a 
concept of embodied thought. It is here that the coherence of such an immersion 
does break down at times, but we will consider both of these issues as we 
progress through this chapter. 
In his essay, "The Prince and the Frog", one of the few places that Agamben 
deals directly with Adorno, he attempts to read the debate between Adorno and 
Benjamin in a reversal of its usual characterisation. If the usual way of 
characterising the debate is by Adorno calling Benjamin a "vulgar materialist", 
whose Marxism is conjured without mediation, Agamben's strategy is to invoke 
Benjamin's philological methodology as a true historical materialism that dispenses 
with the crudity of dialectical thinking altogether. For Agamben, it is Adorno who 
is the vulgar dialectical thinker who invokes a mediation that has no substance 
other than idealism or a crude deterministic Marxism of base determining 
superstructure, and a prescription of how we get to the base through an 
interpretation of the superstructure, as he argues: 
"Vulgarity is, rather, the attribute of that interpretation which, conceiving the 
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relationship between structure and superstructure primarily as a relationship of 
cause and effect, needs 'mediation' and the 'total social process' to give a 
semblance of meaning to this relationship, and at the same time save its own 
idealist coyness. 00 
Whilst there is the germ of an argument in Agamben's essay, it is spoiled by his 
complete misreading of Adorno's relation to dialectical experience, premised on a 
Heideggerean reading of Hegel. In his account of Adorno's appropriation of Hegel, 
Agamben quotes from a passage from the Phenomenology of Spirit, which begins 
with the statement that "The True is the whole". 31 He then proceeds to read 
Adorno's use of the concept of mediation as a completely unproblematic idealistic 
rendering of this concept in terms of the truth of the whole, that every particular 
only gains its truth in an absolute whole. There is no reference to Adorno's 
programmatic reversal of Hegel's dictum into the "whole is the untrue", or his 
many statements such as "the totality of the universal expresses its own failure". 32 
Agamben's fundamental misunderstanding is that when Adorno refers to the total 
social process, he refers to an antagonistic or negative totality, a totality that has 
to be constructed, because it is being lived in the form of a total capitalism, but it 
is by no means the truth or the endpoint of a dialectical experience. This 
attribution of a concept of total mediation ignores Adorno's critique of idealism. 
Agamben may want to make the point that any form of dialectical thinking 
cannot escape its idealism and has to reckon with the indetermination of its 
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beginning, but he doesn't do that here, just attributing a concept of mediation to 
Adorno that he doesn't possess. 33 
However, the germ of the argument is the concept of construction, or what 
might be termed radical interpretation, and the relation of the object of study to 
the formation of a critical subjectivity which can experience an aspect of truth, 
even within a reified whole. The discussion and the distinction between Benjamin 
and Adorno here becomes clouded because of Adorno's later adoption of many of 
Benjamin's conceptual terms for the process or experience of construction (such as 
concepts of constellation and redemption) however, the difference does lie in a 
certain concept of dialectics, and rests here on distinctions between concept and 
image to which we now turn. 
Concept and Image 
Adorno and Benjamin's shared aim is to turn towards the object of reified culture 
or society and attempt to release that object from its ensnarement in the form of 
a rigid thinking, without subsuming the particular under a universal. The turn 
towards the object in dialectical thinking, is a shift of emphasis between 
particularity and universality, in that the universal appears only through the 
particular and is captured only fleetingly. Through a certain immersion in 
objectivity, the reified objects of capitalist culture and society can be released from 
the grip of conceptual subsumption and figure a new concept of truth. Thus, there 
is a certain affinity with the motive of phenomenology, in that what it attempts to 
204 
release is a process of life itself freed from the capture by concepts. The affinity 
with phenomenology lies in the Husserlian slogan "to the things themselves", in 
that Adorno want to account for the meanings of objects in as presuppositionless 
a way as possible, but without either the bracketing of experience as 
transcendental epoche, or the positing of an originary unity of intentionality with 
intended object, of noema and noesis. This process will have to proceed through 
the mediation of the categories of thought, the forms of conceptuality which we 
currently operate with, and through the milieu of a reified contemporary 
experience. As he states, "there is no knowledge which can repudiate its 
mediations; it can only reflect them". 
34 The question for Adorno is the grounds for 
the possibility of such a reflection. In an apt metaphor for the dialectics at a 
standstill, he outlines this proceedure as follows: 
"In its microstructure Hegel's thought and its literary forms are what Walter 
Benjamin later called "dialectics at a standstill" comparable to the experience 
the eye has when looking through a microscope at a drop of water that begins 
to teem with life; except that what that stubborn, spellbinding gaze falls on is 
not firmly delineated as an object but frayed, as it were, at the edges. 05 
What is interesting about this metaphor is the place of the subject. The immersion 
into an object is, what Adorno would term elsewhere a "distanced nearness". 36 The 
object is viewed without presupposition but from a position in which the subject 
still has a differentiated subject position. The purpose of the immersion in 
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objectivity is to set into play the sedimented contents of such an object which 
have been reified within capitalism. Those contents will be both natural and 
historical: both processes of social labour reified into natural realities as second 
nature by capitalism, but also the moment of the somatic, of the natural intrinsic 
to the processes of social labour. This is the first sense of the speculative move in 
this materialist dialectics, the idea of a dialectics as a resuscitation, a bringing to 
life of the object of study, which can only be accomplished through a different 
attitude to objectivity. However, to be successful, this resuscitation must involve a 
certain construction of the material, a theory must await this experience of 
immersion. There is a strong tension here between a dissolution of subjectivity and 
its preservation, a tension that is stressed differently by Benjamin and Adorno. 
For Benjamin, the important moment of construction is the experience of the 
immersion in the object as a closed object of reified life, in the letters to Adorno, 
he refers to it as a "monad". 37 This construction in Benjamin is the interpretation 
and relation of aspects of reified existence which as reified forms of culture can, 
in the construction of their relation to the possibilities stored within them but not 
developed, open up possibilities that have been missed and prefigure forms of 
redemption. The experience of the object as a dialectical image produced through 
the presentation of textual material is the experience of the truth moment covered 
over in capitalism. The process of construction in Benjamin is presentational in the 
sense that the array of direct quotations, or the relation between disparate and 
diffuse elements of culture, form an image which can be either assimilated 
consciously or unconsciously. In this regard it is interesting to contrast the reading 
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that Benjamin gives to the images of surrealism as "profane illumination" with 
Adorno's account of surrealist images. 39 
It is the concept of a "profane illumination" that Benjamin uses in his essay 
on surrealism which elucidates both the similarity and difference in Adorno's and 
Benjamin's usage of dialectical images. 
39 In surrealist images, there is a 
displacement or refusal of identificatory meaning in favour of an experience 
before meaning, of a threshold where image and language take precedence, and 
destabilise any conception of meaning or the subject. The subject is destabilised 
through this experience of surrealist images so that the difference between waking 
and sleeping is worn down. This is not just an experience of intoxication, although 
certain experiences of intoxication may prefigure, in a problematic way, such a 
"profane illumination". 0 Benjamin describes the mechanism on the self in such an 
experience as a form of dream experience which "loosens individuality like a bad 
tooth" 41 These surrealist images provide models for the dialectical images 
Benjamin wants to construct through the presentation of objects and quotations in 
new and distinct configurations. The presentation of such constellations will give 
an image-idea of collective possibilities which have been suppressed, particularly in 
forms of life growing old. 
Adorno was critical of this dream element of the dialectical image that 
Benjamin drew from surrealism. This critique relates to Adorno's own account of 
surrealist images. The relation of dialectical images to dreaming removes the fetish 
or reified character of the objects or concepts formed in a constellation. For 
Adorno the important aspect of the reception of the image in the attempt to 
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assimilate it is not its analogues in dream experience, but the dual element of 
both fearing and desiring what is revealed as alien, as dead. The presentation of 
the dialectical image as constellation is a presentation of something that enables it 
to be read as a reified existence, something that provokes the subject in fear and 
also desire, to oscillate as a subjectivity in a form of tension. One pole of this 
oscillation is the reification of the ego as the subject in "full control of itself and 
free of all consideration of the empirical world", which then reveals itself as the 
other pole, as something dead. 42 Thus the dialectic in the reception of the 
dialectical images of surrealism is thoroughly negative. It is a dialectic through 
which the subject as supposedly free attempts to approach the image in terms of 
both fearing and desiring it, and finds its reflection in an image of death, as lack 
of life itself, this rigid separated ego, without any possibility of movement or 
change. As Adorno argues: 
"The montages of Surrealism are the true still lives. In making compositions of 
what is out of date, they create nature morte" 43 
The dialectical force of the fetish character of the object is displaced by 
attributing a concept of the dream character to the dialectical image, a dream 
character which falsely invests the image with a possibility for instigating 
unconscious identifications in the subjective reception of the dialectical image. 
Adorno's critical force is thus targeted against what he fears is a concept of the 
collective unconscious within Benjamin's work, which he sees as a means of 
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synthesising the reception of the dialectical image in consciousness through an 
immediate identification of possibilities which are brought to light in the 
presentation of the dialectical image: 
"The idea of the collective consciousness was invented to distract attention 
from true objectivity, and from alienated subjectivity as its correlate. Our task is 
to polarize and dissolve this 'consciousness' dialectically in terms of society and 
singular subjects, not to galvanize it as the imagistic correlate of the commodity 
character. '"44 
Benjamin responds to this critique, by emphasising the importance of a conception 
of "dream figures" within the dialectical image, particularly in terms of an act of 
awakening, an awakening in which the image appears. It is this sense of 
immersion in the objects or concepts that are formed in a constellation which can 
produce the image in a moment of awakening which is the experience of the 
image. The dialectical image is not the construction of the constellation, but the 
experience of this constellation as possibility, as awakening. This does not mean 
that a theory of reception may still be needed and that the idea of the collective 
consciousness is only one attempt at this, as Benjamin argues: 
"The dialectical image does not merely copy the dream -I never remotely 
intended to suggest that. But, it does seem to me that the former contains 
within itself the exemplary instances, the irruptions of waking consciousness, and 
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that it is indeed precisely from such places that the figure of the dialectical 
image first produces itself like that of a star composed of many glittering 
points. Here too, therefore a bow needs to be stretched, and a dialectic forged: 
that between the image and the act of waking. i45 
The problem for Adorno is how such a dialectic could be formulated, as it 
seems to be beyond subject and object mediation. It appears to need a mediation 
between an "experience without a subject" and an image that appears at the same 
time as its reception. 46 For Benjamin, the experience of the dialectical image 
produced through the conceptual construction of the material becomes an 
experience of something beyond subject and object mediation, an image that 
flashes up and then consumes itself in its reception. There is a certain relation to 
a concept of Erlebnis here, obviously not the concept that Benjamin outlines in 
terms of information and surface experience, but the concept of an experience 
which changes all other forms of experience, the experience which transforms both 
the temporality of experience (it is not experienced as a continuity) and the 
subject-object relation within experience (this is dissolved). What Benjamin 
acknowledges is that there is no route back from such an emphatic dissolution of 
the subject in the dialectical image, there is not a second moment of theorisation. 
The tension in the debate between Adorno and Benjamin, then, rests on this 
question as to whether the experience of immersion can be recuperated as a 
subjective experience, or must be understood as fundamentally an experience 
without a subject. The philological method, that Agamben refers to, stakes 
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everything on this experience of a dialectical image through a certain constellation 
of concepts. The dialectical image is related to Benjamin's speculative concept of 
experience, which in turn is related to his early project of attempting to overcome 
the Kantian antinomies through a different concept of thinking beyond the subject- 
object relation as an overcoming rather than a synthesis. This would be a move 
that could overcome the limits of Kantian reason through a certain concept of 
experience. This speculative concept of experience is still fundamentally Kantian, in 
the sense that the experience of the dialectical image is the experience of a 
certain changed concept of time, Jetzseit, a now-time, where what has been is 
gathered into a present moment, that can, even momentarily gather together and 
complete time. This is fundamentally still a Kantian experience, in that it is an 
experience that depends upon a schematism through time, only this form of 
schematism through the Jetzseit fundamentally alters normal forms of temporality 
and subject-object relations. Whereas the Kantian schematism secures the object, 
Benjamin's procedure fundamentally dissolves subject-object relations in an 
emphatic experience. This absolute experience is nevertheless only possible 
historically, because it can only be legible given a particular historical 
configuration. This is how Benjamin tries to distinguish such a concept of absolute 
experience from an experience of absolute essence, as he writes: 
"What distinguishes images from the 'essences' of phenomenology is their 
historical index ... they attain to legibility only at a particular time ... truth 
is 
charged to the bursting point with time. , 47 
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This account relies on a concept of the legibility of phenomena in the world, that 
phenomena can be read as texts, and also on a certain messianic concept of 
redemptive time, both of which are highly speculative concepts. However, the 
concept of dialectical image is productive of a changed conception of the dialectic 
in a way that Adorno's concept-laden dialectics cannot be, because Benjamin has a 
productive moment within his dialectics that is not sublation in idealistic terms, 
but the production of immanent speculative experiences through the apprehension 
of dialectical images. Benjamin's use of image enables him to recast and inflect 
the Kantian concept of intuition through different spatial and temporal forms. 48 
This reformulation of dialectics then moves decisively away from a Hegelian 
concept of mediation, but still constructs a mediation nevertheless, as Peter Osborne 
writes: 
"There is mediation in the experience of the dialectical image: a mediation 
between the lived historical present of the `now' and a specific past, via the 
perspective of history as a redemptive whole. " 49 
Thus Agamben concedes too much in his attempted defence of Benjamin as a 
non-dialectical thinker, in that the philological presentation of the monad contains a 
mediation in the form of its relation to history and a conception of time. The 
characterisation of the philological method as the method, without "dialectical 
precautions", that can "kiss the frog of praxis on the mouth" and turn it into a 
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prince, ignores the fact that this new conception of the dialectic has a concept of 
mediation and time to grapple with. 
50 Agamben does acknowledge this, and many 
of the remaining essays in the collection Infancy and History concern a relation 
to a messianic concept of time. However, acknowledging the mediation in 
Benjamin's dialectic would draw attention to the fact that it is actually his 
dialectic that has a concept of the whole, of history as completed in the time of 
redemption, even if this is immediately consumed, and then referred to the 
production of revolutionary practice resulting from this experience. 51 The idea of a 
completion of experience in time actually has a more Hegelian structure in terms 
of the immanent circularity of the dialectic than Adorno's transformation of 
Hegelian dialectics into negative dialectics does. The structure of now-time as an 
"eternal present" can be reconfigured in Hegelian terms as the absolute subject- 
object, substance-universal that is produced through history and appears in time. 52 
In this sense, Hegel's idealism and Benjamin's messianic retrieval are compatible. 
However, Adorno's critique of Hegelian mediation is its presumption of the whole 
as the true, this structure of circularity, which already presumes an outcome to the 
dialectic. When Adorno attempts to characterise the dialectic in terms of the time 
of the dialectic it is not as an opening up to a completion, but as a series of 
intermittences of stops and starts; the movement of the dialectic is a movement of 
fixed and dynamic elements that is never completed. Benjamin's use of the 
dialectical image enables him to articulate a positive concept of experience that 
can, as a lived experience, grasp the absolute immanently, but he can only have 
such a concept if his idea of a messianic fulfillment of time is also accepted. 
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Despite Adorno's invocation of Benjaminian themes in his later writings, when he 
outlines a conception of the dialectical image, it is always inflected negatively, and 
in the sense of something that can negate the current experience of reification 
rather than offer a positive image of redemption. This is Adorno's minimal 
description of the dialectical image in his lectures on metaphysics: 
... 
it is a condition of metaphysical experience that it can miss the mark, that 11 
it can be quite wrong, and that, on the other, it requires an objective moment, 
antithetical to it and incapable of being assimilated to it - that these two motifs 
together form the dialectical figure, the dialectical image. "53 
Adorno's formulation of the dialectical image here is twofold. First, in terms of its 
fragility, that it is always vulnerable to failure. This is the element that Benjamin 
refers to as catastrophe, that the opportunity of metaphysical experience may be 
missed. This is not a presupposition of the dialectical image in Benjamin, but a 
danger that it is fundamentally unstable, and that the right configuration may not 
be traced to produce the experience. The second characteristic that Adorno 
maintains is that this experience remains a mediated subject-object experience, that 
there must always be a moment of something ineliminable, or material, even within 
the metaphysical experience. This is specifically what Benjamin was attempting to 
move beyond with his concept of speculative experience, either configured through 
the dissolution of the subject in experience, or the dissolution of the subject into a 
collective subject, or the attempt to dissolve the antinomy between knowledge and 
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perception through the production of images which could be the foundations of an 
emphatic experience, that in itself could serve as the motor for revolutionary 
experience. 
It is easy to see here why Adorno's new conception of the dialectic may seem 
denuded in comparison with Benjamin, even if we don't accept Agamben's 
presentation of the debate. Benjamin's conception of a redemptive completion of 
time in the dialectical image was itself dialectically inflected by his attempts to 
read this redemptive moment materially, as different modes in which the absolute 
could be realised immanently in the most individual and particular moments. Peter 
Osborne has outlined how Benjamin's account of the photograph as image, which 
is both singular, and potentially infinitely reproducible instantiates a certain form 
of the iconic (ideational or absolute) side of images, with their instantiation in 
history as reproducible. As he argues: 
"Benjamin replaced the simple theological unity of the image's participation in 
the divine with the multiform, materially diverse, series of concrete unities of 
indexicality and iconicity made up by the history of technical reproduction .,, 
54 
The illumination of the photograph is the capturing of the particular experiences 
that are fleetingly gestured towards in Surrealist images. The fleeting experiences 
and gestures which are captured in early photography, captured as moments in 
time, can be studied in terms of the possibilities within such early photographs 
that have been missed. The possibility that we may recover such fleeting gestures 
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is released by the technology of the photograph in terms of its reproducibility. 
But, there is still no key to the legibility of the particular instantiation of the idea 
within the image. This is not really the critique that Adorno provides, in that in 
his conception of constellation, the idea of an image as an instantiation of an idea 
of truth remains, but as a horizon, rather than a definitive lived experience. 
Constellation is a weak imagism, in the sense that its power to form compelling 
images is always curtailed by the constitution of constellations as a mediation 
between one concept which calls for another concept in an attempt to unseal the 
truth of the object. Adorno's account of a certain immersion in objectivity, 
conveyed through the experience of the art object can provide a more realised 
form of reconciliation, as the communication of the differentiated, as the aesthetic 
experience does not consist in the formation of judgements. However, the 
experience of negative dialectics as self-reflection moves within a mediation 
between construction, interpretation and expression in which there is no final 
redemptive experience. 
Construction, Interpretation, Expression 
For Adorno, dialectical experience remains at the level of the contradiction between 
the concept and object, and its speculative import remains through the concept, 
rather than in the construction of image. In a critique of dialectics as it became 
reified by Soviet ideologists, Adorno outlines his understanding of dialectics as 
materialism without images: 
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"Dialectics lies in things, but it could not exist without the consciousness that 
reflects it - no more than it can evaporate into that consciousness. The thought 
is not an image of the thing. . . the thought aims at the thing 
itself... What 
clings to the image remains idolatry, mythic enthrallment. The totality of images 
blends into a wall before reality. The image theory denies the spontaneity of 
the subject, a movens of the objective dialectics of productive forces and 
conditions ... Nothing 
but an indefatigably reified consciousness will 
believe ... that 
it possesses photographs of objectivity. "55 
Adorno's target here is not Benjamin's dialectical images, but a cruder theory of 
materialism as a naive realism, but the critique retains its force when applied to 
Benjamin, at the level of the importance that Adorno applies to a concept of 
reflection as central to any dialectical experience, and a concept of reflection as 
experience that is fundamentally Hegelian. Hegel's insight in his concept of 
experience, is this doubling of reflection involved in the self-reflection of an 
immediate experience as mediated both through the subject's relation to the object 
and the object's relation to the subject. For Adorno, this dialectical experience 
escapes its idealistic inflection as a philosophy of consciousness through the 
Marxist emphasis on the relation between subject and object as one of social 
labour. The experience of the object as mediated rather than immediate is the 
experience of the reified object as having embedded within it the social relations 
of its production. However, this moment of social labour must not be hypostasised 
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in itself to a metaphysical principle, as it relies on a mediation between labour 
and nature where neither are completely subsumed by the other. Therefore, Adorno 
twists and inflects Marx's materialist critique of Hegel, by proposing a further 
dialectical critique of Marx: 
" 
... the step 
by which labour sets itself up as the metaphysical principle pure 
and simple is none other than the consistent elimination of the "material" to 
which all labour feels itself tied, the material that defines its boundary for it, 
reminds it of what is below it, and relativises its sovereignty. 
06 
This is the twofold materialist speculative thinking that I have outlined above. As 
Adorno states, there is no "stepping out of the world constituted by labour into 
another and unmediated one", but the process of mediation itself never completely 
subsumes the natural moment within the historical act. 
57 The dialectic of nature 
and history remains the consistent thematic throughout Adorno's work. The 
immersion in objectivity then cannot be at the cost of a critical subject able to 
reflect upon that objectivity, which is at the core of dialectical experience. 
In the above discussion I have concentrated on the construction and 
interpretation of the life in objects conceived as the embeddedness of forms of 
social labour within objects, and the attempt at a dialectical experience to bring 
those objects back to life. As we have seen, there is a further moment in Adorno's 
speculative dialectics and that is the natural or somatic. The natural element within 
this dialectics relates to the speculative concept of an expressive philosophy, which 
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leads on to the non-conceptual in terms of the somatic. Expression here becomes 
the expression of an ineliminable material moment within thought. How can we 
give any content to this moment of life in things, in terms of an expressive 
philosophy ? 
Expressive Philosophy: The Life of Things 
At the beginning of the chapter, I outlined Adorno's experience of negative 
dialectics as a deepened form of self-reflection, which doesn't result in the 
emptiness of a subject always beside or ahead of itself, or a subject as empty 
law-giver above the law. Adorno attempts to think the subject as a body that 
thinks. To be more accurate we could call this an experience of the ineliminable 
materiality of thought itself. What does it mean to call this an experience ? It is 
this question that I will try to respond to in the final section of this chapter. It is 
a difficult question for Adorno, as it is an experience that only occurs negatively, 
through the deepening of contradictions, which cause a certain shattering of the 
ego, in its realisation of its dependence on the natural moment it has suppressed. 
This experience is then an experience of a remnant or addendum. The inability to 
accurately identify such a moment is due to the different connotations that Adorno 
gives to this ineliminable materiality, different connotations which may serve as a 
model for a constellation of concepts which try to express something that cannot 
be easily conceptualised, but nevertheless cause certain difficulties in attempting to 
understand this life of things. 
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At one level, Adorno emphasises this materialism as a logical implication of all 
thought, a certain emphasis on the reliance of all ontological categories on a 
certain material "something". Adorno tends to assert this rather than argue for it. 
So he states: 
"There is no Being without entities. "Something" - as a cogitatively indispensable 
substrate of any concept, including the concept of Being - is the utmost 
abstraction of the subject-matter that is not identical with thinking, an 
abstraction not to be abolished by any further thought process. "58 
This is no more than the Kantian thing-in-itself, in the sense that there can be no 
concepts without intuitions. Adorno needs more than a noumenon, he needs a 
material moment as the noumenal which can matter for thought, that can be 
experienced rather than just conceived. 
To try and rectify this Adorno argues for a form of thought that is not 
fundamentally divided from affect. The motive for thought itself, rather than a will 
as transcendental ego, will be related to pleasure and need. Pleasure and need are 
not separate from thinking but the motor, or the unrest that drives thinking. The 
primary drive for such a thinking is the suffering of the body, the physical 
moment within thought that is registered as a lack of bodily fulfillment. Thinking 
is therefore, deeply motivated by the suffering body. 
But, why is the body suffering? To answer this question Adorno moves to the 
theory of Freudian psychoanalysis. The history of civilisation is the history of a 
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renunciation of instinct in favour of societal happiness. But, in the historical form 
that such a renunciation has taken, in capitalist society, the subject experiences this 
renunciation as a loss. The supposed gain from individual renunciation, is not 
worth the repression. What lives on in the subject are then the sexual instincts 
that are suppressed in favour of a drive for self-preservation in the progress of 
civilisation. 
We have seen in chapter three how Adorno gives a more nuanced account of 
this repression of sexual instincts in favour of civilisation, in the sense that what 
is prior to the ego, in terms of instinctive drive can be just as destructive as it is 
liberating. Adorno's account of civilisation is not a straightforward account of 
renunciation of instinct, in the sense that enlightenment is a necessary and 
progressive process of separation from dominating nature, however it is in the 
form of such a separation that an entwinement with nature is lost. In terms of 
this conception of the ineliminable materiality, Adorno refers to it as the "impulse 
before the ego", and he calls for an "anamnesis of the untamed impulse that 
precedes the ego". 59 This concept of a remembering, or bringing back into the 
present something fundamentally lost, is therefore, one past-oriented way of 
reviving a concept of life before repression. The concept of anamnesis suggests 
that such an untamed impulse resides somewhere within the subject, unchanged by 
history 
Finally, Adorno will write about the addendum as the result of a certain 
experience of negative dialectics, as a residue of what remains after the 
determinate negation of the conceptual categories. Such an experience, is the 
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experience of a loss of ego, but nevertheless a desubjectification which doesn't 
result in the merging of subject and object. Such an experience is registered 
physically as both fear at the loss of ego, a certain vertigousness, but also in 
experiences which don't fulfill themselves. The paradigmatic experience in this 
sense, for Adorno, is happiness. What is constitutive of such experiences is an 
opening, a possibility that that the subject may exist in a different relation to 
objectivity, but this cannot be formulated as a completed outline of a fulfilled 
experience of life, as it occurs at the very limits of the possibility of experience 
as defined by the social form in which experience takes place, the society of 
capitalist exchange. This is not a transcendental experience, in terms of a form of 
rationality that would lie beneath or beyond identity thinking, as its completion or 
suppressed ground. It is impossible to give any account of a fulfilled rationality, 
and when Adorno refers to concepts such as "affinity", he is clear that it is not: 
" ... a remnant which cognition 
hands us after the identifying schemata of the 
categorial machinery have been eliminated. Rather, affinity is the definite 
negation of those schemata. 960 
The attempt to resuscitate or gesture towards the archaic either in terms of 
impulses, or as we have seen earlier, in terms of a mimetic faculty that migrates 
into aesthetic comportment unchanged by the vicissitudes of history results in a 
gestural thinking of the material within thought. The problem for Adorno is to 
account for this survival of an impulse, this living on within the subject, of 
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something before the subject. Adorno defines the will in terms of a dependence on 
impulse and a separation from impulse, but an impulse that always returns. This 
theory of repression taken from Freud is problematic, because it assumes that the 
impulse, or the Freudian drive mechanism are ahistorical and interact with the 
social repression in terms of a return of the repressed which is unaffected 
historically. Adorno's argument that there is a survival of the will, a "nachleben", 
within the subject, a living on, needs to have a more mediated grounding. 
61 As it 
is formulated, at times, it is a polar opposition between an ahistorical concept of 
drives within the subject, repressed in terms of the historical formation of the 
ego. 62 However, there is no detailed account of the history of the drives themselves 
in their relation to a return as this ineliminable materiality. This leads to the 
gesture towards a bad sense of speculation, in terms of an anamnestic recovery of 
impulse which has no material grounding. Adorno writes of the somatic impulse of 
the will entering into the imagination in the following terms: 
"A will without physical impulses, impulses that survive, weak-ended 
(abgeschwächt), in imagination, would not be a will, "63 
There is a problem of how to translate the German word 'abgeschwächt' here, 
which Ashton attempts with this formulation "weak-ended", which doesn't make a 
great deal of sense in English. I understand Adorno to mean here that the impulse 
survives in a weakened form, through a process of raising it to the sphere of the 
imagination, as a need that remains as an unrest within thought, as something 
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bodily, which motivates towards a different mode of living which wouldn't repress 
instinctuality. This is what Adorno means by suffering driving thought: 
"This doctrine is easy to criticise as secretly expressing a naive naturalism. 
In fact it is a last epistemological quiver of the somatic element, before that 
element is totally expelled. It is the somatic element's survival, in knowledge, as 
the unrest that reproduces itself in the advancement of knowledge ... 
The 
physical moment tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things 
should be different. 'Woe speaks: Go'. "64 
What is needed to give this account some concretion is an account of the relation 
between body and thought, in terms of how the process of a survival of the 
somatic element survives, is weakened, and migrates into other modes of 
comportment such as aesthetic comportment. What does weakening mean here ? 
What is the process of survival, and how does this survival enable us to approach 
the object in order to register the speculative material experience as negative self- 
reflection, which can prefigure the possibility of something other? 
Adorno needs to give some account of the relation between embodied thought 
and its historical entanglement in conceptual thinking, other than through an 
opposition of ego and id. Although he attempts to historicise Freud, by adapting 
some of Freud's middle period work in terms of the blurring of boundaries of 
ego and id, and the importance of a concept of narcissism due to its account of 
how the subject can identify with its own false needs, Adorno is caught on the 
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horns of a dilemna. He is fundamentally opposed to any concept of a timeless 
unconscious, whether that is configured in Oedipal terms or as a collective 
consciousness, and thus his references to survival and anamnesis, need to account 
for the historical changes in the phenomenon that is being recovered. However, he 
also needs a notion of a material element to thought which is going to move 
thought beyond its current reified context, if his metaphysics is going to be a 
materialist metaphysics. One way of attempting to negotiate such a problem would 
be an analysis of embodied thought, not in terms of a fundamental ontology, or a 
set of relations of material inference, but as a historical phenomenology of the 
body. Adorno resists such a concentrated formulation, because he would have to go 
to certain aspects of Heidegger's work, in order to give an account of being-in- 
the-world, in terms of embodiment. This would give Adorno some more content to 
respond to the question of what he means by this indissoluble something as a 
physical suffering. This is not to say that this would be an ontological account, it 
would need to be historicised in itself. 
One example of such an approach, would be to try and think Adorno's concept 
of "distanced nearness", in terms of what Merleau-Ponty has termed the bodily 
experience of "touched-touching". 65 The concept of the "touched-touching" arises 
from a reflection on a particular bodily experience. If I touch my left hand with 
my right hand, I will the act of raising my right hand and touching my left. 
However, once I reflect on such an action I realise that in the touching of my 
left hand, my right hand is also being touched by the left, a form of touching that 
is unwilled but as the consequence of my initial act of touch I am also being 
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touched. The body is, therefore, "both thing and vehicle of my relation to 
things". 66 Merleau-Ponty attempts to build an analogy in this reflection on bodily 
experience to our further experience of being amongst objects, or in relation to 
objects in the world, in that there is something about our relationality to the world 
that corresponds to this core structure of a 'touched-touching', of an activity which 
is also as activity intrinsically a passivity: 
"The relation with the world is included in the relation of the body with itself. 
The relation of my two hands= the exchange between them; the touched hand 
is given to the touching hand as touching; they are the mirror of each other - 
something analogous in the relation with the things: they touch me just as I 
touch them. Not surprising: They are that on which the synergy of my body 
opens; they are made of the same stuff as the corporeal schema; I haunt them 
at a distance, they haunt me at a distance". 
67 
What this analysis of the body as a certain relationality gives is a concrete 
physical instantiation of a model for auratic experience, which is taken out of the 
purely visual sphere. Understanding the auratic in terms of an attitude towards 
objectivity of a "distanced nearness" can here have a grounding in embodiment. 
The particular form of human embodiment, encapsulated in the ability to be close 
to objects in the world, yet distanced, is encapsulated in the form of a relation of 
a "touched-touching". Such a bodily relation will change over time, through 
transformations in bodily experience, and our relation with objects, but provides a 
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grounding for a comportment towards objectivity which could exist with objects 
without dominating or dissolving into the object. The concept of a "distanced 
nearness" as a visual concept is far more difficult to account for, as Merleau- 
Ponty acknowledges the "eye cannot see the eye, as the hand touches the other 
hand" 68 The shifting of a concept of the auratic from the realm of iconic or 
aesthetic images to the realm of objectivity per se in terms of a visual 
experience of something as a "unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it 
may", does not give us a coherent account of the immersion in objectivity, in 
which as nature a subject separates itself from nature. The contemplative look that 
Adorno writes about in terms of a distanced nearness still has an element of too 
much of the objectifying gaze, therefore a distance without nearness. 69 Adorno's 
account of this "distanced nearness" is as follows in Minima Moralia: 
"But in the long, contemplative look that fully discloses people and things, the 
urge towards the object is always deflected, reflected. Contemplation without 
violence, the source of all the joy of truth, presupposes that he who 
contemplates does not absorb the object into himself: a distanced nearness. 1170 
An analysis of this relation in terms of the bodily relation of a "touched- 
touching" would enable a more concrete description and understanding of what 
such an immersion in objectivity could mean as "distanced nearness". Such a 
description bases itself upon an embodied place of thought within the world, due 
to certain capacities of the body. This capacity resides in an affectivity of the 
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body, its ability to both be alongside and separate from objectivity, even conceived 
in terms of its own body. 
This is not to say that such an embodied relating should be hypostasised in 
itself, as beyond the historical. In accordance with the idea of natural history, such 
an ontological turn could be historicised in itself. In fact, the grounding for such a 
historicisation lies in the account of a destruction of experience which is largely 
configured in bodily terms, as the replacement of a bodily relation to the world in 
terms of the growth of forms of living which privilege the body as a pure 
stimulus-response mechanism. The instantaneity of response caused by the shock 
effect of modern forms of life (such as the assembly line, the experience of the 
modern city) moulds and adapts the body in new ways, as a centre or field of 
tension, exposed to these currents of change. This is Benjamin's formulation in the 
essay on "Experience and Poverty", of the "tiny, fragile human body", which lies 
at the mercy of a "field of destructive torrents and explosions". 71 Such a thinking 
of the body in terms of it as the locus for the destruction of a certain form of 
experience, would also inevitably have to account for the new possibilities revealed 
to the body by technological developments and attempt to relate these to the 
system of exchange. It is not that this argument is not elaborated in Adorno's 
work, for example, in his analyses of the changes in forms of listening to music 
produced by the culture industry, it is just that the thinking through of the concept 
of the body as implicated in thought is not conceived primarily in any other way 
than the hydraulic model of drive and repression in Freudian theory. 
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There is a good reason for this, in that any statement of what it means for a 
body to be our locus within the world, can tend towards an absolutisation of such 
an experience. Merleau-Ponty tends towards this with his ontological 
conceptualisation of the "touched-touching" relation as the concept of "flesh". As 
he argues that: 
"If it is true that as soon as philosophy declares itself to be reflection or 
coincidence, it prejudges what it will find, then once again it must recommence 
everything, reject the instruments reflection and intuition had provided 
themselves, and install itself in a locus where they have not yet been 
distinguished, in experiences that have not yet been 'worked over', that offer us 
all at once pell-mell both 'subject' and 'object'. 
02 
Adorno's critique of damaged life demonstrates that there is no such location that 
can be preserved pristine and immediate. To mistake the bodily relating as 
ontological ultimate is the mistake of identifying the "remnants" of life for the 
absolute itself. 73 Simon Jarvis has noted that Adorno's speculation calls for a new 
"phenomenology of affect" which may owe more to "Proust rather than Husserl". 74 
Any such phenomenology though will have to deal with the very affects as 
historically transformed that are to be described. The problem for a new 
phenomenology of affect even in a Proustian form as a phenomenology of the 
involuntary recall of affects now decomposed is that such an involuntary recall 
either presumes the experience to be recalled in involuntary memory occurred at 
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a certain temporal moment, and therefore is accessible, or argues that the initial 
experience itself was unconscious. Adorno's dispute with Benjamin about the 
characteristics of the memoire involuntaire coalesces around this point. Benjamin 
argues that the initial moment was unconscious, and Adorno disagrees. However, if 
the initial taste or experience is not unconscious, the recovery of such an 
experience has to exist within the lifetime of somebody who originally had such 
an experience. Surveying the history of affects from the stance of a completed 
destruction of experience would mean that there were no experiences there to be 
recalled. The generation that had gone to "school in the streetcar", and now finds 
itself plunged into rapid change, according to Benjamin's formulation, is now dead. 
We are all living through a rapid process of change that would not allow for the 
recall of such affects, even in involuntary memory. If there is to be a Proustian 
moment in the phenomenology of affect, it will be oriented towards the future in 
terms of an unfulfilled experience that opens up possibilities, in terms of the 
Proustian place-name, an experience which we will discuss in the final chapter. 
Perhaps the either-or between Proust and Husserl is too stark, and we need an 
element of Proust, and an element of the phenomenology of being-in-the-world in 
terms of embodiment that I have attempted to elucidate via certain aspects of 
Merleau-Ponty's thought. Nevertheless, Jarvis is correct in his argument that we 
cannot refuse an attempt to construct any means of theorising these "traces" of 
the natural, particularly as "current circumstances turn out to go on and on being 
current". 75 - 
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However, I think that Adorno's negative experiential project of a life at the 
limits of the possibility of thought, which is produced through the immanent 
negation of conceptual categories provides a useful means of attempting to 
articulate the possibility of life. Similarly to Benjamin's concept of dialectical 
images, such an experience is produced by the determinate negation of the 
conceptual categories in a process of reflection that will produce an experience 
that cannot be articulated without the process of negative dialectical thinking 
itself. There cannot be a description of the experience of the material within and 
without the subject, the subjective experience against the 'I', without the process of 
contradictions that are outlined through a process of critical self-reflection. In this 
sense, the somatic moment as an experience of desubjectification, both painful 
sundering of the ego and opening to other possibilities for subjectivity is Adornian 
sublation, but a sublation that does not rest in fulfillment or closure, but an 
opening that calls for both political action and a further hyper-reflection. It calls 
for political action, as this experience of a possibility of a different relation 
between subject and object, could only be achieved in a stable mode through the 
transformation of the exchange economy which determines relations between 
subject and object in terms of abstract equivalence. It calls for a hyper-reflection, 
because the description of such a process of negative dialectics as resulting in a 
momentary sublation, nevertheless builds a system of reason which in itself starts 
to mimic the false whole of social totality. Therefore such a speculative experience 
will rest on a concept of possibility which exists in the contradiction between 
both the affirmation of something transcendent to conceptual categorisation and its 
231 
denial. Adorno formulates this concept of possibility in terms of a project for 
metaphysical experience as the question that a materialist metaphysics poses is the 
possibility of living today. 
This possibility of life is also the question that Agamben poses in relation to 
the project of attempting to construct a form of life in which something like a 
bare life cannot be isolated. Adorno and Agamben share an affinity in their 
discussions of the reduction of life in modernity which reaches its apotheosis in 
the camps, and continues as a paradigm for modern political societies in 
Agamben's contemporary analyses. Both further differentiate their concepts of life 
from any naturalistic grounding, although Adorno's project attempts more of a 
dialectical relation to the moment of the natural within the historical. In the next 
chapter I will consider the experience of life as a possibility which lies at the 
margins of the current state of damaged life. This is an experience that both 
Agamben and Adorno attempt to link to a concept of possibility drawn from 
Aristotelian origins. However, the difference between their approaches will give a 
fundamentally different inflection to what a critical rescue of an experience of a 
'life that does not live' might mean. 
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Chapter 7: The Possibility of Living Today 
In his lectures on metaphysics, Adorno writes: " ... the question whether 
it is still 
possible to live is the form in which metaphysics impinges on us urgently 
today. "' I argued in the previous chapter why such a question is speculative, as 
the possibility of life has been removed to the margins of human experience. In 
the first two chapters of this thesis I outlined the process whereby life in reified 
society has been reduced to a form of "life that does not live" and articulated 
how the concept of bare life outlined by Giorgio Agamben could give further 
content to such a concept of damaged life. In this chapter I want to consider the 
possibility of life today, in terms of an experience of life that lies at the limits of 
reified experience. This experience is tied to the experience of freedom, in that the 
constellation of concepts of possibility, life and metaphysical experience result in a 
negative articulation of freedom. I think that this is a project shared by Agamben 
and Adorno because they are both concerned with a form of experience that is 
not posited as a sovereign transgression of the bounds of actual experience, but 
holds itself in reserve in relation to any projected project of liberation, whether 
this be configured in terms of a bursting of the bonds of the current reified 
existence through desire or an affirmation of a life beyond the human. Both 
thinkers also attempt to resist the nihilistic tendencies of an intrinsically negative 
thought, through a refusal to embrace pure negativity as negativity, although, as we 
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will see Agamben ultimately fails to articulate a concept of freedom which can 
resist its own negativity, because of his lack of a materialist or historical thinking. 
The nihilism I am referring to here is one intrinsic to the very concept of a 
"life that does not live", intrinsic in the sense that the temptation is to emphasise 
in the denial of life a means beyond life. Such a formulation has a dialectical air 
about it, but ultimately, if it is thought without mediation it becomes a simple 
identification with the forms of power that have produced such a situation. It 
becomes such an identification because it affirms the site of bare life as the route 
through which and by which redemption occurs. It is an affirmation of a 
redemptive value in extreme degradation. 
The negativity intrinsic to a concept of a life that does not live results from 
an ontology of the false state of the world. As Christoph Menke has argued, this 
results in certain forms of saying "no" to life. 2 These forms of negation are not 
absolute in themselves, but attempts to open up a possibility of things being 
otherwise through a negation of the current circumstances. Such a process could 
easily find itself caught between a spritualising or nihilistic stance. The 
spiritualising stance would be an affirmation of a position beyond the status quo, 
as an existing redemptive state opened up by the negativity of an ontology of the 
false state of things. Nihilism would be to affirm the existence of a damaged life 
in itself as the only form of life possible. The concept of possibility, and its 
variant as potentiality in the work of Agamben, will hold itself in a peculiar 
relation to actuality. The possibility of life in Adorno's work will refer to the 
possibility of an experience of something that can be actual, but at the same time 
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beyond the bounds of possibility. To affirm its actuality, without recognising its 
intrinsically negative and unrealised character, is the spiritualising mode of 
redemption. To affirm only the impossibility of such an experience is to accept 
the immanent context and that there can be no form of life that moves beyond 
such a context. This would be the nihilistic move. One way to resolve this would 
be a withdrawal from life itself, an affirmative concept of a "life that does not 
live". Adorno mentions this as a ploy in the following terms, when trying to 
respond to the possibility of living today: 
" ... one might well compare 
this situation to that of the philosophy of late 
antiquity, in which, in response to the same question (the possibility of life), 
people fell back on expedients such as ataraxy, that is, the deadening of all 
affects, just to be capable of living at all ... 
I would say that even this 
standpoint, although it emphatically embraces the idea of the freedom of the 
individual, nevertheless has a moment of narrow mindedness in the sense that it 
renders absolute the entrapment of human beings by the totality, and thus sees 
no other possibility than to submit. "3 
Adorno emphasises an element in this embrace of a denial of life as a form of 
freedom, but then withdraws it. My argument here will be that if we attempt a 
critical rescue of a concept of life through an immanent critique of damaged life, 
then it is not a desirable result to arrive at something that is very much like 
death, sheer stasis. Ultimately, this is where Agamben's thinking of a potentiality 
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that holds itself as potentiality arrives. Now, there is a need for caution. The Homo 
Sacer project is incomplete and Agamben has spoken about a volume which will 
give more content to a concept of form of life in which something like a bare 
life cannot be isolated. However, his statement that in this projected volume he 
will be turning away from a historical reading doesn't indicate that he is moving 
in a direction that would negate my criticisms here. 4 
Readings of Aristotle 
Both Adorno and Agamben's concepts of possibility refer back to Aristotelian 
discussions of the concept, and these readings determine the different paths that 
the concept of possibility takes in their respective thought. Ultimately, it is a 
question of matter, in that the salient importance of Aristotle's conception of 
possibility for Adorno is that it is tied to matter rather than form, while Agamben 
does not interpret or refer to this element of Aristotelian theory. 
To refer to Aristotelian theory here is somewhat disingenuous, as the concept 
of possibility appears in different guises in Aristotle's work, and is interpreted in 
different ways by commentators on Aristotle. 5 The aim of my argument here is 
therefore not to appraise different readings in terms of a correct interpretation, but 
to explore how these different emphases in reading Aristotle give rise to very 
divergent constructions of the concept of possibility. 
Aristotle's concept of possibility relates to the difference between dynamis and 
energeia, which Agamben reads as an opposition of potentiality to actuality. This 
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opposition is important for Agamben as it is through such an opposition that he 
wants to interrogate the meaning of possibility within human action, what it means 
when someone says "I can, I cannot". 6 The problem for Agamben's reading is that 
he appropriates these terms from Aristotle's account of possibility, without a sense 
of their distinctive Aristotelian usage. For Agamben, possibility is prior to actuality, 
and the problem is how possibility becomes actual. Formally, the problem becomes 
for Agamben, an attempt to think a form of possibility that does not exhaust its 
potentiality in its actualisation. However, there is no recognition that for Aristotle, 
actuality is prior to possibility. In his Metaphysics Aristotle writes, "We have 
discussed the various senses of 'prior', and it is clear that actuality is prior to 
potentiality. "7 This is clearly not the sense of a relation between possibility and 
actuality that we are usually dealing with, for example in terms of causal 
relations. The reason for Aristotle's distinctiveness here is his attempt to transform 
the Platonic idea, and preserve elements of its timelessness, but to relate it 
materially to a world that changes. The Platonic idea is related to form, to 
actuality, in terms of d namis, but this actuality as form is prior to all possibilities 
which in some way exist in an unfulfilled state in search of a form. As Aristotle 
writes: "For of non-existent things, some exist potentially, but they do not exist, 
because they do not exist in fulfillment. "8 This paradoxical statement only makes 
some sense if related to the distinction between dynamis and ener eia, which does 
not map straightforwardly onto a distinction between possibility and actuality. 
Energeia is form in so far as it is realised in matter, a force which as immanent 
idea moves matter towards a realisation. Form is a substrate, a substance of which 
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the stuff of matter partakes. This is the transposition of Platonic Ideas into 
Aristotelian philosophy. The Platonic Forms or Ideas exist, but not transcendent to 
matter rather as immanent to their development. Therefore, dynamis amis as pure 
possibility is the thought of matter without form, existing in pure possibility 
awaiting a form. For Aristotle, it is the ideas as substantial immanent forms that 
have a higher reality than pure possibility as matter, and need to be thought of 
as prior but in relation to possibility. This is why some non-existent things can 
exist potentially, in terms of Aristotle's formulation, but not actually, because they 
have not been formed, they are not existing in fulfilled form. Thus, Adorno 
formulates Aristotle's conception of possibility as a reversal of our understanding 
of the relation between possibility and actuality: 
"To state the position paradoxically, reality in Aristotle's philosophy corresponds 
to what we call possibility and possibility to what we call reality. "9 
Our modern understanding of the relation between possibility and actuality is of 
pure possibility as pure form in search of contingent content, and when we speak 
of reality or actuality we mean something filled with a sensible content. Whereas 
the opposite appears to be the case in Aristotle's thought. For Aristotle, energeia as 
form is the higher form of reality, whereas pure possibility as matter is not in 
accordance with the real or the actual. 
Agamben's concept of potentiality and its relation to possibility is not clearly 
delineated in his writings. He notes that Aristotle refers to two kinds of 
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potentiality. First, there is a potentiality which is developmental in nature, and 
refers to inherent human capacities that can develop over time. The second form 
of potentiality relates to a capacity which a person has that can be actualised or 
not actualised, such as the potential of the poet to write a poem. 
10 Such a 
potentiality is related to a contingency, that an action may or may not take place. 
Such a contingency can be read in terms of either the fact that certain actions 
take place but are not necessary, or in terms of an indeterminateness, a 
contingency in which something can be in one way or another without either 
having a certain prevalence or priority. ' For Aristotle, contingency is related to a 
certain potentiality which can either become actual or not. That which has a 
potentiality to be also has a potentiality not to be. In this sense there is a pure 
possibility as potentiality which is this radical contingency, or pure possibility. For 
Aristotle, possibility is related to contingency, as each potentiality can fail at any 
time to be actualised. However, as we have seen this potentiality resides in a 
particular conception of the relation between matter and form. 
Both Adorno and Agamben stress the concept of dynamis in their reading of 
Aristotle, this concept of pure potentiality or possibility, as a form of radical 
contingency. However, for Agamben this is a radical contingency related in some 
way to the will. As we have seen earlier, Agamben talks about the formulation of 
potentiality in terms of the question "I can, I cannot". Agamben moves between 
readings of De Anima and the Metaphysics and this is perhaps why his concept 
of potentiality does not relate to the context upon which Adorno draws in terms 
of matter as pure possibility in his reading of the Metaphysics. However, for both 
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thinkers, the central concept is that of pure possibility and its mode of existence 
as pure possibility. Agamben reads this as: " ... a potentiality that 
is not simply the 
potential to do this or that thing but potential to not-do, potential not to pass into 
actuality. "12 He interprets a certain phrase of Aristotle's as stating that all 
potentiality is an impotentiality, all potentiality exists as potentiality in the 
possibility that it might not realise itself as actual. Aristotle writes that: "What is 
potential is capable of not being in actuality. What is potential can both be and 
not be, for the same is potential both to be and not to be. 03 
Agamben reads this passage as the "originary figure of potentiality, which we 
may now define with his own words as the potential not to be". 14 He doesn't read 
this passage in the context of the relation of form to matter. In that context, the 
potentiality not to be is a form of contingency related to the fact that a matter 
might not find its form. Agamben wants to relate this to a concept of possibility 
in terms of the will and a passage from potentiality to actuality in terms of the 
act. But the relation between potentiality and actuality in Aristotle's text here is 
not related to the problem of a passing over from potentiality to actuality in 
terms of action, but in terms of the relation of matter as pure possibility to form 
as its immanent fulfillment. Thus, Agamben's characterisation of the problem of 
potentiality as that which is "truly potential is thus what has exhausted all its 
impotentiality in bringing it wholly into the act as such" configures the passage 
from potentiality to actuality in the form of will. This is not immediately present 
in the relation of form and matter, as actuality and possibility in Aristotle. The 
result, for Agamben, is a thinking of possibility as pure negativity, as the existence 
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of a pure negativity as a hesitancy, an affirmative concept of negativity. In his 
concept of freedom he tries to think freedom in relation to this potentiality not to 
be, a potentiality to hold itself in reserve. 
Potentiality 
As we have seen, the form of potentiality that Agamben takes from Aristotle is a 
potentiality which conserves itself as potentiality through the refusal to act. The 
figure that represents this potentiality without action for Agamben is the fictional 
character in Hermann Melville's short story "Bartleby, the Scrivener". Bartleby is a 
legal copyist, who joins a firm and refuses to complete work that he is asked to, 
and even refuses to leave the building when he is sacked. He ends up dying in a 
state of "radical passivity", when he has been forcibly removed from the legal 
offices. '5 Bartleby is exemplary in the sense that he separates any notion of the 
will from its realisation in a determination, an action or a decision. Potentiality is 
here a radical contingency that refuses to actualise itself, and attempts to hold 
itself in a state of pure possibility: 
"Bartleby calls into question precisely this supremacy of the will over 
potentiality ... 
Bartleby is capable only without wanting ... The formula that he 
so obstinately repeats destroys all possibility of constructing a relation between 
being able and willing ... It is the formula of potentiality ... 'I would prefer not 
tot". 16 
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The formula that Bartleby repeats throughout the story, when asked to carry out 
an act is "I would prefer not to". This formula disengages his action from any 
form of will or life, but doesn't enable those around him to attribute any meaning 
to his actions. Bartleby is an exemplar of a "life that does not live", but a form 
of life that can find a resistance to any form of power that wants to take hold of 
him. Furthermore, he resists this power not on the grounds of his will or his 
desire, but on the grounds of a potentiality that never actualises itself. Although 
Agamben states that this formula is separated from the will, there is still a sense 
of an active will here. What has happened is that the will has dissolved into an 
experience of potentiality as potentiality, and discovers itself as will in the formula 
"I would prefer not to". This formula is neither an "I can" nor an "I cannot", but 
just this oscillation between the two modes. Bartleby's relation to potentiality is a 
hovering between affirmation and negation, a hovering between an affirmation of 
being or a nihilist rejection of being. Agamben terms this an absolute contingent, 
and it is the basis of his fundamental ontology of potentiality. This absolute 
contingent relates its contingency (the fact that it could not or could be) to its 
possibility (as something that can take place). It holds in reserve its actualisation 
and thus maintains a relation to potentiality as potentiality. This experience of 
potentiality is an intellectual experience that nevertheless dispenses with a relation 
to truth, an experience of thought that "frees itself from the principle of reason". 17 
This experience is an experience of a form of life in which something like a bare 
life cannot be isolated, and hence, its importance for Agamben in political terms as 
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a form of resistance to the sovereign power that operates through the decision on 
bare life in the state of exception. 
What are the features of this experience of freedom as potentiality ? Jean-Luc 
Nancy has outlined an experience of freedom in a similar way, a freedom that has 
the following features: freedom is without foundation; there is no subject that can 
identify its own moment of spontaneity as self-presence as the ground of freedom; 
the ground of any action is fundamentally an absence of ground. The experience 
of freedom, therefore, takes place at the limit, or to be more precise, on the limit 
itself of any experience. This is an experience on the limit because it is an 
attempt to grasp the essential absence at the heart of human experience itself and 
move beyond all thought as determinate. This thought as "the other thought of all 
thought ... 
is the burst of freedom". 18 This lack of foundation is the inaugural 
experience of freedom itself. It is in the experience of freedom that we become 
aware of the originary ground of experience as an absence of ground. Experience 
in this sense is the experience of a nothing at the heart of existence, and the 
attempt to test the limits of that nothingness. The experience of freedom, therefore 
opens itself up to the experience of experience itself. If we want to understand 
experience itself, then what we discover is this experience exposed at the limits, 
without foundation or grounding, but attempting to found its place on such a 
ground: 
"What makes experience here is the carrying to this extremity where there is 
nothing, except through the decision of foundation, and as this decision ... the 
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experience of having nothing given, nothing founded, the experience of owning 
no capital of experience, the inaugural experience of experience itself. i19 
Why the move to a decision here, an appropriation of this experience of freedom 
in terms of a decision ? The necessity for such a move is that Nancy describes 
evil in terms of the action that posits itself as spontaneous cause, as the identity 
of a self-present subject that can initiate causal series. The spontaneous cause 
refuses the absence at the heart of experience, and therefore cannot tolerate 
anything that is not identical with its grounding of itself in experience. Evil is 
fundamentally a positivity which cannot tolerate its negative ground. The 
experience of freedom is the ability to tolerate this non-identity at the heart of 
thought. Experience "does not belong to itself', but when it tests itself on the 
limit, "it is returned to what it is not" 20 Evil is the insistence on foundation, and 
the experience of freedom is an attempt to affirm this lack of foundation as a 
foundation itself, as an originary experience that is always beside itself. Such an 
affirmation would not be the constant worrying at the grounds for freedom or the 
deepening of the antinomies of freedom, but an experience, both of thought and 
beyond thought of trying to exist within this space of an originary lack of 
presence: 
"A thought affirmative of this affirmation, a thought that would be neither the 
product of a dialectic nor the arbitrary prophecy of a subjectivity is what a 
logic of the experience of freedom must propose. i2' 
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Agamben's thinking of potentiality through figures such as Bartleby is an 
attempt to map this space of the groundless ground as the heart of all 
metaphysical thought. Agamben thinks this space in terms of language, in terms of 
the difference between the voice and language. The voice as expressive of things, 
and as expressive of the natural within the human does not coincide with 
language. There is always a discontinuity that passes from the natural 
expressiveness of the voice to its formulation in language. Agamben tries to 
affirm an experience of language which could reveal the expressive power of the 
word separated from its significations. He tries to articulate what he terms the 
"speechlessness" of language, an original expressive quality of words which is 
analogous to gesture rather than signification. He characterises this experience of 
language in the following way: 
"We walk through the woods: suddenly we hear the flapping of wings or the 
wind in the grass ... the dry leaves crackle as a snake slithers away. Not the 
encounter, but this flight of invisible animals is thought ... We came as close as 
possible to language, we almost brushed against it, held it in suspense: but we 
never reached our encounter. i22 
Agamben's difference from Nancy's account of the experience of freedom is an 
attempt at an immanent experience of dwelling in this interval between language 
and originary voice, to try and arrest this moment of the interval, a form of arrest 
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that he describes in terms of Bartleby's formula of potentiality. It is difficult to 
ultimately identify any difference here in their positions, but Agamben wants a 
destruction of any mystical authority in the negative ground of experience, in 
terms of an attempt to try and think how such a negative ground could be lived 
as a form of life. It is not enough for metaphysical thought to think that it can 
overcome the problems of its lack of grounding through a deepening of the 
experience of negativity. Agamben states that such an attempt to surpass the 
problem of the grounding of a metaphysical thought through a "simple repetition 
of its fundamental problem" is bound to lead to failure. 
23 There is a turn here 
towards an attempt to delineate how such an experience of freedom could be 
lived. But what kind of life is this ? Bartleby's existence as a form of life as 
impotentiality is radical nothingness itself. Bartleby ends up dying through his 
inability to do anything, even feed himself. This is certainly a form of escape from 
the will, but in terms of a radical depersonalisation which ends in death. 
Agamben's argument as to the decay of experience suggests that the very process 
which produces bare life as an empty form of life that can be subject to the 
isolation and decision of what is living and what is dead, is also the experience 
that can move us beyond such a state, as this experience results in an awareness 
of our lack of identity with ourselves. The current dissolution of experience 
through the emptying of traditions and beliefs, the transformation of experience as 
Erfahrung to experience as Erlebnis, results in an opening, due to the very lack of 
a place in the world: 
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"Contemporary politics is this devastating experimentum linguae that all over 
the planet unhinges and empties traditions and beliefs, ideologies and religions, 
identities and communities. Only those who succeed in carrying it to 
completion - without allowing what reveals to remain veiled in the nothingness 
that reveals, but bringing language itself to language - will be the first citizens 
of a community with neither presuppositions nor a State ... 
i24 
The injunction not to allow what reveals to remain veiled is an attempt to move 
Nancy's account of the experience of freedom into a thinking of the political, in 
the sense that the question of what it would mean for such an experience to exist 
as a politics becomes Agamben's question. But the passage to the political is 
impossible, because there is no account of how this experience of impotentiality is 
itself mediated by social and political forms, other than through the use of the 
example of "bare life". It is the strength of this paradigm of bare life that it leads 
to such an invocation of a wholly immanent existence, but its weakness lies in the 
fact that it converts itself into a pure transcendence. This tension is evident in 
Agamben's account of bare life as both a worrying political ontology of the 
present, in that the political forms of late modernity are full of examples of such 
a bare life, but also as the means by which a certain politics can take shape 
through a metaphysics of potentiality. In a recent critique of Agamben's State of 
Exception, Antonio Negri points to these two elements in Agamben's thought: 
"There are in fact two Agambens. The one holding onto an existential, fated 
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and horrific background, who is forced into a continuous confrontation with the 
idea of death; the other seizing (adding pieces, manouvering and building) the 
biopolitical horizon through an immersion into philological labour and 
linguistic analysis ... The paradox is that these two Agambens always live 
together and, when you least expect it, the first re-emerges to darken the 
second, and the gloomy shadow of death spreads over and against the will to 
"25 live, against the surplus of desire. 
Negri appears to be engaged in a form of wishful thinking in characterising the 
second Agamben as a philosopher of desire, since it is through a radical 
potentiality without actualisation, and as indetermination, that Agamben attempts to 
think a form of life that could escape bare life. However, this characterisation of 
redemption through an extreme desubjectification is the difficulty for Agamben's 
thought. This thinking of potentiality is indebted to Heidegger's thinking of the 
event as that which reveals the meaning of Being as a groundless ground. 
However, the problem for Agamben is in this fundamental ontology as politics. 
Agamben's politics is a fundamental metaphysico-politics which stands on unstable 
grounds. The complete lack of any thinking of history, or historical mediation 
results in a total indetermination of politics and metaphysics, that leaves us with 
no mediation between the figure of pure potentiality as a liminal experience in 
opposition to biopower and pure potentiality as liminal experience produced by 
biopower. This is the radical immanence of Agamben's political ontology, but it is 
an immanence which doesn't give any grounds for a politics or even an immanent 
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progression or realisation that isn't related to the actualisation of a potentiality that 
holds itself in reserve. This is perhaps why Agamben attempts a rapprochement 
with Deleuze's thought, at times, as it would give his political ontology a concept, 
such as virtuality, which would allow for a certain immanent realisation of politics 
which isn't related to the actualisation of possibility. 
Adorno and the Negative Actualisation of Possibility 
For Adorno, the Aristotelian concept of possibility is important as a corrective to 
the direction in which the relation between possibility, actuality and necessity has 
taken in Western metaphysical thought since Aristotle. Aristotle's conception of 
matter as pure possibility serves as a corrective to the migration of possibility 
into a concept of pure form in Kantian philosophy. The important corrective in 
Aristotle's formulation relates to the indissoluble something as the content of any 
thought, that we discussed in the last chapter. Aristotle's definition of matter as 
potentiality contains the thought that there can be no form without something as 
the ground for its synthesis. There must be a material there to be formed. Adorno 
outlines a tension in Aristotle's theory of matter as pure possibility, a tension 
which he will continue to trace in his account of freedom. He writes: 
"There is a curious tension and difficulty in the concept of ii (matter) in 
Aristotle; on the one hand it is denigrated, disqualified, censured in every 
respect, including the moral, while on the other there is the remarkable 
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assumption whereby this element, though heterogeneous with regard to form, is 
endowed with a kind of animation, a tendency, even a certain kind of 
yearning 26 
This account of matter as both inseparable from possibility and freedom is crucial 
for Adorno. His account of freedom will rely on a contradiction between a 
concept of possibility as pure form which has migrated into the transcendental 
subject, and an attempt to rescue this concept of matter as pure possibility, both as 
ground of freedom and heterogeneous to any kind of form. 
Adorno doesn't have a positive concept of freedom, rather what he outlines is 
an "idea of freedom as the possibility of non-identity". 27 This idea of freedom as 
the possibility of non-identity has two elements, one that is experiential and one 
that is regulative. Both are related to possibility in the sense that the regulative 
idea of freedom provides a horizon which is impossible to communicate in the 
current reified context. The regulative idea of freedom is Adorno's concept of 
reconciliation, a reconciliation which would involve a form of relating between 
subject and object which would not involve the annexation of that which is alien 
to thought. This is the utopian horizon, it can be given no more content than this 
in the current context. The experiential element of freedom is the register within 
thought of something heterogeneous to thought and also constitutive for thought. 
Adorno wants to think the non-identical, and more radically to experience the 
non-identical, not only as heterogeneous to current conceptual categories but also 
as deeply related to them. This is not the construction of a pure exteriority, and 
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indeed, the argument that we traced in the last chapter concerning embodied 
thought shows that it cannot be a pure exteriority. Adorno's thinking of the non- 
identical as possibility results from a deepening of the Kantian antinomies of 
freedom and causality. 
Adorno's philosophical understanding of freedom proceeds through an analysis 
of Kant's third antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason. It will be useful briefly 
to outline this argument as it is crucial for Adorno's development of the theme. 
Kant proceeds in the antinomies by a statement of a thesis which is proved by 
showing that its antithesis leads to nonsense. Kant's first thesis is that there is an 
ultimate form of causality from which the causal chain in the natural world is 
derived. He proves this thesis through the critique of its antithesis, namely that the 
only causality in the world is that of the causal chain succeeding in an infinite 
regress according to rules in the natural world. Kant's argument here is that the 
causal chain as a whole needs a necessary beginning for it to be explained in 
terms of its own concept of causality, that every thing that appears presuppposes a 
preceding state which it inevitably follows according to a rule. There is no such 
preceding state for the causal chain as a whole, and therefore to salvage the 
principle of causality, there must be a transcendental originating activity, which 
generates the causal chain. This is the realm of transcendental freedom. As Adorno 
points out, what you have here, is freedom derived from the principle of causality 
as its necessary ground, an "astonishing expansion of the concept of causality to 
embrace the idea of freedom, so that freedom, too, is a causality, a causality sui 
generis". 
28 
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The other pole of the antinomy states the opposite thesis, that there is no 
freedom, and everything takes place in accordance with the laws of nature. Kant's 
argument here is that if we attempt to prove the antithesis of this statement, for 
example assuming that there is a freedom as originator of the causal series, then 
we postulate this freedom as an a priori category of thought, something that 
makes our experience possible. But if freedom is a category, then our experience 
will be chaotic, because freedom as the opposite of a conformity to law would be 
charged with providing the laws for the application of concepts to the objects of 
possible experience for the understanding. This would make the unity of 
experience impossible. Kant's conclusion from these two opposing theses is that 
they arise because thought is attempting to move beyond possible experience and 
thus gets enmeshed in these contradictions when trying to understand things such 
as the sufficient ground of a causal series. 
Adorno's critique is that Kant's solution to the contradiction does not take the 
contradiction seriously enough. It is the very meaning of causality that pushes us 
towards these antinomic theses, not an inappropriate usage. If Kant wants a concept 
of causality to operate as an a priori category for the possibility of experience, 
then he cannot just wish away the problems that such a concept causes. Kant 
needs to return to this question in his moral philosophy in order to give an 
account of freedom of the will, and he does so by postulating a separation 
between the realm of knowledge and that of morality. Freedom and law become 
conjoined in a pure practical reason, in the form of the moral law. The moral law 
is formed through the only legitimate use of reason beyond experience in the 
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Kantian philosophy, and in this legitimate usage of reason beyond experience, we 
also arrive at a legitimate concept of freedom as the moral law which 
is not 
subject to any external conditions. For Adorno, the categorical imperative is this 
uncoupling of freedom from experience in a rigid refusal that anything material or 
affective should matter in morality: 
... the very strange coupling of 
freedom and law that is contained in the 11 
categorical imperative is arrived at in such a way that the principle of freedom 
should itself be nothing but reason, pure reason, and that it should not be 
subject to constraints by anything external, alien to it that is itself not 
29 
rational. 
Adorno argues that this move in the moral philosophy institutes a form of 
freedom which is removed from the realm of experience and practice and thus 
tends to view anything that is external to it as an impingement on its operation. 
Furthermore, in its equation of freedom with law, it restricts the bounds for free 
choice far more than the concept of natural causality does in the third antinomy. 
Adorno wants to return to the contradictions outlined in the third antinomy to 
see if they point towards an experience of freedom that is not compromised in 
the way that we see with the moral law. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno will 
attempt to deepen and inflect the Kantian antinomy of causality and freedom in 
order to open the possibility of a different and freer way of living, the 
"possibility to be another than one is". 30 
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Adorno's analyses of concepts of freedom and causality stress the levels at 
which these concepts are enmeshed in relations between society, individual and 
nature, and it is not straightforward to disentangle a concept of freedom as 
possibility in opposition to necessity as conformity to law. When such polar 
concepts are postulated they tend to be false and tend to accord with the concept 
of identity. If we take the concept of causality, and its increasing indetermination 
as a concept in both science and society at large, this can be taken as an index 
of a growing realm of possibility and freedom within realms that were previously 
considered subject to rigorous laws and rules. However, to read this move away 
from a simple model of causation as necessarily increasing possibilities is to 
ignore the relation between society and concepts such as causality. For Adorno, the 
concept of causality has just relocated itself into the system itself: 
"Causality has withdrawn to totality, so to speak. Amidst its system it is no 
longer distinguishable. The more its concept heeds the scientific mandate to 
attenuate into abstractness, the less will the simultaneously ultra-condensed web 
of a universally socialised society permit one condition to be traced back with 
evidentiality to another condition. 01 
This is not praise for scientific reductionism, but the argument that developments 
in the understanding of causality have a certain relationship with the societal 
whole, and that the inability to trace an evidential ground through diffuse 
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informational codes and networks can have the effect of entrenching power, in the 
sense that the project of understanding becomes more abstract and complex. 32 
A deeper reflection on the causal principle pushes us to the thought of 
something that is not thought, that is beyond the realm of identifications. The 
attempt to trace back a series of thoughts in a causal chain inevitably pushes us 
to the limits of our identifications. In this sense, a reflection on causality leads to 
possibility because possibility lies in what is non-identical with thought. Therefore, 
in Adorno's thought, rather than an opposition between possibility and actuality, 
necessity and contingency, there is a deeper opposition between identity and non- 
identity. Reflection on causality can lead us to the possibility of non-identity and 
it is the possibility of non-identity that is freedom. 
What does this mean ? The non-identical must be thought materially as that 
something which is both within thought (as the body) and therefore moves 
thought, but that is also heterogeneous to all attempts to identify it conceptually. 
So Adorno states that "if the hand no longer twitched, there would be no will". 33 
The idea of freedom as the action of an individual without determining external 
factors, freely chosen in accordance with freely adopted motives, is challenged by 
Adorno: 
" ... what would be equally free is that which is not tamed by the 'I' as the 
principle of any determinationi34 
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Freedom in this sense would be a relation with that which is non-identical to the 
'I', which could be rationally and discursively presented, the communication of 
differentiation. According to Adorno's account of conceptuality, this is not currently 
possible, and would call for a change in the mode of production and organisation 
of society. 
Nevertheless this concept of freedom as that which escapes the grasp of the 
subjective principle is an attempt to correct the equation in Kantian philosophy of 
possibility with the form of experience, rather than with its content. Adorno tries 
to think possibility equally as something that escapes all form and exists as a 
pure possibility without form, in Aristotelian terms. However, this pure possibility 
must register in experience in some way. This experience of possibility was 
outlined in the previous chapter in terms of the material registering of something 
other that is the result of a process of self-reflection. This leads us into 
attempting to formulate something that cannot be formulated, the absolutely other. 
In Adorno's lectures on metaphysics, he gives a number of determinations for this 
experience of the absolute other in theology. His reference point here is what he 
terms the "theology of crisis", and thinkers such as Karl Barth, who argued that 
the concept of metaphysics was becoming degraded in its association with cultural 
categories, and that what was needed was a restoration of dignity to the concept 
in terms of the absolute other. Adorno gives three different forms in which this 
absolute other can be characterised. First, it remains so indeterminate and abstract 
that it cannot relate. Second, it takes on the cultural determinants that are the 
subject of the initial critique, and, third, its content is summoned up from the 
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outside in a leap of faith. Adorno refuses to take up the challenge that this 
critique could pose to his own conception of the non-identical, and moves on to 
discuss how "lofty words" should not be used. 35 However, this difficulty of an 
experience that lies at the limits of experience but wants to describe itself as a 
moment of life certainly mirrors some of the problems that Adorno displaces on 
to the theology of crisis. 
The problem for the concept of possibility is its link to any actualisation. 
Given the account of the dialectic of enlightenment which has stated that 
enlightenment reverts to myth, in the specific form of a human subjectivity which 
denies its life in order to preserve it, how can there be a possibility of that which 
is impossible in the current context, the experience of life itself ? Adorno needs to 
give an account of possibility as openness to experience that is produced through 
a determinate negation of the false state of damaged life. 
Philosophy and Music 
Adorno's thinking of possibility as an experience at the limits of thought is 
marked by a contradictory imperative to move beyond the bounds of what it is 
able to say. This contradictory imperative is marked by the contradiction between 
the elements of communication and expression in all language. The element of 
truth within identity thinking lies in the aim of the thought to coincide with the 
meaning of the object, to name the object accurately, which is developed under a 
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compulsion to communicate the matter at hand, but this compulsion to 
communicate is always marked by a failure to completely identify; there 
is always 
a moment of non-identity. The form of thinking encapsulated by predicative 
subject-object thought fails to encapsulate this contradiction at the heart of 
language itself, and falsely attests to an experience of identification which 
eradicates the moment of non-identity. The attempt to construct a constellation is 
the attempt to gather series of concepts together to figure new relations between 
subject and object, which point towards the preponderance of objectivity. The 
experience of the dialectic is an experience analogous to that of composing 
music: 
"The reader is to float along, to let himself be borne by the current and not to 
force the momentary to linger ... On the other 
hand, the reader ... 
has to slow 
down the tempo at the cloudy places in such a way that they do not 
evaporate and their motion can be seen". 
36 
Adorno is explicit about this connection between philosophical form and musical 
composition in his account of the relation of Hegel and Beethoven. There, he 
argues that the concept of a totality, which is an identity immanently produced 
through material mediated by nonidentity "is a law of artistic form transposed into 
the philosophical domain". 37 
Adorno's musical form is, of course, not Beethoven's, but Schoenberg's twelve- 
tone atonal music, which enables him to construct constellations of concepts in a 
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quite different compositional form. What is paradigmatic about the formal relation 
of the twelve tones is that none can dominate and one can only be repeated after 
the other eleven have been heard. 38 The clearest place that Adorno uses this form 
is in the twelve sections of the "Meditations on Metaphysics", which complete 
Negative Dialectics. The analogy of the relation of speculative metaphysics and 
music incorporates a notion of experience into the unfolding of the constellations 
themselves and the experience of their reception. The concept of experience that is 
left undetermined by Adorno, which can only be "concretised in its presentation", 
can also, even more radically, only be concretised in its reception and 
reformulation by the reader. 39In his essay written in 1956 "On the Contemporary 
Relationship of Philosophy and Music", Adorno outlines the parallels and difference 
between philosophical language and musical expression 40 The relation between 
philosophy and music is configured through the early Benjaminian idea of the 
Name. This theory is an explicitly theological theory of the Name, which argues 
that the function of proper names within language is to directly express the 
object being named. The name doesn't stand as a representation of the object but 
fits the object perfectly, the paradigm here being the act of creation as naming, as 
Benjamin states: 
"Man communicates himself to God through name, which he gives to nature 
and (in proper names) to his own kind, and to nature he gives names 
according to the communication he receives from her, for the whole of nature, 
too is imbued with a nameless, unspoken language, the residue of the creative 
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word of God, which is preserved in man as the cognizing name ... i41 
In the language of name and thing, names and things immediately coincide in the 
act of creation. This model of naming provides Adorno with a utopian horizon for 
both the need within concepts, to fully identify the object as in names, and as a 
regulative ideal for all attempts at reconciliation between subject and object. 
However, Adorno's concept of reconciliation does become confused at times. 
Sometimes, he writes about a rational form of identity thinking, where the object 
would find its fulfillment in the word, or name that fits it perfectly. This model 
appears to refer to an identity between concept and object. However, Adorno, more 
often writes of reconciliation as not involving an annexation of what is alien to 
the concept, but a rational communication which would allow the object to be 
communicated as different. This form of reconciliation is not a fulfillment or a 
rational identity, but a new utopian horizon in terms of a reconciliation of subject 
and object which would still be a relation that was non-identical, but allowed the 
non-identical to be expressed rationally. 
Let us consider this with regards to the relation between philosophy and 
music, because the analogies that Adorno draws here will illuminate some of the 
problems of interpretation that we attempted to deal with in the last chapter, 
primarily how the experience of an immersion in objects can be recuperated for a 
subjective, yet critical experience. In his essay on philosophy and music, he writes 
that: 
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"As language, music tends towards pure naming, the absolute unity of object 
and sign, which in its immediacy is lost to all human knowledge. , 
42 
Music is not imbued with the power of naming, but it can approach that power in 
an incomparable form because what the name intends to express is something 
without intention, and music, in both its resemblance to and its difference from 
language, has a particular relation to the expression of the "intentionless thing". 43 
Music attempts to express this power of naming through the relation of form and 
content in each particular work, a relation that develops historically through the 
tradition of music and in response to historical and political changes beyond 
music. Adorno describes the relation between philosophy and music as follows: 
"In the utopian and at the same time, hopeless attempts at naming, is located 
music's relation to philosophy, to which, for this very reason, it is incomparably 
closer, in its idea, than any other art ... 
But music does not know the name - 
the absolute as sound- immediately, but if one may express it this way, attempts 
its conjuring construction through a whole, a process". 44 
We saw earlier how Adorno's construction of constellations appropriates 
compositional technique as an analogy for the process of the configuration of 
conceptual materials in an attempt to open up the possibility of a different 
relation between the subject and object, which could more fully express the non- 
identical as non-identical. What I am interested in here is the model of 
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interpretation provided by music, as music provides a utopian model of an 
embodied interpretation in terms of performance. This model of interpretation is 
outlined in another essay, written in the same year, entitled "Music, Language and 
Composition". 45 Musical interpretation, in the fullest sense, is musical performance, a 
performance not conceived as -a decoding of the language of music, but as an 
attempt at an embodied mimesis. The performance of a piece of music is always 
an interpretation, but an interpretation that attempts a coincidence between the 
performing and the musical notes, to the degree that that they could coincide. They 
would coincide not in terms of meaning or understanding, but in gesture. The 
coincidence of the bodily gesture of performance and the sign as musical note, 
would be the coincidence of name and object. It is still only an attempt in music, 
but as an attempt provides a utopian model of interpretation, an interpretation 
which is both free but rests with the particular objects at hand, namely the 
musical text. 46 
How do we relate this model to philosophical language? The tension between a 
materiality of language that is expressive and the impulsion to communicate is 
mediated through the very form of presentation and never finally resolved. The 
experience of reading is the metaphysical experience that opens up the possibility 
that there may be other forms of thinking than those encapsulated by the logic of 
identity thinking. The presentation of concepts in constellational form aims to open 
up the antinomy between communication and expression at all times, for the 
purpose of opening up the possibility of different ways of relating to the world. 
But why does language resound with the material in the sense that Adorno gives 
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here ? The emphasis on the materiality of language is an attempt to dissever 
language from its significative function, and to demonstrate the expressive nature 
of language in itself. A turn to words as they exist as words attempts to think a 
way of using concepts that would not be purely significative. This project was 
unifying for Adorno, throughout his philosophical work, from the early "Theses on 
the Language of the Philosopher" through to his late works. The difference is that 
this thinking of the materiality of language becomes emphasised more and more 
as an element within an idea of form, rather than purely an aspect of the name, 
although the problem of the separation of form and content certainly informs even 
his earliest work. 47 The thinking of the materiality of language and its relation to 
an idea of form, is the thinking of this materiality as opening up a space for the 
materiality of objects themselves as mattering within thought, and of thought itself 
as an embodied thought. The concentration on words as words doesn't serve to 
invoke a theological aspect of naming as creation, but blocks the significative 
aspect of words. Therefore, rather than the idea of naming as an orignary 
archetype indicated by the materiality of words, it would be better to think this 
emphasis on words as something blocking their representational content and thus 
pointing to everything they fail to represent, which perhaps they could express. 
Musical interpretation is a utopian model because it does not proceed through 
understanding, but through the embodied immersion in the musical material. That 
which reverberates in the space of language is not the things themselves but the 
echo of the things themselves. This is the tension between the concept of the 
name and its transposition into a secular concept of the materiality of language. 
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Adorno and Agamben write about the materiality of language in very similar 
ways, because they share a certain common heritage in Benjamin's theory of the 
Name. What Agamben terms the "woody substance of language" serves as a means 
of separating language from its representational power, in an attempt to open up 
the possibility of a different way of living within language, which through the 
emphasis on its materiality, attempts to point to its dependence on objectivity. 
48 
However, the immersion in objects is conceived differently by both Adorno and 
Agamben. Fundamentally, the immersion in the materiality of language or the 
attempt through constellations to construct a form which would not suppress 
particularity, is for Adorno an attempt to open up the possibility of the non- 
identical, which is the possibility of life, of something ineliminably natural within 
the human subject. Agamben conceives this immersion into objectivity as also 
producing a limit as possibility, but this limit opens up a space that Agamben 
often terms the interval, and a messianic time, which reveals a possibility that is 
fundamentally dislocated from any materialism, but is the thinking of an absence 
at the heart of thought. It is this space that Agamben wants to think of as a 
space of a form of life, but what kind of life is this? 
Transcendence and Immanence 
In his essay, "Immanence: A Life ... 
", Deleuze attempts to think the category of a 
life distinct from any subject position or relation to an object, and he does this 
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through an initial characterisation of a life that appears before the moment of 
death: 
"Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life 
playing with death ... The life of the 
individual gives way to an impersonal and 
yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal 
and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: 
a "Homo tantum", with whom everyone empathises and who attains a sort of 
beatitude". 49 
Deleuze takes this moment from a fictional episode in Dickens's Our Mutual 
Friend, but he does not want to limit the apprehension of a life, as something that 
only appears at the instant of death. 
50 Deleuze argues that this life is everywhere, 
but cannot be actualised in a moment, but only as something "between-times, 
between-moments". 51 For Agamben, this essay of Deleuze's is important because it 
outlines a form of life as absolute immanence. This form of life as absolute 
immanence is related by Agamben to the idea of an "immanent cause", a subject 
who can conceive of itself, at the same time as both active and passive. Such a 
concept of immanent cause would be a life lived in a moment of life which had 
no distinction between possibility and actuality, or subject and object. Agamben 
writes of it in terms of Deleuze's characterisation of the immanence of desire to 
itsel£52 This immanence of desire to itself is neither a lack of desire nor the 
otherness of desire, but "desire's self-constitution as desiring". 53 Agamben 
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understands this formulation in relation to his conception of potentiality as 
something that preserves itself as potentiality. This is an attempt to construct an 
ontology which does not rest in either a complete fullness of Being or a complete 
absence of Being, but tries to exist in the space between these two 
ideas. The 
difficulty for Agamben is that his conception of the meaning of Being still exists 
within the register of something that attempts a project or process of grounding. 
Therefore, his attempt to transcribe a Deleuzian ontology of vital differentiation 
leads him to try and think this concept within the domains of a concept of 
potentiality rather than a virtual becoming. Agamben's appropriation of Deleuze's 
concept of life sees its indetermination as an ontological problem for the existence 
of human life, rather than an ontological fact for life as a whole. His 
understanding of what Deleuze means by life as "composed of virtuality" is that 
this is a life whose pure potentiality coincides with its Being. 54 The concept of 
the virtual is intimately related to the concept of life, in that the virtual belongs 
to an understanding of life as involved in a creative and complex evolutionary 
process which doesn't determine its outcome. The virtual is thus "real" in that it is 
a process of becoming within life itself, but it is never actual in the sense that it 
is purely realised in an isolated entity. Furthermore, there is no fixed identity to a 
body or a subject which can determine a discrete location for a force, action or 
event. There is just a context of flux and infinite becoming. 55 The ontology at play 
in the concept of the virtual is an ontology that does not delimit or determine 
any originary beginning, but rather a process of originary differentiation, so that the 
virtual can be read at a number of different ontological levels. As opposed to the 
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possible, then, the virtual does not consist in either a completely negative 
determination of possibility, which states that there are no obstacles which cannot 
be surpassed, or a positive concept of possibility which logically argues for the 
idea that there are pre-existent possibles, that any event could be foreseen given 
its necessary conditions. 
56 Agamben's thinking of the absolute immanence of a life 
as the coincidence of a pure potentiality with Being attributes too static a 
formulation to the virtual in its transcription into potentiality. Agamben's thought 
still remains within the bounds of the Kantian third antinomy, in attempting to 
think this absolute immanence as an immanent cause. There is no "plane of 
immanence" in Agamben's philosophy just this relation of pure potentiality and 
Being, a relation that he attempts to think as an affirmative experience of a 
relation to Being which is the lack of grounding for any human subjectivity. The 
affirmative element to this is this thinking of pure potentiality, but pure 
potentiality has no content other than an exhaustion, an inability to realise itself, a 
hesitancy. 
Agamben reads this as a form of thinking which thinks itself, and in doing so 
thinks a pure potentiality, which is neither a complete emptiness or an object, but 
just the potentiality to think or not to think. This attempt at a form of experience 
between the experience of an object and the experience of nothing, still does not 
delineate of what this is an experience. Gillian Rose has written that "ontology 
cannot admit ... that the subject has any actual experience", and Agamben's attempt 
to stake a space for experience as pure possibility confirms this critique. 57 This 
form of life as pure potentiality may be beyond the grasp of any form of power, 
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but as an account of life, it gives no material content to such a life, and no 
means for this life to move beyond a "life that does not live". In a sense, as 
Alexander Düttmann has pointed out, this experience of pure potentiality cannot 
confirm itself as pure potentiality in the way that Agamben wants it to, because 
then it would have to refuse the hesitancy intrinsic to the experience of a 
potentiality that refuses to actualise itself. Düttmann makes the point that if one 
could exist in the state of pure potentiality, then there would be no experience of 
the hesitant, and therefore pure potentiality as an achieved state can only be 
conceived in a deconstructive reading as both possible and impossible, in that the 
experience of an achieved state of hesitancy is difficult to characterise. 
58 
Agamben's concept of pure potentiality as form of life attempts an immanent 
interpretation of a life that refuses to actualise itself as life, that remains within a 
position of pure actuality. At a formal level, this conception is not too far from 
Schopenhauer's conception of the denial of the will to live. For Schopenhauer, the 
denial of the will to live is the moment of freedom produced by a contemplative 
attitude of the subject, which separates itself from the will to live, as the unifying 
will of both subjects and objects. 59 For Schopenhauer, this separation from the will 
to live results from a changed knowledge that can be produced by a heightened 
reflection, aesthetic experience, or the experience of bodily suffering or compassion 
with the suffering of others. Schopenhauer talks of the result of this changed form 
of knowledge in terms of the "universal quieter of volition". 60 This process of the 
denial of the will to live results in an "entire suppression of character" 61 
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The results of this experience cannot be affirmed or given any concrete 
characteristics, as Schopenhauer states, it is a "passing away into empty 
nothingness". 62 The denial of the will to life removes the thinking subject from 
the realm of a will to life which destroys life itself, but in this removal there is 
no form of resistance to life, because life is pure emptiness itself. Thus, 
Schopenhauer writes of submitting to the will of the other as an exercise that 
increases freedom in terms of the denial of the will to live. Schopenhauer refers to 
this in religious terms: "For precisely what the Christian mystics call the work of 
grace and the new birth, is for us the single direct expression of the freedom of 
the will" 63 This single expression of freedom consists in a denial of the will to 
live. There is a reversal here, in terms of an absolute immanence that finds itself 
as a pure and empty transcendence. The attempt to delineate the features of a 
singular life that could escape the grasp of power results in a life within which 
no signs of life can be distinguished, a complete exhaustion of life. 
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Chapter Eight: Redemption and Reconciliation 
The possibility of an experience that lies at the limits of experience, yet remains 
an experience of something, rather than just an emptiness of experience, requires 
that Adorno give some material content to the contradiction implicit in his 
concept of the possibility of metaphysical experience. The contradiction results 
from the reality of a reified experience which is so complete that an experience 
beyond such a reified whole can only be configured in transcendent terms as a 
metaphysical experience. Such a metaphysical experience, though, cannot be 
constructed as a standpoint beyond or outside society, but only through the 
determinate negation of the current false state of things. Adorno, furthermore, 
disavows any fundamental ontological starting point from which to criticise the 
false whole. The process of a determinate negation of the current society results in 
an experience at the limits of possibility, an experience which is transcendent to 
the possibility of experience given the current formation of subjectivity within 
capitalist society. Adorno needs an account of the experience of possibility that 
holds itself in suspension between an actual experience, which is impossible, given 
the current structures of society, and a purely possible experience that is never 
actualised, which would then dissolve into an emptiness of experience. A purely 
possible experience that is not brought into consciousness cannot be called 
experience. 
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Metaphysical experience is linked to the possibility of life as it is only at the 
margins of experience that a form of life not totally subsumed by the structures 
of capitalist society can be found. This presumes that at a certain point in the 
process of a disintegration of reified experience, a breakthrough occurs immanently 
as a result of a dialectical process of the deepening of contradictions , which then 
results in an experience that is tied to materiality. For Adorno, this is an 
experience of life, but an experience of life in its deadened form. This is the 
importance of Benjamin's account of the allegorical for Adorno. In the allegory, the 
observer is presented with a vision of the natural world as petrified, deadened. 
Such an experience of the present is, at the same time, a painful protest, an 
experience of shock and horror at the dissolution of subjectivity, but a dissolution 
that has in this negative experience a moment of awakening to possibilities. 
Rather than conceiving this awakening in relation to the point between sleep and 
consciousness, or through thinking of dream states and waking states, one could 
see this as a philosophy of exhaustion. Only at a point of exhaustion in the 
dialectical contradictions is the experience of possibility registered in the utterance 
of the exhausted metaphysical experience, "is that all? ". This is the form of 
revelation within the breakthrough of the present moment, but it can only exist as 
such in relation to what has gone before and what is to come. The process is one 
of exhaustion of the contradictions of experience itself. This is not therefore an 
affirmative concept of potentiality, but an opening to the possibility of the future, 
the possibility that things might be altered. 
271 
However, there is still a question as to why this dissolution does not remain 
only a dissolution. The experience of dissolution itself becomes the experience of 
an openness constitutive of possibility, that things might be different. The 
grounding for the rescue of such an experience lies in Adorno's complex and 
confusing uses of the concepts of redemption and reconciliation. My interpretation 
of these two concepts and their interrelation will serve as a means of questioning 
the possibility of metaphysical experience. I will begin this chapter by exploring a 
critique of Adorno's concept of redemption as outlined by Agamben in his book 
The Time that Remains. Such a critique will lead me on to an interpretation of 
Adorno's concept of redemption as a negative redemptive experience, an experience 
that does not fulfill or rescue that which is forgotten, but that reveals in an 
explosive moment of time, a deadened and unreconciled experience. However, such 
a moment of negative redemption, because of its unfulfilled nature gives an image 
in reverse of the possibility of reconciliation, a reconciliation which lies not in a 
unity of subject and object, but in the experience of their non-identity. This 
negative redemptive moment serves as a vacuum which dissolves subjectivity of 
its rigidity as ego, but at the same time illuminates the world as a deadened 
existence, as the possibility of a constructed eternal; capitalism itself as eternity 
constructed in a transient mode. The stasis of the negative redemptive time serves 
as a mirror for the stasis of society, but at the same time, arrests the process of 
decay, even for a moment. This arrest provides a perspective from which the 
possibility of reconciliation can be viewed in negative terms. This process is one 
of a bodily exhaustion, and it is in a number of different figures of the exhausted 
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that I want to read a series of experiences that will conjoin redemption and 
reconciliation in differing ways. Rather than reading Adorno's concepts of 
reconciliation and redemption as either a privileging of one term over the other, or 
a theological gesture, I will attempt to put into play, through an interrogation of 
figures of exhausted life, certain contradictions in the way these figures relate to 
the concept of metaphysical experience. In this way, I hope to give an account of 
the concepts of redemption and reconciliation that does not rely on a single 
aphorism, or theoretical construction within Adorno's work, but remains faithful to 
the contradictions implicit within any attempt at thinking metaphysical experience. 
Having said that, my guiding interpretation here is that a purely theological or 
aesthetic reading of Adorno's concept of redemption is mistaken, and a reading 
of the concept of reconciliation as a unity of subject and object is also 
fundamentally mistaken. ' 
Redemption and Reconciliation 
Agamben's critique of Adorno's aphorism on redemption begins by citing an 
argument by Jacob Taubes. Taubes writes that Adorno's concept of a standpoint of 
redemption results in a gesture of an "as if' taken towards the possibility of 
redemption that results in an aestheticisation of redemption. Such an 
aestheticisation results in the ultimate indifference to the possibility of redemption 
itself contained in Adorno's statement that whether redemption actually occurs 
"itself hardly matters". 2 Taubes argues that Adorno refuses an affirmative concept 
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of redemption, because of his reliance on aesthetics, and particularly music, as the 
only place for salvation within a fallen humanity. 3 However, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, music serves as a model of reconciled practice that never finally 
achieves a salvation. Music is not redemptive, but some of its forms serve as a 
model of reconciliation. Redemption is not, therefore, perceived as an aesthetic 
elevation of a standpoint differentiated from the world, but as an attempt to think 
the possibility of something that might be different from the current status quo. 
The modernist art work itself proceeds through its own decayed forms to present 
a model of the destruction of experience through its lack of an affirmation of 
art's ineffability or dignity. Taubes's accusation of a straightforward aestheticisation 
fails to articulate how such an aestheticisation becomes an immanent construction 
of an image of the destruction of experience within modernity. Aestheticisation 
does not presume a position outside or removed from society. However, it does 
presume that redemption is not possible. 
Agamben proposes a reading of Adorno's aphorism at the end of Minima 
Moralia alongside the first lines of Negative Dialectics. The reason why the 
standpoint of redemption must remain an "as if' is because philosophy has missed 
the opportunity to realise itself. Redemption is impossible because philosophy has 
missed the moment for its realisation. 4 The reduction of the concept of redemption 
results from this analysis that there was a moment in history for philosophy to 
realise itself, in Marxist terms, as an actuality, to change the world, but this 
possibility has been missed. However, Agamben's reading of these two passages 
together does not take into account that the failure of philosophy to realise itself 
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is not a failure of redemption, but of a fulfillment of the promises of philosophy. 
The actualisation of philosophy relates to a concept of a fulfilled philosophy in 
actuality. What I will argue is that this failure does not call forth redemption, but 
a necessity for a new concept of reconciliation, which does not lie in completion 
or fulfillment. It is not that the failure of philosophy to realise itself results in an 
invocation of a standpoint of redemption that is impossible, but that it calls for a 
changed concept of reconciliation, which in the current reified context can only be 
outlined through a negative experience of redemption. For Agamben, the key 
modality for Adorno's whole work becomes a modality of impotenitality. This 
mode of impotentiality results in a fundamentally non-Messianic thought, because 
ultimately Adorno does not see any grounds for the recuperation of that which 
has been absolutely lost and forgotten. A true thought of redemption would 
emphasise the "unforgettable" as an exigency within thought that can never 
materialise other than through a redemptive gathering of time. Thus, Agamben 
argues that: "Despite its appearance, negative dialectics is a thought which is 
absolutely not messianic", and because of its inability to think the redemptive 
moment other than an "as if' it becomes a form of "ressentiment" in Nietzsche's 
terms, a philosophy which punishes itself through its refusal to affirm any form of 
redemptions For Agamben, the conclusion of Minima Moralia serves as the final 
seal of such a "ressentiment", because the whole attempt at a reflection from 
damaged life without the possibility of redemption reduces philosophy to the 
ethical justification of such a resentment at life. 
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The messianic, for Agamben, is not a "standpoint", but the dissolution of any 
subjective position which could look on and regard the world from a position "as 
if' something had or were taking place. That which is redeemed is the absolutely 
fallen spirit, as that which can only be saved when it is absolutely lost. 6 
Agamben's thinking relates the experience of potentiality as to the experience of a 
Messianic time, a "time that remains". The Messianic time is the time of this 
remnant that holds itself as potentiality withdrawn from everyday temporality 
awaiting its completion in the time of redemption. The messianic time is a time 
that "contracts itself and begins to finish". 7 Messianic time, is therefore, a time that 
holds itself in a space between chronological time and the time of redemption. It 
is the time that is waiting for its fulfillment as redemptive time. However, in a 
characteristic move, Agamben attempts to think this not as pure deferment, but as 
the time of a certain achievement, the time that it takes for us to achieve a 
representation of time, which would not be a spatial representation in terms of the 
chronological time of the instant, or a historical time of past, present and future, 
but a representation that would be adequate to the end of time in the time of 
redemption. Agamben's concept of messianic time is explicitly dependent on 
Benjamin's conception of a time that can both interrupt and open up the 
possibility of a completion of history. This gesture at completion is not a 
completed redemption, but a perspective on redemption that occurs within the 
historical as the insight into the completion of the historical in the time of 
redemption. However, it is difficult to understand what this redemption as the 
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completion of history could be here, whether thought in terms of the Name, or in 
terms of the completion of historical time in the time of redemption. 
The opposite critique from the one offered by Agamben has also been targeted 
at Adorno's concept of redemption. This critique argues that Adorno smuggles in a 
theological notion of redemption which reduces the force of an emphasis on the 
immanent context. The standpoint of redemption can therefore only be thought as 
either a regulative ideal, or more esoteric form of the phenomenological epoche, an 
injunction to adopt a voluntary position or induce oneself into a state of 
observation from a redemptive standpoint. 
8 Adorno's invocation of such a 
theological concept is read as a refusal of the logic of immanence implicit within 
his philosophical methodology of a dialectic without sublation. 
What both these critiques, from different extremes, miss is that Adorno's concept 
of redemption is a negative, secularised concept of the redemptive. This is its "as 
if', or semblance character. It is certainly not the adoption of a position outside of 
society, but the attempt to construct within the immanent constraints of possible 
experience, the revelation of such an experience as a form of damaged life. The 
standpoint of redemption is a constructed experience, not an adopted posture. It is 
the result of a process of negative dialectics, not the initiating presupposition. 
Redemptive concepts thus take on a negative hue when used by Adorno. The 
temporality of the standpoint of redemption is a stasis, an arrest of time, but in its 
arresting of time it does not fulfil time, but mirrors the eternal arrest of change 
within capitalist society. It reveals the supposedly transient as the same. Adorno's 
temporality of breakthrough relates to a certain heightening of an instant of time 
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that dissolves subjectivity, but the dissolution of subjectivity is only an instant, it 
doesn't complete time or fill out time. In fact, it returns the subject to a time that 
appears even more the empty succession of chronological time. The moment of the 
shattering of experience, whether through an achieved aesthetic experience, or 
through the chance coming together of different elements of experience is an 
experience that separates the ego from its drive for self-preservation which has 
sedimented itself as the formal principle of reason. However, no one can live in 
such a state, but the return from such a dissolution results in an exhaustion, which 
points to the recognition that there is more than just the reified context and 
things could be different. 
The concept of a remnant that is saved within a Messianism is inflected 
through an experience of the waste or remains of a life itself. The remnant that is 
saved in Messianic time is not that which is eternal and unforgettable, opposed to 
the contingent, but the remnants or ruins of life itself. The remnant cannot be 
thought as something unforgettable, yet irrecoverable other than in the time of 
redemption, but only as that exigency which remains as life within the subject, as 
that which is transient and could be lost. Adorno's thinking of this loss is thus far 
more pessimistic than a thinking of the unforgettable, as it is the possibility of 
losing something that precisely cannot be redeemed. Agamben writes of the 
unforgettable as an exigency that exists within thought, that cannot be recovered 
or return to experience, or even manifest itself in the register of a return of the 
repressed. That which is lost, yet unforgettable, can only be redeemed not 
remembered. For Adorno, the exigency within thought is not the unforgettable but 
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the non-identical, and that which is non-identical is not irreparably lost to thought, 
but suppressed and dominated by thought as identity thinking. The negative 
moment of redemption, in terms of a form of looking towards the past, is the 
revelation of all that has been lost, and that is beyond redemption. Furthermore, the 
redemptive moment is not of the spirit, but a bodily exhaustion. Such a bodily 
exhaustion pre-figures certain moments that open up the possibility of a different 
form of life within the subject. 
However, the possibilities opened up by different forms of exhaustion relate in 
fundamentally different ways to Adorno's concept of reconciliation. Reconciliation 
does not lie in a move beyond subject and object, but in a form of cognition and 
a state of society which could allow a relationship between subject and object 
that would not be dominating. Adorno describes it in the following terms: 
"Reconcilement would release the non-identical, would rid it of coercion, 
including spiritualised coercion; it would open the road to the multiplicity of 
different things and strip dialectics of its power over them. Reconcilement 
would be the thought of the many as no longer inimical, a thought that is 
anathema to subjective reason. "9 
Reconciliation in terms of both reason and society, would be that state in which 
what was alien to thought and identification remains in its difference in thought. 
This would be a different model of fulfilled experience. This fulfillment does not 
lie in completion, or even rational identification, in the sense of a completed 
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coincidence of subject and object. Error, fallibility, the fact that thought fails in its 
identifications, would all still be the marks of a reconciled society, but these would 
be constitutive characteristics of a rational experience itself. 
The negative experience of a form of redemption opens up the possibility of 
reconciliation, in the sense that the lack of completion and fulfillment in a 
negative experience of redemption can give us a weak image of reconciliation. 
This image of reconciliation would be that, which in its incompletion, would 
appear as incomplete, and enable a form of experience which could rest with 
such an incompletion. Willem Van Reijen has argued that redemption is figured as 
the vanishing point of reconciliation. 10 What he means by this, is that the 
redemptive moment ceases to be figured other than as a miniscule moment of 
fulfillment that can be understood through the concept of reconciliation. My 
interpretation is the opposite. The negative experience of redemption opens up the 
possibility of reconciliation, through its negative reflection of the lack of 
fulfillment and openness within a certain exhausted experience. Such an experience 
figures reconciliation as its vanishing point in two ways. First, the revelation of the 
world as that which is dead, both within the subject and without, dissolves the 
imperialism of subjectivity as the empty form which trusts in its own ability to 
completely identify the object. Second, the realisation of its own fallibility, error 
and dependence on objectivity opens up the possibility of a different form of 
living. This possibility can be related to the impotentiality that Agamben refers to 
as the predominant modality in Adorno's thinking. 
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Agamben takes this concept of impotentiality from a modality elucidated by the 
anthropologist Benjamin Whorf, in his writing on Hopi Indian linguistics. 
" Whorl 
writes of three forms of the impotential. One refers to a modality which changes 
an event that will happen to an event that "tries to" happen, so the "girl will 
dance" is changed to "the girl tries to dance". 12 Second, when the impotential is 
related to the past, it will refer to an event that was expected but never occurred, 
a frustrated attempt. Third, there is the form of the impotential which relates to a 
theoretical possibility in the past that has never occurred, or never yet occurred. 
These forms of impotentiality occur throughout Adorno's work, but are primarily 
important as forms of metaphysical experience that relate to a concept of 
reconciliation, not redemption. The impotential, then, relates to the changed concept 
of reconciliation of which we have given an account above. 
Reconciliation as the vanishing point of a negative experience of redemption is 
produced in a series of figures of exhaustion. It is through an account of certain 
figures of exhaustion, particularly as bodily exhaustion, that Adorno wants to relate 
the possibility of an experience that will open up the subject in its dissolution to 
its own conditionality. This is an opening that can figure either reconciliation or 
extreme degradation. However, this is the true demand of the negative redemptive 
experience, in that it figures the possibility of reconciliation, and this is why the 
demand that thought must comprehend its "own impossibility for the sake of the 
possible", supersedes any invocation of the reality of redemption. The demand of 
thought to comprehend its own impossibility proceeds through an experience of 
"consummate negativity" which can become the "mirror image of its opposite". 13 
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But how precisely does this consummate negativity, this experience of the 
impossible produce possibility ? It is far from guaranteed. But through an 
examination of certain figures or modes of exhaustion, we can explore the 
relationship between concepts of reconciliation, redemption, possibility and 
impossibility, to try and articulate what Adorno's concept of a metaphysical 
experience means. 
Figures of Exhaustion 
1. Beckett. 
In an essay on Beckett's work entitled "The Exhausted" Gilles Deleuze elucidates 
several forms of exhaustion within Beckett's work. 14 The figure of the exhausted 
relates to an exhaustion of possibility. The difference between tiredness and 
exhaustion, for Deleuze, is characterised by a different relation to possibility. The 
tired person is tired through an inability to realise a particular possibility, whereas 
the exhausted person exhausts the possible itself: "He exhausts himself in 
exhausting the possible, and vice-versa. He exhausts that which, in the possible, is 
not realised. i15 In this exhaustion, there is nothing left to realise, only the 
nothingness that lies at the end of an exhaustive series of possibilities. What 
Beckett combines, for Deleuze, is: 
11 ... a 
keen sense or science of the possible, joined or rather disjoined with a 
fantastic decomposition of the self... the greatest exactitude and the most 
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extreme dissolution: the indefinite exchange of mathematical formulations and 
the pursuit of the formless or unformulated. These are two meanings of 
exhaustion, and both are necessary in order to abolish the real. " 16 
The question raised by Beckett's figures of exhaustion is how through such a 
dissolution of subjectivity alongside the exhaustion of the real, a space for a 
thinking of possibility itself can be opened up by the exhaustion of actual 
possibilities. For Adorno, such an exhaustion opens up possibility because the 
experience of Beckett's works reveals the loss of subjectivity and the lack of 
experience in modernity and thus negatively images the possibility that something 
else might happen. There is a closeness between an idea of freedom as the 
possibility of nonidentity and an exhausted humanity that would be just a 
deadened form of the nonidentical. Adorno writes that: "Nonidentity is both the 
historical disintegration of the unity of the subject and the emergence of 
something that is not itself subject". 17 However, this nonidentity can be both 
freedom or hell, dependent on the form in which such a disintegration of the 
subject occurs, which determines what emerges as that which is not subject. 
Beckett's play Endgame delineates the closeness of a thinking of reconciliation 
and death, as a state of complete peace, a state of indifferentiation which does not 
allow for any thinking of the nonidentical or the subject. 
This negative image of life serves as a outline of its defects, in the form of a 
negative ontology. What Beckett presents in Endgame serves as an image of false 
life which the audience can recognise as its own life. It can reflect the possibility 
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that such a presentation of an eternal time is therefore actually a constructed one 
and could therefore be changed. The exhaustive series of combinations that Beckett 
presents in his plays and novels ( for example, the different combinations of 
sucking stones in Molloy, the exhaustion of a language in repeated and 
meaningless forms, and the reduced space and temporality of the plays which take 
place in a no-man's land ) all present the paradoxical idea that there is no 
content to life any longer, other than one of abstract domination. However, this 
purely immanent exhaustion of possibilities for life within works such as Endgame 
opens up the critical thought that, in this exhaustion, there may be a glimpse or a 
possibility that things could be altered, as Adorno writes: 
"The immanent contradiction of the absurd, the nonsense in which reason 
terminates, opens up the emphatic possibility of something true that cannot even 
be conceived of anymore. It undermines the absolute claim of the status quo, 
that which simply is the way it is. Negative ontology is the negation of 
ontology: it was history alone that produced what the mythical power of the 
timeless and eternal has appropriated". '8 
The question posed by Endgame is whether, in the immanent context of such a 
reduction of life, there can be any possibility of a reconciliation or redemption 
which can be disentangled from such an absolute domination. The need for a new 
concept of reconciliation results from the similarity between the end state of 
humanity as depicted in the play, and the time of absolute peace in a traditional 
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concept of reconciliation. Adorno describes Hamm's hankering after such an end 
state as a time of peace, in which all could be stillness and there would be no 
endless, repetitive and exhausted series of possibilities. However, the figure of 
exhaustion in Beckett precludes a time of peace or rest. The point at which the 
end comes becomes an endlessly vanishing moment, as beyond words, there is not 
silence, but voices, gestures, breaths themselves. Beckett's works give the lie to any 
easy concept of a reconciliation of life, as Adorno writes: 
"The Old Testament "dust thou shalt become" is translated into: filth. Excretions 
become the substance of a life that is death. But the imageless image of death 
is an image of indifference, that is, a state prior to differentiation. In that image 
the distinction between absolute domination - the hell in which time is 
completely confined within space, in which absolutely nothing changes any 
more - and the messianic state in which everything would be in its rightful 
place, disappears. The last absurdity is that the peacefulness of the void and the 
peacefulness of reconciliation cannot be distinguished from one another". 19 
Such an insight demands a concept of reconciliation that is not a unity of subject 
and object in an achieved indifference or a prior indifference, but a concept of 
reconciliation that is constructed as the experience of a form of rationality that 
would be constituted by its failure to completely identity, by error and fallibility. It 
is through a second figure of exhaustion, that of happiness, that Adorno reads this 
concept of reconciliation. 
285 
2. Proust and Happiness. 
Adorno's characterisation of metaphysical experience relates to the future in terms 
of happiness, an experience that he characterises in Proustian terms in the form of 
the promise of the place name: 
"One thinks that going there would bring the fulfillment, as if there were such 
a thing. Being really there makes the promise recede like a rainbow. And yet 
one is not disappointed ... what 
it takes to form this universal, this authentic 
part of Proust's presentation, is to be entranced in one place without squinting 
at the universal. , 20 
The important insight here is not necessarily the experience of the promise of 
happiness and its inevitable failure, it is the model of experience contained in the 
happiness of the place-name itself, which means that the disappointment is not 
experienced when the place does not fulfill the requirements hoped for. This is 
undoubtedly a model of transcendence, experience as transcendence, but it is 
distinctive metaphysically in that it is related to experiences rather than intellectual 
intuitions. In his essays on Ernst Bloch's work, Adorno gives more content to this 
experience of a lack of fulfillment, as the experience of an opening to a different 
possibility of relating to the world. In his essay on Bloch's Spirit of Utopia, 
Adorno relates the "early experience" of reading the text at the age of seventeen 
as a metaphysical experience itself, which connects with both the presentation and 
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the content of Bloch's writings. This experience is described as an "amazement". 
This amazement is occasioned by the form of the writing as much as the content, 
and a certain intensity of temporality in the reading. The speeded up tempo of the 
text expresses the attempt at a breakthrough in every line of the text, and it 
challenges any attempt to peacefully contemplate the object at hand, constantly 
jolting the reader on to the next sentence. This reflects the content of the work, 
which Adorno conceives as a rediscovery of an original motivation within 
philosophy, that of an amazement, but turned not towards the Platonic Idea, but to 
the "individual things". What is discovered from this attention freed from 
convention, is less important than the act itself. It is the act of experience changed 
through an interpretation that produces the model of experience not its 
fulfillment. 2' In his essay on Bloch's Spuren, Adorno refers to the childhood 
experience that Bloch elucidates of a feeling that, amidst the everyday world, 
"there is something going on", which cannot be easily accessed. The remembrance 
of such a feeling in adulthood, a feeling analogous to the one of amazement we 
just mentioned, brings about a negative inflection of such a metaphysical 
experience in terms of a reflection on current life, revolving around the phrase, "is 
that all" ? The division of happiness into a happiness that is close and fulfilled, 
and a sublimation of a happiness in a heightened, sublimated form as something 
elevated beyond the material (a division which Adorno attributes to Goethe) is 
forced back together in Bloch's writing and in metaphysical experience itself. 22 
Happiness comes from investing hope in the mundane everyday and transforming 
into something it is not, but could be. This happiness cannot be adequately 
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represented or discursively communicated, as the very structure of an experience of 
happiness is that, when one is in a state of happiness it is impossible to know. 
Happiness is only recovered through memory. Thus, Adorno writes: 
"To happiness the same applies as to truth: one does not have it but is in 
it 
... 
He who says he is happy lies, and in invoking happiness, sins against it. 
He alone keeps faith who says: I was happy. i23 
The problem with Bloch's philosophy is that he turns these experiences into the 
elements of a metaphysical system, and thus betrays their particularity. Adorno 
argues that the particular is ultimately sacrificed to a moment of breakthrough and 
a utopia, and thus the metaphysical experience becomes absolutised in its relation 
to redemption. 
What would be a breakthrough that didn't turn itself into an absolute ? Adorno 
tries to think this in terms of the Proustian place-name or the childhood 
experience of amazement, experiences that are fundamentally unfulfilled and cannot 
be fulfilled, so the breakthrough is then turned back negatively and reflected on 
to the contemporary situation from which it emerges. The breakthrough is not a 
transcendent bursting of the bonds of immanence, but a form of transcendence 
which immediately reflects back onto the current reified context. These 
breakthroughs are often configured as changes in the lived experience of 
temporality, but these are not permanent changes in temporal experience, or even 
glimpses of a world beyond, but a slight shift of the immanent context. These 
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changes in temporality can be oriented towards the past or the future depending 
on the particular experience involved. For example, Adorno writes of the dejä vu 
which can open up the possibility of a different relation towards the past, and the 
experience of a "fruitless waiting", which both lengthens a certain lived experience 
of time in the moment of the waiting, and in its fruitlessness disarms the subject 
in two ways. First, to wait fruitlessly causes a reflection on what was waited for, 
and the whole process of why the thing waited for was given such worth and 
dignity in the first place. Thus, the experience causes a reflection on the process of 
desire and how that desire is being constructed. The second moment, in the 
experience of fruitless waiting, is that in this reflection the subject realises that 
this is a model for experience as a whole, a waiting for something to happen 
that never does, which causes the question of "is that all ? ". This triggers a 
reflection on what experience is and could be, and that this fallible experience 
could open the possibility for a form of experience which didn't model itself on 
the concept of a possession or a fulfillment. 
Such an experience is an exhaustion because all that is hoped for and invested 
in the place-name fails to actualise itself in the reality of the visit. The experience 
of "is that all T% or the hopeful yet disappointed waiting empties out subjectivity, 
yet opens it to the possibility of a life that is marked not by a dominating 
fullness, but by an exaggeration, a constant missing of the mark. This experience 
has its confirmation in the form of a construction of constellations of concepts 
which in the gaps that they create between identifying judgements, aim to create a 
model of experience which is not fulfilled or able to be fulfilled. This is a 
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model for a life lived, not in the enumeration of its successes, but in the 
awareness that a life completes its course only in a deviation from its original 
premises. Such a deviation though is still a loss, in that it marks the impossibility 
of the identification aimed at in the form of the judgement. But the failure 
(indeed, impossibility) of such an identification, opens itself to the possibility of 
that which is non-identical with thought. In Minima Moralia, Adorno writes that: 
"If a life fulfilled its vocation directly, it would miss it. Anyone who dies old 
and in consciousness of seemingly blameless success, would secretly be the 
model schoolboy who reels off all life's successes without gaps or omissions, 
an invisible satchel on his back. Every thought which is not idle, bears branded 
on it the impossibility of its full legitimation, as we know in dreams that 
there are mathematics lessons, missed for the sake of a blissful morning in bed, 
which can never be made up. "24 
The title of this aphorism is "Gaps". It is through these gaps in experience, that 
the possibility of reconciliation via a lack of completion and fulfillment can be 
figured, but only in a negative form as the result of a certain exhaustion of 
experience that is not disappointment or failure, but, in its loss, opens itself to 
something in life not encapsulated in the form of an identifying judgement. 
3. Kafka and Gesture. 
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In his essay on Kafka, Adorno emphasises the particularity of details within the 
works, details which protude and are immediately incommensurable with any 
greater meaning. Adorno's intention is to deflect an immediately symbolic reading 
of Kafka's texts in terms of an existentialist drama of an individuality fatefully 
existing in an absurd universe. The particularity that most captures Adorno's 
attention in Kafka's texts is the emphasis on gestures, both linguistic and non- 
linguistic. Adorno describes a certain characteristic linguistic gesture of Kafka's in 
the form of the parable. Kafka's writing often functions through a parable which 
has no key to interpretation. The sentences affirm an emphatic meaning which 
when interrogated fails to appear. In this sense, they are analogous to a linguistic 
gesture, a statement such as "that is the way it is" which dissolves when the 
interpreter attempts to decode it. The parable without a key for its interpretation 
exhausts all meaning in its emphatic presentation as indecipherable linguistic 
gesture25 This linguistic gesture is punctuated by a whole series of bodily gestures 
and physiognomies that are clearly delineated but hard to understand. There are 
the figures such as the metamorphosis of Gregor Samsa into the giant bug in 
Metamorphosis, and Kafka's many peculiar animal fables ("Investigations of a 
Dog, "Josephine the Mouse Singer"), but also small details in the novels 
themselves such as Leni's fingers being connected by a web of skin in The Trial, 
or the frequent descriptions of what psychiatry terms 'inappropriate affect', the 
accompanying of sad words with laughter, for example. The physical gestures 
punctuate and dislocate the linguistic gestures: 
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"Gestures often serve as counterpoints to words: the prelinguistic that eludes all 
intention upsets the ambiguity, which, like a disease, has eaten into all 
signification in Kafka. "26 
The prelinguistic, though, is not a bodily moment that can be returned to as if it 
had not been affected by any destruction of subjectivity. It is not in the bodily 
gesture that a humanity can refound its embodiment, but the gesture, unwilled, 
lights up the fate of a certain form of embodiment as a destruction of experience. 
What occurs with the bodily gesture in Kafka is, at the same time, something 
eternal and ephemeral, slowed down to a point of standstill. The gesture takes on 
the aura of an eternalised image, but at the same time is purely ephemeral, 
unwilled and transitory. Although Adorno does not refer to this, one thinks of a 
fugue state of schizophrenia, a slowed down, indecipherable, ephemeral, yet 
completely emphatic non-linguistic gesturing. Adorno refers to such gestures as 
"eternalised" and they have the effect, like Benjamin's dialectical images, of 
bringing "the momentary to a standstill". 27 The gesture is an extreme form of 
individuation, the bodily expression of meaning without language and often without 
intention, but it returns in Kafka as a horrific revelation of something beyond the 
subjective ego, the revelation of an alienated yet precarious life within the subject. 
The subject is frightened by its own gestures, and those of others, and, at the same 
time, invests them with an emphatic and premonitory meaning. What this moment 
reveals in Kafka's work is a moment of regression, marked by a revelation of the 
objectivity within the subject: 
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"The crucial moment, however, toward which everything in Kafka is directed is 
that in which men become aware that they are not themselves - that they 
themselves are things. , 28 
This awareness is horrific, but also opens up a dissolution of subjectivity which 
can reveal itself in the momentary time of a 'now' which does not complete time, 
but arrests life itself in the gesture, and in this arrest returns the subject to all 
that it depends on and all it has lost as embodiment. There is a closeness to a 
redemptive reading of gesture in Adorno here, but the final move of a gathering 
of this temporal breakthrough as a redemption of all that is lost in a completion 
of time is lacking. There is no completion, only momentary arrest, and no 
fulfillment, but only a form of extreme dissociation. The destruction of gesture 
does not presume an absolute gesturality to which it relates, but only the loss of 
any relation to the gesture as such. 
Agamben writes on gesture in a very similar way, of the gesture being a figure 
of: 
" ... (an) annihilated human existence, its 'negative outline', and at the same time, 
its self-transcendence not toward a beyond but ... in a profane mystery whose 
sole object is existence itself. 49 
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The "profane mystery" is related to a concept of an absolute gesturality, which 
Agamben then outlines as the sphere of a redemptive politics, a politics that 
would relate itself to an "absolute gesturality of human beings". 
30 But there is no 
positive redemption of an absolute gesturality in Adorno's negative thinking of the 
gesture. The similarity with a redemptive experience is that the gesture is an index 
of absolute loss, as horror, the body confronting the subject as something beyond 
its control, and in that moment of being beyond control, the gesture also figures a 
form of reconciliation, a life which could be surprised by the excess of its own 
embodiment over the structures of its subjectivity. 
31 
4. Music in the Background. 
In an early essay from 1934, entitled "Music in the Background", Adorno analyses 
the phenomenon of cafe music, or incidental music. Music has been pushed into 
the background, into a reified or incidental form of listening. The music itself is 
reduced to its barest and degraded form, and often played in specially conceived 
arrangements, and with particular exaggerated effects. However, something still 
survives in the ruin of this music and in the interplay of the music and the 
people in the cafe. The pale resemblance of the original music still has the effect 
of offering a certain illumination to the surroundings. It offers such an illumination 
in two ways. First, as objective ruin amongst a reified scene it imitates and 
confirms this scene, precisely as a kind of ghostly mood music. Adorno writes of 
this effect in the following way: 
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"The coldness from table to table: the strangeness between the young gentleman 
and the unknown girl across from him ... coldness, desire, the strangeness of the 
closeness between the two - the music transports it with an abrupt gesture into 
the stars, like the name of Ariadne abandoned. 9,32 
The equivalence between the coldness of the situation in the cafe and the 
confirmation of such a situation by the music provides an independent testimony 
of the ruin of experience. 
However, the second moment in this account of background music is the 
moment when a piece of music attempts to breakthrough, to reveal itself and stake 
its claim beyond the ruin of its own arrangement, context and reception. The 
dissolution of the music in both its arrangement, and in the context in which it is 
arranged nevertheless expresses an intimation of its original form, an intimation 
which is presented as a ruin of that form. This dissolution of the essence of the 
music does not make the music fall silent, does not stop at dissolution, as a 
completed process of dissolution would make the works fall silent. There is in this 
ruined form, a dissolution, that is still audible: 
"The question is only whether they stop at dissolution. In dissolution the works 
fall silent. Here, they become audible once again. Not, it is true, they themselves, 
in their structured form. But the ruins of their sound have been joined 
together in a second, strangely transparent form. The first fiddler does not make 
the noble melody ordinary with his soloistic intrusiveness; it has already lost its 
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noble character and therefore abandons itself to the fiddler. The truly noble 
melody will shine like a star against the background: one hears it as music. "33 
The shock of the music as it is experienced by the listener who is not listening, is 
a form of awakening, but what they are awakening to is a ruin itself, a ruin of a 
certain tradition. There is no complete moment of rescue here, though, no 
completed transcendence, but just the realisation that what the listener hears despite 
themselves, what breaks through, is itself only breaking through in a degraded 
form. It cannot be recuperated or redeemed, but it can open the possibility of a 
different way of being, something beyond this current experience, alongside this 
frustration of an awareness that the current experience is not itself all there is for 
experience. Thus, Adorno's quotation of a phrase from Karl Kraus is appropriate 
here, in that what is revealed is that: 
"Nothing is true, and it is possible that something else will happen. 04 
As a motto for a metaphysical experience, this serves quite well, and it shows the 
distance in Adorno's concept of metaphysical experience from any affirmative idea 
of redemption. The breakthrough is not conceived in terms of its relation to 
redemption, but its relations both to an extreme negation and an extreme 
possibility: nothing is true and something else might happen. 
5. Nothing to Do. 
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In his aphorism, "Sur VEau", Adorno outlines a form of negativity without any use, 
as a form of life analogous to a bestial existence. Such a life would not function 
in terms of productive goals, but remains within itself, as a body with nothing to 
realise, "Bien faire comme une bete", lying on water and looking peacefully at the 
sky". 35 Such an existence is without need or fulfillment, and encapsulates a certain 
form of being nothing. There is nothing but absolute peace here, a life that exists 
as a nothingness. What differentiates this from Agamben's use of the figure of 
Bartleby is that the aphorism serves the purpose of a negation of a productivist 
concept of utopia, and replaces it with a concept of utopia as absolute peace. 
However, neither of these concepts rest as an ontological first or as an absolute 
emphasis upon a transgressive sovereignty of experience. Agamben's thinking of 
potentiaility is a subtle affirmation of a nothingness of the will which still 
attempts to affirm itself as an existence, as a potentiality, but, nevertheless, in its 
affirmation does not take into account how such an ontological concept is itself 
determined by social forms. The idea of absolute peace, which we have seen in 
the comments on Beckett and Kafka, as a tension between a conservative concept 
of reconciliation and an image of a life become hell, the ever-changing forms of 
capitalism as the ever same, is affirmed in this aphorism, as an experience beyond 
any use. However, both sides of the dialectic need to be thought in relation to 
each other, an idea of life beyond productivity, and the idea of the hell of an 
exhaustion of bodily possibility as the petrification of subjectivity itself. This 
petrification has its extreme form in the body under torture, that Jean Amery has 
written about. The complete transformation of the body into flesh under torture is 
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the extreme counter pole of a dialectic which emphasises the existence, like a 
beast, of an absolute nothingness of the will. The production of a nothingness of 
the will in the body of the person tortured, raped or abused results in a reduction 
to an embodiment without any experience of redemption or reconciliation, as 
Amery writes: 
"But only in torture does the transformation of the person into flesh become 
complete. Frail in the face of violence, yelling out in pain, awaiting no help, 
capable of no resistance, the tortured person is only a body, and nothing else 
beside that". 36 
Such an experience is then inscribed in the subjectivity of the person who has 
been subjected to torture. There is no longer any place for such a subject to feel 
at one with its own embodiment. There is no redemption or reconciliation in this 
form of bare life. 
Dissolution of Subjectivity 
All these figures of exhaustion result in a dissolution of subjectivity. In Negative 
Dialectics, Adorno states that the aim of his philosophy is "total self- 
relinquishment". os However, such a dissolution will not always result in a 
metaphysical experience, as an opening to the possibility of non-identity. The 
dissolution experienced by the person who is tortured only allows for an 
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annihilation of experience. This is a pure dissolution of experience, which cannot 
open itself to any form of reconciliation. This is a negative experience of 
redemption, in that it shares the hallmarks of this experience; the body 
is 
experienced as an excess of subjectivity, time stops, and the ego dissolves. But, this 
also occurs through an experience of total subjugation that does not allow for any 
appropriation of this experience in terms of an opening of the structures of 
subjectivity. If a dissolution of subjectivity is to be characterised as a metaphysical 
experience, it cannot result in the completion dissolution of the subject into 
"flesh". There must be an opening to a new form of subjectivity in the 
experience. It is precisely this opening that is lacking in the body under torture, 
which is the forced dissolution of subjectivity into a bare life that is totally 
dominated. 
There are two ways that Adorno writes about a constructed dissolution of the 
subject, which can result in a "total self-relinquishment", which would then give a 
model of an experience of reconciliation. Firstly, there is the hermeneutical practice 
of an aesthetic or philosophical experience. This is a hermeneutic that distances 
itself from any attempt to construct a completed meaning but attempts to open 
either the art object or the philosophical concept up to a process of interpretation 
which creates gaps in meaning rather than final meanings. Such gaps, like the 
gestures in Kafka's novels, or the exhaustive series of possibilities of walking or 
sucking in Beckett's novels, or the constellations of concepts in a contradictory 
presentation, induce in the recipient an experience of possibility. Such an 
experience is not that of an actuality, as it relates to either the reception of an 
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artwork, or the experience of a gap or a failure in a conceptual series. However, it 
does register as experience in the form of a dissolution of subjectivity, in the 
emphatic mode of an extreme individuation which finds itself in its own decay, 
either through horror, or a transfigured recognition. This "extreme form" of 
individuation is an individual experience in a process of degeneration that can 
reveal the possibility of what has been missed and what could be changed. 
38 At 
its most extreme, this can be revealed in bodily gesture. 
Adorno's account of such experiences as metaphysical distinguishes them from 
a simple destruction and annihilation of subjectivity, through the comportment 
induced by the aesthetic experience or the experience of reading the philosophical 
text. Metaphysical experience is a form of Erlebnis, but not the degraded form of 
reflex responses. Rather, it is an experience that cannot be clearly outlined 
conceptually or materially, but interrupts everyday temporality without completing 
it. However, such an Erlebnis can only be thought in relation to a concept of 
Erfahrung as an ability to open oneself to the possibility of a metaphysical 
experience, an openness that comes through the ability for a consummate 
achievement of determinate negativity. This is as an achievement of lingering with 
the object, producing an interpretation through a mimesis which allows the object 
itself to come into view. It is precisely such an experience that is being destroyed 
in the increasing reification of capitalist society. Without such an experience 
(Erfahrung), there can be no metaphysical experience as an experience of 
interpretation or reading. Benjamin's project of turning the degraded Erlebnisse of 
modernity into Erfahrungen is complicated for Adorno, because he refuses the 
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affirmative concept of redemption required by such a project. Agamben can affirm 
a destruction exemplified by a form of life that is removed only by a hair's 
breadth from bare life, because he has an affirmative concept of the redemptive 
which can save that which has completely fallen. The problem for Adorno, is the 
possibility of the total annihilation of the fallen, as the example of the tortured 
body as a produced total self-relinquishment demonstrates. The relation of 
mimetic comportment as experience and praxis is not developed and therefore the 
call for a praxis demanded through the total self-relinquishment remains gestural 
in a bad sense of the word. 
The second mode in which a dissolution of subjectivity becomes a 
metaphysical experience does not relate to the construction of constellations of 
concepts, or the aesthetic experience of modernist artworks. This is the experience 
encapsulated in the exhaustion of an "is that all ?" or a fruitless waiting. The 
experience of the place-name is a model of experience not through frustration, but 
through the lack of an expected disappointment. One would expect an experience 
of disappointment, because the place actually visited does not fulfill the promise of 
the place-name. What is peculiar about Adorno's description of the place-name is 
this model of a lack of disappointment. Why is disappointment not experienced 
when the hopes invested in the place-name do not actualise themselves on the 
longed-for visit ? What returns unwilled in this lack of disappointment must be 
something unconscious, analogous to the other experiences Adorno describes, such 
as dejä vu. What occurs in the experience of dejä vu, is not simply the experience 
of an uncanniness caused by a feeling that one has been in the place before. On 
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the contrary, there is a gap in the expectation of what is presented to an initial 
expectation, a gap that presents itself in the form of "that's not all there is". Such 
an experience relates to the unconscious, to a return of something unbidden as a 
natural moment within the unconscious. But this is not a return to a plenitude, but 
to a feeling of being at home, at complete ease with that which is fundamentally 
differentiated. It is the return of such a repressed feeling that opens the subject to 
the realisation that what exists is not the total sum of possibility. This is the 
Proustian model of experience, not the memoire involuntaire so frequently quoted. 
Involuntary memory promises a traditional reconciliation with a fulfilled notion of 
sensuous objectivity, that completes and traverses time, in a unity of the past with 
the present, in the emphatic, yet unwilled sensation that brings back the initial taste 
or smell. The experience of the place-name as Adorno outlines it, is a jolt to an 
expected order of experience given by the fact that disappointment does not 
follow. 
The key to thinking these two concepts together lies in Adorno's use of 
mimesis. Mimesis is described in Dialectic of Enlightenment, as both an opening to 
the other and an attempt to control otherness through imitation. The mode of 
domination of an originary mimetic comportment lies in its attempt to model itself 
on the objectivity, as a means of displacing its power. Lying within such a 
concept of mimesis is the possibility of a form of a rational control of nature, 
which does not proceed through identification. However, such a mimetic 
comportment is entrapped as it proceeds through fear. It functions only as a failed 
stage of an attempt to control the natural. What is lost in the movement from 
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mimesis to identity thinking is this mode of rationality co-existing with non- 
identity. What Adorno attempts to recuperate as metaphysical experience is a 
concept of the mimetic that sublimates the fearful moment contained within 
mimesis. This is sublimated through experiences such as the aesthetic shudder, or 
the fearful identification of the listener in the cafe with the ruined, background 
music. However, because such a fear does not take place in a situation where 
humans are controlled by nature, but have dominated nature to the point of its 
invisibility, the fearful moment immediately sublimates itself into the awareness of 
the loss of the liberating or reconciled moment of mimetic rationality. Mimesis in 
this sense is not the description of a faculty that has simply migrated into 
aesthetic comportment, but a certain mode of relation that is repressed and returns 
in the experience of a self-relinquishment. This self-relinquishment is the main 
marker of a mimetic comportment. 
The difficulty is how to differentiate these experiences of a disintegration of 
subjectivity from the general disintegration of the subject produced in society at 
large, and even more, the model of a radical disintegration of the subject in the 
process of torture or the reduction of a life worse than death in the camps. How 
can a subject bear witness to its own ruin ? For Agamben, the only response to 
such a question can be through a redemptive assumption of that position as 
revealing the salvation within what is most fallen and degraded. This salvation 
proceeds by removing by the smallest amount the bare life to a form of life 
which cannot be dominated, but as a remnant can be saved. Such a remnant is the 
difference between the figures of Bartleby and the Muselmann. The difference 
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between a life that is completely open to be dominated and a life that cannot be 
dominated proceeds through an assumption of the dominated position, as that 
position which cannot be dominated. It is not the assumption of the stance of the 
masochist, but the assumption of an originary potentiality that doesn't allow power 
to take hold. But such an originary potentiality, in itself, is a petrified form of life, 
a nothingness itself. Deleuze describes Bartleby and other similar characters in 
Melville's work in the following terms: 
"But at the other pole are those angels or saintly hypochondriacs, almost stupid, 
creatures of innocence and purity, stricken with a constitutive weakness but also 
with a strange beauty. Petrified by nature, they prefer ... no will at all, a 
nothingness of the will rather than a will to nothingness (hypochondriacal 
"negativism"). They can only survive by becoming stone, by denying the will 
and sanctifying themselves in this suspension. "39 
This is a description of a pre-historical form of mimesis, a petrification, in the 
terms of both an immobility and a fearful imitation, but a petrification that in its 
attempt to escape domination, reduces itself to a nothingness. Such a petrification 
is produced in the aesthetic experiences of modernist artworks that Adorno 
describes, but the imitation induced there reveals the petrification of subjectivity 
itself in a mimesis with capitalist forms of temporality, particularly the conjunction 
of a transient historical mode of production as an eternal feature of human 
existence. What is feared is no longer the domination of nature, but the extirpation 
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of all that is natural within the subject, by an eternalised present. The breakthrough 
moment of an aesthetic experience opens the subject to an image of time itself as 
standing still in terms of the form of life reproduced within capitalist society. 
Adorno writes that: 
"The life process itself ossifies in the expression of the ever-same ... The 
absurdity explodes: that something happens where the phenomenon says that 
nothing more could happen; its attitude becomes terrifying. In this experience of 
terror, the terror of the system forcibly coalesces into appearance; the more the 
system expands, the more it hardens into what it has already been. What 
Benjamin called "dialectics at a standstill" is surely less a Platonizing residue 
than the attempt to raise such paradoxes to philosophical consciousness. , 40 
The terror produced by the dialectical image is a fear of the system itself, and is 
therefore, the production of a critical subjectivity in the form of a recognition of 
its own domination. Mimesis serves to displace narcissism. Furthermore, the 
inducement of a mimesis opens the subject to the reconciling modes within 
mimetic rationality, the possibility of a form of rationality which could exist with 
otherness in a relation other than domination or fear. Such a possibility can only 
be induced by certain experiences, such as aesthetic experiences, and the 
metaphysical experiences outlined above. The suspension of time in a negative 
redemptive moment, either of terror, or of the dislocation of expectation caused by 
metaphysical experience, produces the return of a reconciliatory moment which is 
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not concerned with unity but with a way of being at home with that which is 
differentiated from the subject. 
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Conclusion 
Agamben has described a paradigm as a "singularity which, showing itself as such, 
produces a new ontological context". 
' Bare life is such a singularity. Through an 
analysis of forms of life, where the distinction between life and death, biology and 
politics, and private and public experience no longer has any grounding within the 
body of the human subject, Agamben elucidates a political ontology of the present 
which stems from a number of singularities in modern life. The paradigm of bare 
life takes seriously the attempt to think both the continuity and the discontinuity 
of a life after Auschwitz as survival and sets out the problem of how there can 
be a life where there is life no longer. 
I have argued that any response to such a question must proceed immanently 
from such a damaged state of life. This is the strength of both Adorno and 
Agamben's insistence on an immanent attempt to provide an account of an 
experience of life beyond the reified context of damaged life. However, there is a 
limit to such an affirmation of immanence. The appropriation of bare life itself, as 
a means of opening the subject to the emptiness constitutive of subjectivity 
cannot provide any space for the construction of a critical subjectivity towards the 
process of its own dissolution. Agamben's emphasis on a "life that does not live" 
as the means which can be appropriated for its own salvation, in terms of a 
potentiality that holds itself in reserve, only preserves the situation of damaged life 
through the elevation of a pure moment of redemption. 
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Adorno's analysis of damaged life and experience has an immanent emphasis 
on the dissolution of experience as a means for moving beyond dissolution, which 
can open the possibility of a critical subjectivity. This is because his treatment of 
the statement "life does not live" as a contradiction reflects a state of historical 
development, and a tension within the subject. Life does not live, not only because 
of its complete reification, but also because there is a moment of recognition of 
this reification, which is produced through the deepening of a dialectical 
contradiction. Dialectics works through the extremes and, it is in the extremity of 
a construction of a life in which life has been extirpated that the possibility of a 
different way of living can be glimpsed. 
There is no foundational concept of life that can be resuscitated intact and 
serve as a route beyond this reified context. However, there are traces of life 
which have survived, not intact, but at the margins of identity thinking. Concepts 
such as mimesis, aura and the somatic remainder function as gestures towards 
embodied experience. However, I have argued that such concepts are not thought 
adequately in relation to a concept of embodiment, and Adorno's account of the 
migration of mimetic comportment into aesthetics needs to be supplemented with 
an account of it as an embodied experience. I have highlighted examples where 
this occurs in concepts such as the shudder, the return of mimesis in a negative 
redemptive experience, and the model of an unfulfilled experience that can serve 
as a means of figuring a changed concept of reconciliation. Such a model does 
not involve a recovery of an originary embodied rationality, but traces which can 
be remodelled within a future way of living. Adorno's concept of life is related to 
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the possibility that life could be different, rather than a rescue of that which is 
lost. 
However, a different way of living that can proceed through the dissolution of 
experience itself can only open itself to possibility, and not annihilation, if there is 
an opening to life at the end of a dialectical process of dissolution. This demands 
an account of the destruction of experience which is not total. Adorno's attempts 
at a presentation of philosophy which creates gaps in conceptual series, and a 
disintegration of experience that reveals both the reification of life and the 
possibility that it could be changed, relies on the survival of a certain kind of 
experience. 
Such an experience involves the ability to linger with objectivity and model 
the subject on an object in a way that could allow a relation between subjectivity 
and objectivity that does not dominate through identification. Such an experience 
can only be configured negatively, in terms of a mimesis of a deadened form of 
life, which I outlined through figures of exhaustion in the final chapter. However, 
there are also experiences which open the subject to the possibility of 
reconciliation, through an awareness that life does not consist of fulfillment 
through identification, but through an 'opening' to objectivity. 
There are therefore three forms of experience that Adorno outlines, each of 
which relates differently to the concept of life. First, there is an experience of 
interpretation, either aesthetic or philosophical, which consists in the ability to 
allow the object to be interpreted without a final closure. This is the experience 
that Adorno describes in his account of the form of the essay, or the experience 
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of reading Hegel's philosophy, or elsewhere as a form of mimetic comportment 
that relates to the ability of the individual to free herself from a rigid 
subjectivity, in order to be open to the object. Such an experience is a prerequisite 
for a dissolution of subjectivity that is not going to result in an annihilation of 
experience. I have argued that Adorno needs a better account of how this concept 
of experience survives the destruction of experience, and is transformed historically 
as embodied experience. The body is a naturalistic ground of experience that 
nevertheless must be historicised, but unless such an experience can be accounted 
for in terms of its transformation over time, it reverts to an ahistorical construction 
of a form of rationality largely unaffected by the historical destruction of 
experience itself. Such an experience relates to life in terms of its embodiment, in 
similar ways to those that John Dewey has described as being premised on an 
ability to exist temporally and spatially in a rhythmic, yet non-dominating relation 
with the environment. Such accounts will change historically. I outlined one form 
of such an experience in terms of Merleau-Ponty's concept of embodied 
experience as the "touched-touching", and discussed its relation to Adorno's account 
of the importance of a distanced nearness for a model of a reconciled relation of 
experience. An account of the "touched-touching" as it changes through time 
enables an account of what is lost and what survives in embodied experience. We 
can then construct anew what it means to have an experience, in the sense of a 
distanced nearness, in each historical period. 
The second form of experience is the experience of breakthrough, the 
experience that I have termed a negative redemptive moment. Such an experience 
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only occurs through a dissolution of experience itself that opens the subject to the 
mimesis of life as deadened. This is the relation of experience and life in the 
negative redemptive moment. Benjamin writes: 
"A historical materialist cannot do without a notion of a present which is not 
a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop ... Thinking 
involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking 
suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that 
configuration a shock, by which it crystallises into a monad. i2 
This moment of breakthrough is negative, because it does not redeem what is lost 
or fulfill time, but enables an experience of reification, life as reified. However, in 
this negative experience there is a reverse image of reconciliation, as a vanishing 
point of this negative redemptive moment, an ability to live harmoniously with 
that which is differentiated from subjectivity. Reconciliation functions here as the 
vanishing point of a negative redemptive breakthrough since the predominant 
experience of the dissolution of subjectivity is one of horror at the deadened 
existence, and protest at the relinquishing of the rigidity of the ego. But this 
opening is itself a process of letting go of subjectivity that can weakly image a 
fuller conception of an experience of reconciliation, which can only come about 
through this individual experience, against the rigid, dominating subjective ego. 
The third form of experience is the trace or figure of a reconciled experience 
that opens the subject to a different experience of life, as one without domination. 
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In its strongest form, in metaphysical experiences, this experience is the 
experience of possibility itself. However, this experience of a pure possibility, 
although related to what Agamben terms potentiality, immediately dissolves in the 
moment of the metaphysical experience and returns the subject to a reified life. 
But it remains as an exigency or demand within thought that things could be 
otherwise. In this sense Adorno's metaphysics calls for a politics, whereas 
Agamben's metaphysics dissolves politics into metaphysics. Although the concept of 
the political is left undetermined by both thinkers, Adorno's account of a changed 
concept of metaphysical experience demands a political response, even if it 
disavows any content given to such a response. The relation between this third 
form of experience and life, is the futural aspect of a demand that life be 
different. The experience of possibility opens the subject to the realisation that the 
lack of fulfillment constitutive of the metaphysical experience can serve as a 
model of an experience which would not lie with the complete unity of subject 
and object in a fulfilled mode. 
However, to register such an experience in a critical way still depends on a 
subject. Without subjective experience, as embodied experience that proceeds 
through self-reflection to an awareness of its inherent contradictions, there can be 
no possibility for an experience that would point to a life beyond the "life that 
does not live". Such a subjective experience cannot be thought alone as that of a 
formal subject that denies its own relation to materiality, but furthermore, neither 
can it be a complete dissolution of subjective experience, without a moment of a 
recovery of the subject. Such a moment of recovery can only be theorised in 
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terms of a bodily experience itself, a basis, a locus, to which human experience 
always returns, but in a reified form. This is not a return to an originary 
potentiality, but a body exhausted with all that it embodies, which, nevertheless, in 
the painful realisation of its own fragility as subjectivity, is opened towards the 
possibility of a different form of life. 
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